INTRODUCTION

Bolivia's democratization efforts in the past decade confirm many of the perils associated with Latin American presidentialism. Owing to the complex and hybrid nature of the Bolivian presidential system, however, generalizations to other Latin American cases are difficult to make. Because it includes certain features normally associated with parliamentarism, Bolivia's system is not strictly presidential (Shugart and Carey 1992:81–85).

The most important difference between the Bolivian system and other contemporary Latin American presidential systems lies in the selection of the Bolivian president. When no candidate achieves an absolute majority, Congress must elect the chief executive – from among the top three finishers (before the constitutional reform in 1994) or from the top two (since then). While selection of the chief executive by the legislature is often seen as a positive aspect of parliamentarism, in Bolivia it has at times served to weaken and even destabilize executives. As this chapter will show, when coalitions in the National Congress are stable, the congressional election of the head of state has also served to strengthen the executive. Although Congress elects the president, there is no dependence of the executive branch on parliamentary confidence. Thus, Bolivia's system is a hybrid that combines features of both presidentialism and parliamentarism. I shall call this form of government hybrid presidentialism.

Owing to a congressional electoral system based on single-member districts, the full hybrid nature of the system did not manifest itself until after the 1952 Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR)-led revolution.