Nietzsche's polemical text On the Genealogy of Morality is a brilliantly incisive attack on European “morality” that poses a disquieting challenge to the presumed value of our moral values. Combining philosophical acumen with psychological insight in prose of remarkable rhetorical power, Nietzsche takes up the task of offering us reasons to engage in a re-evaluation of our values. Yet if this is Nietzsche's project, as most commentators agree, we are confronted with a puzzle that has been succinctly stated by Philippa Foot: “Why do so many contemporary moral philosophers, particularly of the Anglo-American analytic school, ignore Nietzsche's attack on morality and just go on as if this extraordinary event in the history of thought had never occurred?” (1994: 3). With the notable exceptions of Bernard Williams, who broadly shared Nietzsche's suspicions (see in particular Williams 1993; also Clark 2001), and Foot herself, who attempts to respond to Nietzsche's attack (albeit on the mistaken grounds that Nietzsche is committed to the priority of aesthetic over moral values), it seems that twentieth-century analytic moral philosophy has preferred to ignore rather than address the challenge that Nietzsche poses. In contrast, in what has become known (slightly misleadingly) as “continental philosophy”, Nietzsche has consistently been acknowledged as a central figure of modern philosophy. Indeed Gilles Deleuze claims “It is clear modern philosophy has largely lived off Nietzsche” (1983: 1).