The Cambridge Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions series is built around attempts to answer two central questions: How do institutions evolve in response to individual incentives, strategies, and choices, and how do institutions affect the performance of political and economic systems? The scope of the series is comparative and historical rather than international or specifically American, and the focus is positive rather than normative.

The nine path-breaking empirical studies in this volume capture the state of an important field, institutional analysis, in rapid transition. Institutional analysis focuses directly on the connection between institutions and economic performance. It emphasizes incomplete information and the costs of measuring performance and enforcing property rights. Unlike other books on property rights that deal specifically with particular political problems (e.g., the commons), regions (e.g., the developing world), or types of property (e.g., intellectual), this volume is concerned with property rights in general. It stresses the importance of history and the significance of adjustments on unanticipated margins. Several chapters document the creation of new political institutions, public policies, and forms of contract, all important kinds of institutional change, while the remainder explain the costs of extant regulations. The result is an impressive array of studies showing what we know about the origins and effects of institutions, which create the incentive structures in societies.

Like the earlier collections in this series, Perspectives on Positive Political Economy and Modern Political Economy, this one addresses both organizational development and the interaction between existing institutions and outcomes.