The papers presented in this volume and in the International Economic History Congress (IEHC) session that preceded it constitute an important contribution to the study of governments, debts and financial markets in Europe. They point to the usefulness of studying these phenomena in comparative perspective, both across a broad set of states and over a lengthy time span. The papers also suggest the importance of drawing insights from historical cases and episodes that are often overlooked in general histories of the evolution of public credit in Europe. My concluding remarks for this volume will draw on those presented in the 2006 IEHC session. They represent observations by a political scientist who is grateful for the opportunity to comment on work by a respected group of historians and economists. There are many issues upon which these papers shed light. One of the most important, and that upon which I will focus my remarks, involves the following puzzle – why, given that long-term borrowing has obvious advantages for states, do we observe so much variation between states in terms of the date at which a long-term date was created? Likewise, why, once states have created a debt, do we also observe such considerable variation in the terms on which they borrowed, or more generally in their subsequent success at obtaining access to credit?

Economic Growth and the Imperatives of War

A first logical place to look for an answer to this puzzle is with a simple story emphasizing the imperatives of war and the effect of economic growth. Demand for war finance prompted states to develop mechanisms for borrowing long term, and it will surprise few readers to see that the imperatives of war were crucial to the development of a public debt in many of the cases considered in this volume. The varying intensity of inter-state competition in different European regions might help to explain why some states established long-term debts earlier than others.