Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-76fb5796d-dfsvx Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-27T09:05:55.670Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

2 - Institutional Systems

from PART I - THEORY AND BACKGROUND

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 September 2016

Michael Byron Nelson
Affiliation:
Wesleyan University, Connecticut
Get access

Summary

The structure of every legal order directly influences the distribution of power, economic or otherwise, within its respective community. This is true of all legal orders and not only that of the state.

– Max Weber, “Class, Status, Party”

The structures of global governance lie at the heart of this book. They simultaneously work to shape the governance outcomes that matter to African states and their ability to strategically alter such outcomes. They mediate and determine the opportunities African states have to form, join, maintain, and use coalitions. Global governance is fragmented and incomplete. We have no world government, but we have a UN Security Council charged with maintaining global peace, a WTO that helps states regulate their trade relations with each other, and a host of other institutions that provide similar specialized functions, such as coordinating national patent regimes, encouraging human rights norms, providing development assistance, and monitoring the development of nuclear energy. There are varying legal structures in place at global, regional, and subregional levels. The resulting uneven landscape lacks coherence, creating an array of unique strategic challenges. All this matters for any country – or coalition of countries – that wishes to influence global governance.

There are a number of reasons to think that the experiences of coalitions working in and across international institutions will vary based on the institutional context. As Sonia Rolland points out, there is an established literature on how the strategies of American civil rights groups were shaped by the rights and access domestic institutions granted them. Their success varied from one institution (courts) to another (legislatures). While such experiences may not perfectly match those of groups of countries seeking to act collectively in international organizations, there are clearly parallels. As Rolland goes on to discuss, the WTO has rules that favor some types of groups (the European Union and LDCs) differently than others (the G-77). Narlikar's work shows how variations in institutional structures and voting rules – differences between the UN bodies that have majority voting and the consensus-driven GATT, for instance – have an impact on coalitions.

This chapter identifies a range of structures currently existing in global economic governance and their implications for African states and their coalitions.

Type
Chapter
Information
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Print publication year: 2016

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

  • Institutional Systems
  • Michael Byron Nelson, Wesleyan University, Connecticut
  • Book: African Coalitions and Global Economic Governance
  • Online publication: 05 September 2016
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316492598.002
Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

  • Institutional Systems
  • Michael Byron Nelson, Wesleyan University, Connecticut
  • Book: African Coalitions and Global Economic Governance
  • Online publication: 05 September 2016
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316492598.002
Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

  • Institutional Systems
  • Michael Byron Nelson, Wesleyan University, Connecticut
  • Book: African Coalitions and Global Economic Governance
  • Online publication: 05 September 2016
  • Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781316492598.002
Available formats
×