The case studies in Section III suggest that capture is not ubiquitous and that it is (at least partially) preventable – and, in fact, already partly prevented within existing systems. Because undue influence can be exercised through many possible mechanisms, and because capture and efforts to prevent it have tended to co-evolve as in a centuries-old game of cat and mouse, new strategies for preventing capture are likely to take many forms. The authors in this section explore a range of efforts to mitigate special interest influence in the regulatory process and offer some important suggestions for building upon them.

First, in Chapter 13, Daniel Schwarcz examines state consumer empowerment programs that aim to bring the consumer perspective more fully into the process of regulatory decision making. Ultimately, Schwarcz finds considerable potential in several of these programs for increasing the influence of consumer interests as a productive, countervailing voice to business interests, which might otherwise be overrepresented in regulatory decisions. He concludes that employing the two most successful forms of consumer empowerment in combination could prove especially effective in protecting and advancing the public interest.