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9 - On Whether or Not the Venetians Should Make an Agreement with the Emperor or Risk War against Him

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 April 2017

Marco Cesa
Affiliation:
University of Bologna
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Summary

Although the Venetian Republic had reluctantly shifted sides and signed a defensive alliance with Charles V in July 1523 (see the penultimate debate above), when the French passed into Italy again its assistance to the Imperials was lukewarm at best. In particular, as the Imperials evacuated Milan upon the arrival of Francis I, in the autumn of 1524 (see the introduction to the previous debate),

being required […] to send to their army the troops they had engaged for in the articles of the league, the Venetians, though they did not absolutely refuse, yet gave cool answers, with an intention to regulate their counsels according to the turn of affairs, either because some of them called to mind their ancient confederacy with Francis or because they believed that the King of France being in Italy with so powerful an army, and his enemy in so weak a condition, he must be victorious; or that they more than ever suspected the ambitious designs of Caesar, for to the surprise, and almost with the complaints, of all Italy, he had not yet given to Francesco Sforza the investiture of the Duchy of Milan. (The History of Italy, XV, x)

It is not surprising, then, that upon the justifications that the Venetian ambassador made to Charles after his decisive victory at Pavia (24 February 1525), the Emperor ‘said to the attendants that his excuses were not true, however he would accept of them as such’ (ibid.).

More than any other Italian state, Venice could not possibly like the implications of the imperial success in Lombardy. The shaky position of Francesco Sforza entailed the possibility that Charles reserved the right to seize the Duchy of Milan, in which case the Republic would have found itself squeezed in between Habsburg and imperial dominions on all sides. In addition, the French eclipse from Italian affairs meant the disappearance of the only credible counterweight to Charles's power. At the same time, the Venetians could not challenge the Emperor on their own. The year was thus spent in negotiations with Charles, on the one hand, and with all those who had reason to oppose his triumph, on the other – especially Pope Clement VII and the French regency.

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Debating Foreign Policy in the Renaissance
Speeches on War and Peace by Francesco Guicciardini
, pp. 113 - 128
Publisher: Edinburgh University Press
Print publication year: 2017

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