French losses for the 16th neared 25,000 while the Allies lost 30,000: an ominous ratio because Napoleon’s reinforcements would increase the Grande Armée only to 200,000 men and 900 guns while the Allies would reach 300,000 men and 1,500 guns with the arrival of the North German and Polish Armies. Although the emperor considered the 16th a victory, he could not predict what the Allies would do next. Would they retreat as they had done after less decisive battles such as Lützen, Bautzen, and Dresden? If they did retreat, should Napoleon pursue or move closer to Dresden or to France? If they concentrated their armies north and south of Leipzig, should he retreat? If they attacked, Gyulay’s position at Lindenau could jeopardize his retreat. Alone in his tent with maps spread before him, Napoleon awaited news of the enemy, considering all the movements he could execute the following day, including a retreat to the Rhine. Odeleben tells us that he “passed a very uneasy night. [General Étienne-Marie-Antoine] Nansouty and other generals were called to his bedside.”

According to Jean-Jacques Pelet, “in the middle of the night he [Napoleon] learned the true state of affairs and the misfortunes that had befallen his lieutenants who were engaged away from him.” From Schönefeld at 1:00 A.M. on the 17th, Ney announced that VI Corps had fought the combined armies of Blücher and Bernadotte supported by one Austrian division and lost over half of its effectives and more than thirty guns. He also informed the master that Bertrand had been attacked by at least 20,000 men and had suffered large losses. Ney added that, if such disproportionate forces attacked his army group on the 17th, it would be forced to fall back on Liebertwolkwitz. Marmont added that he could not determine his losses until the corps could be reorganized on the 17th but that the more than 60,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry facing him had increased visibly. From Holzhausen, Macdonald reported that the enemy opposite him numbered between 40,000 and 50,000 men. He predicted the Allies would attack him on the 17th with even more forces. Bertrand expressed the same concerns; he and Poniatowski claimed to be out of ammunition.