Attacks upon seaborne trade were a persistent and important feature of the Atlantic empires established by European maritime powers in the early modern era. Such assaults were often perpetrated by the crews of naval and privateering vessels sanctioned by their respective states to commit acts of violence upon specified targets - usually enemy traders in wartime. At the same time, this colonial and commercial world attracted and spawned a range of predators whose operations were deemed illegal by contemporaries. Such commerce-raiders were viewed as pirates. Of course, this was a highly subjective viewpoint, for the law of the sea was more a reflection of the prevailing balance of state power than an impartial interpretation of natural justice. In reality, the pirates included not only stereotypical, stateless sea-robbers, but also such predators as the Barbary corsairs and Caribbean buccaneers, whose actions were licensed by authorities largely beyond the control of the metropolitan seats of imperial power. This paper is concerned with the various forms of piracy which fell within this imprecise parameter.

At the heart of the discussion is the contention that piracy, for all its political and social ramifications, was essentially an economic activity; that men, and occasionally women, attacked and plundered shipping to generate income for themselves. Though its extent and impact fluctuated greatly, piracy at certain times and in particular regions assumed the proportions of a large-scale business, significant enough to attract the repressive attentions of maritime states. Often located physically and socially on the margins of the Atlantic economy, this business was inextricably linked to its market mechanisms. In providing goods and services to a range of consumers by deploying a variety of resources, piracy was a facet of the markets which governed trading and shipping activity. At the same time, it was largely a function of these markets, for it tended to emerge and thrive at the junctures when disequilibria were evident between demand and supply. The extent to which such market inefficiencies precipitated piratical activity is the main concern of this paper.