INTRODUCTION

Nations exist in a world of threats and opportunities. Their leaders, if they are responsible, seek knowledge - and, ideally, foreknowledge - of these conditions, because the more accurate their understanding of global affairs is, the more they will be able to protect and advance their vital national interests. The goal of global awareness can be achieved only through the painstaking collection (from open and concealed sources) and thorough assessment of information about key events, circumstances, and personalities across the globe. This collection and “analysis” is the essence of “intelligence,” as that term applies to affairs of state.

For the United States and West Germany during the Cold War, the primary focus of their separate and occasionally joint intelligence activities was the Soviet Union - the one adversary with the capacity to annihilate their respective societies in a hailstorm of nuclear missiles. This article explores the tensions and problems involved in the efforts by officials in Bonn and Washington to carry out operations against this and other common targets by sharing intelligence responsibilities. The period examined extends from the opening of German Ostpolitik in 1969 until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990.