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7 - The Item Veto A Negative or a Positive Power?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 November 2012

Thad Kousser
Affiliation:
University of California, San Diego
Justin H. Phillips
Affiliation:
Columbia University, New York
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Summary

Legislators would say I really need funding for a school in my district. I'd say I absolutely understand it, I know that is important and want to be helpful to you, and as soon as I see my smart growth bill pass, I will turn my full attention to the supplemental budget.

– Maryland governor Parris Glendening, describing t he dynamic that allowed him to leverage his power to line-item capital budget items into support f or his policy program

There are no quid pro quos. Governors just line out things that they want to line out.

– Bill Hauck, deputy chief of staff t o California governor Pete Wilson and chief of staff t o assembly s peakers Willie Brown and Bob Moretti, describing t he item veto as simply a budget-trimming tool

In 1994, Newt Gingrich and his Republican revolutionaries became strange bedfellows with President Bill Clinton, making the line-item veto the first pledged reform in the “Contract with America.” Proponents viewed this reform, which conveys to chief executives the power to nullify individual expenditures in appropriations bills without having to reject the entire bill, as a way to eliminate wasteful spending in the federal budget and “restore fiscal responsibility to an out of control Congress.” Indeed, after he had been granted and exercised this new executive power, President Clinton observed, “I think that having it has made it much easier to control s pending.” Veteran legislative leaders, who felt a stake in defending congressional control over the nation's purse, objected.

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The Power of American Governors
Winning on Budgets and Losing on Policy
, pp. 188 - 218
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2012

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