INTRODUCTION

Any reassessment of the changing Asian security environment must allow considerable space for the large, unresolved issues of earlier years. Despite the rush of new issues onto the Asian security agenda, at the core of many regional security problems still lies a continuing worry about an old issue: Weapons proliferation. Indeed, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now appears more worrying than before, precisely because of the change in the nature of war-making units that the events of September 11 have advertised, and the new determination in Washington to act forcefully, and if necessary pre-emptively, to prevent terrorists from acquiring such weapons. Further, WMD remain a major concern of analysts studying the traditional state-centric balance of power in the region.

Such concerns are replicated, albeit at a lower level, in relation to the steady accumulation and qualitative improvement of conventional forces in the region. In short, the Asia-Pacific remains an area where regional institutionalization is under-developed, cross-border tensions are comparatively high, weapons capabilities are increasing, and the complex issues of WMD proliferation have not been solved. In this chapter, I will examine the issues surrounding both nuclear and conventional proliferation, by focusing on the North Korean nuclear issue and China's conventional force modernization.

THE TWO CHESSBOARDS

Since the dramatic events of 11 September 2001, it has become clear that international security is now most appropriately depicted not as one “grand chessboard” but as two interlinked chessboards. Up on the top board exist those state-centric actors who have traditionally monopolized the field of international security, and all their related concerns. On the top chessboard, the principal concern is to check great power conflict, for the simple reason that great-power wars can be incredibly destructive. On that top chessboard, we have developed, essentially since the age of Napoleon, a set of mechanisms for managing that concern, such as power-balancing, diplomacy, arms control and deterrence. Further, unipolarity suggests the basic problems of the top chessboard are currently held in check by U.S. “hyperpower”. Still, even a hyperpower has its limits, and the phenomenon of hyperpowerdom is itself so unusual in international relations that it might be wise to suspend judgment on whether it is stabilizing or not until further evidence is available.