Just as important as Amit's assessment that the United States would not publicly object if Israel attacked, Amit told his colleagues at the critical June 3 meeting that the Americans might help in the political realm, at the United Nations. Israeli officials were only too well aware that the United States did not believe Egypt would attack. Were the United States to challenge Israel on that point, the Security Council might come down against Israel. And if Israel made up a story to make it appear that Egypt had acted first, the United States was not likely to believe it. But if the United States could be counted on not to contradict Israel's version of events, others would be hard pressed to challenge Israel.

Britain too was approached for diplomatic cover. General Haim Laskov was IDF Chief of Staff from 1958 to 1961. Laskov had just been appointed by Eshkol as a special security advisor. In London on May 31, Laskov lunched with Richard Crossman, a minister in Prime Minister Harold Wilson's government. Crossman held the important post of the government's Leader of the House of Commons and was known for being sympathetic to Israel. Laskov was frank about the likelihood that Israel would attack. Crossman asked, “What exactly do you want Britain to do?” Laskov replied, “Help us on the Security Council if we launch our pre-emptive strike. If necessary use the veto.”