A number of assumptions concerning the situation in Chile had become fixed in the minds of Secretary of State George Shultz, other high-ranking Department officials, and Ambassador Harry Barnes by summer 1987. Chief among these was that the slowness of the regime to take concrete steps to advance the transition process (principally those measures needed to genuinely open up opportunities for antiregime forces to mobilize and campaign) raised more than suspicions about the military’s ultimate commitment to return the country to democratic rule. Most policy makers were convinced that Pinochet intended to stay in power. Shultz, in particular, worried that the General’s determination to do so had seen him “consciously diminishing possibilities for an orderly transition” and, were he to put himself forward as a candidate in the presidential plebiscite in 1988, the effect would be to “dangerously polarize Chile.” As to the opposition, it failed to inspire confidence in Washington, let alone among the regime leadership, as a potential alternative government: it was too divided for the comfort of either; too reluctant to fully embrace the plebiscite route for the transition from military to civilian government as laid down by Pinochet; and too far away from presenting a credible – and acceptable – policy platform. Most infuriating of all, Washington had very little influence over events in Chile and Pinochet had made it repeatedly clear that, ultimately, he cared little for how it was exercised.