Can Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, including Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), still launch major attacks? Since the terrorist strikes on the US in 2001, many Al-Qaeda leaders have been captured and the organization's financial system, communications networks and training camps in Afghanistan disrupted. Over 3,000 organizers, operatives and supporters in at least 90 countries have been arrested or killed. Since September 11, an informal counter-terrorism coalition of nearly 70 nations has been working together in law enforcement, informationsharing, transportation and cyber security, and financial asset seizure. US officials say that nearly two-thirds of Al-Qaeda's senior leaders, operational managers and key facilitators have been captured or killed, while the rest are on the run.

Southeast Asia

In Southeast Asia, JI has been hounded by tougher law enforcement and better intelligence-sharing among countries in the region and between them and counterpart agencies in the US, Australia and elsewhere. Over 130 JI members have been arrested in five Southeast Asian countries since late 2001, including Hambali, the senior Al-Qaeda operational planner in Southeast Asia.

Yet the JI — described by the Singapore minister in charge of internal security as “Al-Qaeda's closest ally in Southeast Asia” — is said to be planning more terrorist attacks in the region. Both Al-Qaeda and the JI appear to have been able either to maintain an effective command and operational structure or to renew it in a different form.

Networking

Moreover, there is a web of relationships that link the various militant Muslim groups within Southeast Asia and also connect them to Al-Qaeda. These links were forged over the last two decades, starting with those Southeast Asian Muslims who went to Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight with other mujahidin and who experienced firsthand the glory of jihad and its eventual victory over the Soviet Union. These international connections give the Southeast Asian militants greater reach and resilience.

The militants include hardline elements in the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines, and a small breakaway faction of Filipino Muslim separatists, the Abu Sayyaf Group, which kidnaps for ransom. Al-Qaeda provided funds and training to the Abu Sayyaf and the much larger MILF through a network of front organizations and legitimate Muslim bodies. Al-Qaeda forged similar links with several militant Islamic groups in Indonesia in addition to the JI which has members spread over Southeast Asia.