Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-qxdb6 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-26T05:43:42.960Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

12 - The Bretton Woods era and the re-emergence of global finance, 1945–1973

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 October 2015

Larry Neal
Affiliation:
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign
Get access

Summary

The Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 was an ambitious initiative by the US to reshape the post-war international economy in ways that would avoid the confusion and obvious mistakes that had been made after the First World War. This time, instead of withdrawing into isolation from the problems of post-war adjustments and inadvertently making them worse by setting unrealistic goals, the Roosevelt administration was determined to maintain in peacetime the leadership it had acquired during the war. A piece of doggerel on a scrap of paper found after one of the meetings, “Said Lord Halifax to Lord Keynes, they have the money bags, but we have the brains!” expressed another view. From the British perspective, the US would benefit from the imperial experience of the mother country on how to use its economic hegemony constructively. For Keynes, this meant providing international liquidity in a structured way rather than the ad hoc procedures that had eventually been cobbled together after the First World War. But even that fragile structure had then led to five good years of international prosperity, so it seemed worth constructing something similar but sooner and more solidly.

In Keynes' view, countries could commit to fixed exchange rates with each other by buying into the capital stock of an international bank, set up to issue its own currency, the bancor, which would have a fixed value in terms of gold. Each country with accounts denominated in bancor could use them to settle international accounts with each other. (Readers of Chapter 3 will recall how the Wisselbank in Amsterdam created just such a system for financing European international trade in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with its schellingen banco defined in terms of silver and gold.) The US negotiators in Washington from the Treasury were suitably impressed by this vision (Harry Dexter White, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, had written his PhD thesis on the French experience with the gold standard in the nineteenth century), but they insisted that the US, which necessarily would be the largest shareholder with the largest existing stock of gold on hand and with the US dollar still fixed at $35.00 per ounce of gold, would have to keep control of the purse strings.

Type
Chapter
Information
A Concise History of International Finance
From Babylon to Bernanke
, pp. 253 - 271
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2015

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×