Introduction

When J. R. Seeley posed the question ‘cui bono?’ in the context of British annexations in India, his own answer was ‘English commerce’. J. Hobson tackled the same question later, focusing specifically on ‘the investor’ and the ‘speculators or financial dealers’ who ‘constitute … the gravest single factor in the economics of Imperialism’. Hobson proceeded to highlight that ‘every railway or mining concession wrung from some reluctant foreign potentate means profitable business in raising capital and floating companies’. The representatives of commerce and finance who attracted the attention of Seeley and Hobson were to become the focal point for a new debate on the motivation and outcome of British Imperialism, through Cain and Hopkins's paradigm of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’. British commerce and industry were to be pursued, where possible, in the private sector (off the government's balance sheet). However, Indian railway finance never escaped from the intrusions of government support, either directly through state lines or indirectly through government guarantees. The long-running debate on laissez-faire versus state ownership and management of railways continued over the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, with gentlemanly capitalists and industrialists equally involved. While many participants may have had ideological concerns about excessive state involvement in the process, it was obvious that the relative poverty of India made most of the railway lines unattractive investments, short of state support. Equally, industry could benefit from a government-directed ‘buy British’ policy pursued over the years.