Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of maps
- List of tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- Note on nomenclature
- 1 REBELLION: 1912–1922
- 2 CONSOLIDATION: 1922–1932
- 3 EXPERIMENT: 1932–1945
- 4 MALAISE: 1945–1958
- 5 EXPANSION: 1958–1969
- 6 NORTH: 1945–1985
- 7 DRIFT: 1969–?
- 8 PERSPECTIVES
- Select bibliography
- Index
2 - CONSOLIDATION: 1922–1932
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2012
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- List of maps
- List of tables
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- List of abbreviations
- Note on nomenclature
- 1 REBELLION: 1912–1922
- 2 CONSOLIDATION: 1922–1932
- 3 EXPERIMENT: 1932–1945
- 4 MALAISE: 1945–1958
- 5 EXPANSION: 1958–1969
- 6 NORTH: 1945–1985
- 7 DRIFT: 1969–?
- 8 PERSPECTIVES
- Select bibliography
- Index
Summary
CIVIL WARS
Collins had no time to savour the satisfaction of taking over Dublin Castle, the centre of English administration in Ireland, on 16 January. The threat of civil war already hung ominously over the infant state. As early as 17 December 1921, Liam Mellowes repudiated the right of the Dáil, or indeed of anybody, to accept the Treaty. ‘We who stand by the Republic still will I presume rebel against the new government that would be set up if this Treaty is passed.’ Relations became further strained as the debate proceeded. The anti-Treaty deputies, refusing to accept the verdict of the majority, boycotted the Dáil after losing the vote.
Both Treaty and anti-Treaty forces were internally divided between moderates and extremists. Griffith despaired of finding common ground with his critics. He was confident of public support, and impatient to embark on the historic task of state building. He therefore sought an early general election, urging confrontation with any elements that refused to abide by a majority verdict. Collins proved more reluctant to contemplate confrontation. He liked to imagine himself a bluff simple soldier, but he pursued both a more circuitous and a more conciliatory policy than the civilian Griffith. He hoped against hope that civil war could be avoided. If it could not, he wanted time to build up an army, for most of the active IRA units were probably anti-Treaty. He therefore pursued a devious policy, intent on postponing confrontation as long as possible.
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- Ireland, 1912–1985Politics and Society, pp. 56 - 174Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1990