In August and November 2001 the Indonesian government passed laws on special autonomy for Aceh and Papua respectively. Independence movements in both provinces have been gathering momentum since the resignation of President Soeharto in 1998, resulting in violent conflict between the security forces and supporters of independence. But in addressing these growing conflicts, the government has lacked an overall framework. The Special Autonomy Laws, primarily the initiative of the provinces, offer the most systematic attempt to date to manage regional grievances resulting from Jakarta's failed security and development policies.

This chapter examines the Special Autonomy Law for Papua, against a background of continuing political strife. Drafted in response to growing demands that the state uphold Papuans' basic right to development and security, the law involves a broad devolution of powers and the redistribution of revenues to the province. Through sustained advocacy and lobbying, the provincial government was able to extract concessions from a weak central government lacking clear policy directions.

The concessions offered in the Special Autonomy Law have raised hopes that it may result in a de-escalation and eventual resolution of the conflict in Papua. It is still too early to make a definitive assessment of special autonomy, since the law's full implementation requires scores of implementing regulations to be passed by the end of 2003. The devil will be in the detail of implementation. Nevertheless, the general direction of special autonomy is clear, as are the broader national forces that will shape the environment in which it is implemented.

I argue that Papua is likely to see more violence, not less, in coming years. Whatever the potential of the new law to empower local communities, and this is not inconsiderable, Papuans' basic rights will continue to be threatened as long as the cycle of impunity enjoyed by the security forces remains unbroken. An unreformed security sector and mounting government failures to uphold the rule of law will continue to alienate Papuans from the state and reinforce the overwhelming support for independence in the province. In this context, government success in addressing the grievances fuelling Papuan nationalism is conditional on thoroughgoing reform of national institutions. This is a distant prospect, and is not directly addressed by the Special Autonomy Law.