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Vietnam in 2021: Leadership Transition, Party-Building and Combating COVID-19
- Edited by Daljit Singh, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, Thi Ha Hoang, ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2022
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 01 September 2023, pp 375-391
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Summary
Vietnam was officially reunified in 1976, and in December that year the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) held its 4th National Congress. Since then the VCP has held national party congresses every five years. The 13th National Congress was held in early 2021 and its deliberations shaped domestic politics in Vietnam in the years to come.
The national party congress has seven main duties: (1) to approve the Political Report of the outgoing Central Committee; (2) to adopt short and long-term socioeconomic development plans; (3) to revise the party’s platform; (4) to amend the party’s statutes; (5) to elect a new Central Committee, which will then elect a new Politburo; (6) to decide on any other matters put before the congress; and (7) to issue a final resolution on the proceedings.
This chapter provides an overview of the 13th National Congress and the resulting turnover in party and state leadership in Vietnam. This chapter is divided into four parts: leadership transition, party-building, combating COVID-19 and a conclusion.
Leadership Transition
Leadership transition in Vietnam is a carefully orchestrated process that culminates every five years in a national party congress that elects new leaders and holds elections for the National Assembly, which in turn selects new government officials. Preparations for a national party congress generally start during the second half of the incumbent Central Committee’s five-year term; this includes the often-contentious task of determining the general composition of the new Central Committee and selecting who is qualified to stand for election. The Central Committee is composed of sectoral groups that are given bloc representation, including local party and government officials, the military, officials who hold senior positions in the government, officials who hold senior posts in the party, and members of the Politburo.
Quotas are set for three age groups: under fifty, fifty to sixty, and sixty-one and over. This is to ensure an orderly generational transition. Party rules also stipulate that Central Committee members should retire at sixty-five years of age and that they cannot serve more than two consecutive terms in the same office. Party rules also provide for a limited number of exemptions to these stipulations based on exemplary performance. In the final year of its term, the outgoing Central Committee often holds a series of plenary sessions where straw polls are conducted before confirming the final list of candidates.
Vietnam and ASEAN: A First Anniversary Assessment (1997)
- from VIETNAM
- Edited by Daljit Singh, Malcolm Cook
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- Book:
- Turning Points and Transitions
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 29 May 2019
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- 21 November 2018, pp 762-771
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Summary
Paradigm Lost — Changing Foreign Policy Models
During the mid- to late-1980s, a major transformation took place in how Vietnam's policy élite conceptualized foreign policy. The roots of this transformation are twofold. They lie in domestic circumstances arising from the socio-economic crisis which confronted Vietnam at that time. And secondly, they lie in external influences arising from the “new political thinking” fashionable in Gorbachev's Soviet Union. Vietnam turned from a foreign policy model heavily structured by ideological considerations to a foreign policy model which placed greater emphasis on national interest, balance of power and realpolitik. Vietnamese analysts now tend to emphasize global economic forces and the impact of the revolution in science and technology over military aspects of power when weighing the global balance. The old and new foreign policy models are not mutually exclusive. Ideology and national interest are not dichotomous terms; they can and do overlap and co-exist.
The influence of ideology on Vietnam's foreign policy prior to the mid- to late- 1980s may be illustrated as follows. From the inception of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as an established state in Southeast Asia in 1954, its élite accepted the “two camp” thesis that the world was divided between the forces of socialism and imperialism. In the late 1960s Vietnam adopted a framework known as the “three revolutionary currents”. According to this model, global order was determined by three trends (or revolutionary currents): the strength of the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union; the strength of the workers’ movement in advanced industrial countries; and by the strength of the forces of national liberation in the Third World. In practical terms, Vietnam allied itself with the Soviet Union as the “cornerstone” of its foreign policy. Hanoi's leaders also viewed Indochina as a strategic entity and sought to develop an integrated alliance system with Laos and Cambodia. Vietnam's 1978 invasion of Cambodia and 25-year treaty of friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union were logical end products of this orientation. They resulted in a decadelong polarization of regional relations. Vietnam was left isolated and dependent on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for economic support.
Force Modernization: Vietnam
- from VIETNAM
- Edited by Daljit Singh, Malcolm Cook
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2018
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- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 08 June 2019
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- 06 April 2018, pp 429-444
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Summary
During the period 2012–16, Vietnam was the tenth-largest importer of arms globally. This is an impressive figure given that Vietnam ranked thirty-seventh in the world in terms of its gross domestic product (GDP) in purchasing power parity terms and forty-eighth in the world in nominal terms. This chapter discusses why Vietnam made such large arms purchases, what specific weapon systems and platforms it acquired and for what purpose.
States procure arms for a variety of reasons: to defend themselves from perceived threats, to develop capabilities to suit specific needs, to acquire modern military technology, to gain prestige and to modernize their existing weapons and platforms. Force modernization (or defence modernization) may be conceptualized as two distinct yet interrelated processes. The first consists of reconditioning and upgrading existing stocks of weapons and platforms with new technology. The second process involves the acquisition of more modern sets of platforms and weapon systems to meet new roles and missions.
This chapter focuses on force modernization in Vietnam from the mid-1990s to the present and is divided into seven parts. Part 1 provides a brief historical overview of the Vietnam People's Army until the early 1990s when the conflict in Cambodia ended. Part 2 discusses naval modernization as a response to new security challenges in the South China Sea in the post–Cambodian conflict period. Parts 3 and 4 examine the modernization of the air defence air force and land force, respectively. Part 5 focuses on Vietnam's development of a national defence industry to support force modernization. Part 6 presents an overview of Vietnam's defence budget. Part 7 evaluates Vietnam's force modernization programme.
Part 1: Historical Overview
The Vietnam People's Army (VPA) was founded on 22 December 1944 as a small guerrilla force. Within ten years it had grown into a regular army of 80,000 grouped into seven infantry divisions equipped with heavy artillery and 320,000 grouped into independent regiments and battalions at the regional and local level, largely armed by China. These combined forces defeated the French in the First Indochina War, 1946–54.
After partition in mid-1954, the VPA was reorganized along conventional lines for the defence of North Vietnam. During this period, and especially during the Vietnam War (1965–75), the VPA expanded to include air, air-defence and coastal naval forces.
2 - The Evolution of Vietnamese Diplomacy, 1986–2016
- from PART I - ANALYTICAL AND HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK
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- By Carlyle A. Thayer, Australian Defence Force Academy
- Edited by Hong Hiep Le, Anton Tsvetov
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- Book:
- Vietnam's Foreign Policy under Doi Moi
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 04 July 2018
- Print publication:
- 19 March 2018, pp 23-44
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Summary
This chapter presents a broad overview of the evolution of Vietnamese diplomacy from 1986 to the present. This thirty-year timeframe is divided into three parts. The first part highlights the seismic shifts in Vietnam's foreign policy after its adoption of Doi Moi in late 1986 until 1990. The second part assesses the implementation of Vietnam's foreign policy of “diversifying and multilateralizing” [đa dạng hóa, đa phương hóa] its external relations and becoming “a friend and reliable partner” [bạn bè và đối tác đáng tin cậy] to all countries during the period 1991–2005. The third part analyses Vietnam's proactive international integration, including the pursuit of strategic partnerships with the major powers and regional states, in the period 2006–16. This chapter concludes by noting that Vietnam has been able to make successful major strategic adjustments in its foreign policy to safeguard its sovereignty, national independence and territorial integrity over the past three decades.
Vietnam Joins the International Community, 1986–90
The year 1986 was a pivotal year in the evolution of Vietnam's domestic and foreign policy. Up until 1986, Vietnam had always regarded its relations with the Soviet Union and membership in the socialist camp as the cornerstone of its foreign policy.
Two major factors influenced Vietnam's decision to jettison outmoded Marxist–Leninist conceptions embodied in the “two world theory” that international relations were shaped and determined by the antagonistic contradictions between socialism and capitalism, or, more prosaically, as a struggle between friends and enemies and “who will triumph over whom” [ai thắng ai]. The first factor was Vietnam's mounting domestic socioeconomic crisis due to the breakdown of its Soviet-styled central planning system. The second factor was external and arose from the “new political thinking” emanating from the Soviet Union under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev (Palmujoki 1997; Thakur and Thayer 1987).
Due to the confluence of these domestic and external factors, Vietnam turned from a foreign policy structured by ideological considerations to a foreign policy framework that placed greater emphasis on national interest and pragmatic diplomacy. Vietnamese analysts now stressed global economic forces and the impact of the revolution in science and technology as key determinants of international relations (Cam 1995; Khoan 1995). Vietnam's changed worldview emerged gradually and nested with remnants of Leninist ideology.
13 - China’s naval modernization and US strategic rebalancing: implications for stability in the South China Sea
- from Part IV - Towards conflict or cooperation?
- Edited by C. J. Jenner, King's College London, Tran Truong Thuy
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- Book:
- The South China Sea
- Published online:
- 05 August 2016
- Print publication:
- 01 September 2016, pp 223-240
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Southeast Asia's Regional Autonomy Under Stress
- from THE REGION
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- By Carlyle A. Thayer, The University of New South Wales
- Edited by Malcolm Cook, Daljit Singh
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2016
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 19 May 2017
- Print publication:
- 10 March 2016, pp 3-18
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Summary
Political and security developments during 2015 posed major challenges to the Association of South East Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) promotion of regional autonomy and community building. The vexed issue of maritime disputes in the South China Sea took a new turn with China's accelerated construction of artificial islands, Japan's stepped-up support for claimant states, and the initiation of freedom of navigation operational patrols (FONOP) by a U.S. warship and aircraft. These three developments illustrated once again the difficulties confronting ASEAN in maintaining Southeast Asia's autonomy in the face of intensified major power rivalry. During the year ASEAN continued to press China for an expeditious conclusion of a Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea.
During 2015 ASEAN encountered five significant challenges to its efforts at community building: the Rohingya refugee crisis; the flare-up of border tensions between Cambodia and Vietnam; competing organizational forms of regional economic integration; domestic political transitions in Thailand, Cambodia and Myanmar; and the resurgence of international terrorism.
South China Sea Dispute
China's Artificial Islands
In 2015 China accelerated construction of infrastructure on seven artificial islands in the Spratly archipelago — Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, Mischief Reef, South Johnston Reef, Gaven Reef, Hughes Reef and Cuarteron Reef. Between February and September China completed construction of a three-kilometre-long runway on Fiery Cross. This became operational in January 2016 when China conducted three test flights by civilian passenger aircraft. In mid-year China began building a second airstrip on Subi, while in September China commenced preparatory work for a third runway on Mischief Reef. When completed, the total length of China's airfields (9,000 metres) will be more than twice as long as the four airstrips maintained by Malaysia (1,368 m), Taiwan (1,195 m), the Philippines (1,000 m) and Vietnam (500 m). With the exception of Vietnam, all the runways in the South China Sea will be able to accommodate jet fighters; but only China will be able to operate bombers.
During 2015, U.S. spokespersons repeatedly called on all claimants to halt land reclamation and new construction and refrain from militarizing the features that they occupied. For example, on 18 November President Barack Obama told a press conference in Manila, after meeting his Philippine counterpart Benigno Aquino, “We agreed on the need for bold steps to lower tensions including pledging to halt further reclamation, new construction and militarization of disputed areas in the South China Sea.”
Vietnam in 2013: Domestic Contestation and Foreign Policy Success
- from VIETNAM
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- By Carlyle A. Thayer, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra
- Edited by Daljit Singh
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2014
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 19 May 2017
- Print publication:
- 03 June 2014, pp 355-372
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Summary
Introduction
The year 2013 marked the mid-way point in the tenure of the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) Central Committee elected at the eleventh national party congress in 2011. During the year the Central Committee began to assert its prerogative as the party's executive authority between national party congresses. The Central Committee's new political assertiveness has been at the expense of party Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong and his supporters in the Politburo. The Central Committee's assertiveness also strengthened the power and influence of Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung.
Outside party circles, as events in 2013 illustrated, Prime Minister Dung was widely criticized for his handling of the economy. The Prime Minister and his Cabinet did poorly in the first vote of confidence conducted by the National Assembly.
During the year political activists, bloggers and journalists became more vocal in criticizing corruption and the party's efforts to entrench further its role as “the force leading state and society” in the state Constitution. The state responded to these challenges by stepping up repression against its critics.
In contrast, Vietnam's external relations went from strength to strength. Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung played a high-profile role internationally delivering major addresses to the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore and the United Nations General Assembly in New York. Senior Vietnamese leaders paid visits to all the major powers and Vietnam hosted official visits by government leaders from Japan, South Korea, China and Russia. Vietnam also forged strategic partnerships with five countries. Vietnam increased the number of strategic partnerships from eight to thirteen.
Domestic Politics
This sub-section reviews major domestic developments under six headings: anticorruption campaign, seventh Central Committee plenum, National Assembly vote of confidence, eighth Central Committee plenum, political repression, and constitutional amendments and leadership changes.
Anti-Corruption Campaign
In 2011, during his first term in office as prime minister, Nguyen Tan Dung set up the Central Steering Committee for Anti-corruption and appointed himself as chair. The Steering Committee made little progress. Early in his second term, Prime Minister Dung was removed as chair and replaced by party Secretary General Trong. In January 2013, Trong appointed Nguyen Ba Thanh, secretary of the Da Nang municipal party committee, to head the Central Commission on Internal Affairs.
The Five Power Defence Arrangements at Forty (1971–2011)
- from THE REGION
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- By Carlyle A. Thayer, University of New South Wales
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2012
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 10 May 2012, pp 61-72
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The Five Power Defence Agreements (FPDA) came into force in 1971 as a consultative forum and was initially conceived as a transitional agreement to provide for the defence of Peninsular Malaysia and Singapore until these new states could fend for themselves. The FPDA has evolved and adapted over the past forty years. It has developed a robust consultative structure, complemented by a standing multilateral military component, and a comprehensive exercise programme. The FPDA has gradually expanded its focus from the conventional defence of Peninsular Malaysian and Singaporean air space, through an annual series of Air Defence Exercises (ADEXs), to large-scale combined and joint military exercises designed to meet emerging conventional and non-conventional security threats extending into the South China Sea.
As the author has argued elsewhere, the FPDA has become “the quiet achiever” and an important component among the plethora of multilateral security mechanisms making up Southeast Asia's security architecture. This chapter reviews the development of the FPDA over the last forty years with particular attention to its programme of exercises in the period from 2004, when its most recent evolution took place.
Background (1971–2002)
During the first decade of its existence, the FPDA conducted only a handful of exercises with operational command alternating between Malaysia and Singapore. Each partner decided the degree of resources that it would contribute.
During the 1980s, the FPDA exercise programme incorporated regular land and sea exercises. The latter were initially designated EX STARFISH and were later renamed EX BERSAMA LIMA. Towards the end of the 1980s, the FPDA went into the doldrums as the external powers reduced their participation in FPDA exercises. In 1988, the five Defence Ministers took stock of the situation and decided to revitalize the FPDA consultative process. As a result, it was agreed that separate meetings of the Chiefs of Defence and Defence Ministers should become permanent and convene every two and three years, respectively.
In March 1990, the Defence Ministers agreed to shift gradually from purely air defence arrangements to combined and joint exercises in which land and naval forces would play a greater role.
8 - Cambodia-United States Relations
- from CAMBODIA AND OTHERS
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- By Carlyle A. Thayer, University of New South Wales
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- Book:
- Cambodia
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 26 March 2012, pp 96-107
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Summary
The United States first opened diplomatic relations with the Kingdom of Cambodia in 1950 when Cambodia became an associated state within the French Union. US-Cambodia relations have experienced abrupt changes and reversals since 1950. Political relations deteriorated in the early 1960s as a result of US military involvement in South Vietnam and Cambodia breaking diplomatic relations in May 1965. Diplomatic relations were resumed in July 1969, severed again after the Khmer Rouge seized power in April 1975 and re-established in 1991.
This chapter explores the impact of domestic and international factors on US relations with Cambodia in the period after 1991 when an international settlement brought an end to the decade-long conflict and Vietnamese occupation. Bilateral interstate relations between the US and Cambodia comprise multiple dimensions including, but not limited to, diplomatic political, economic, defence-security and humanitarian-development assistance. This chapter illustrates that the pace and scope of the bilateral relationship varied across these dimensions over time. Progress or setbacks in one area spilled over and affected relations in other areas.
BACKGROUND
Between 1975 and 1991 the United States withheld diplomatic recognition from both Democratic Kampuchea (under the Khmer Rouge) and the People's Republic of Kampuchea/State of Cambodia (a regime set up during the Vietnamese occupation). The US reopened its diplomatic mission in Phnom Penh in November 1991 following the comprehensive international political settlement of the Cambodian conflict in Paris a month earlier. The US ambassador was accredited to the Supreme National Council, a grouping of all the warring Cambodian parties under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). Following UN-supervised elections in May 1993 and the subsequent formation of the Royal Government of Cambodia, the United States immediately extended diplomatic relations and the US Mission was upgraded to an Embassy.
As a result of domestic political turmoil in 1997, the US suspended aid to the central government led by Prime Minister Hun Sen, terminated all military assistance and opposed loans by international financial institutions with the exception of funds for basic humanitarian needs. US political relations with the Hun Sen regime deteriorated sharply during this period. A decade elapsed before US sanctions were lifted. During this period, the pace and scope of rapprochement varied across political-diplomatic, economic, military and aid dimensions.
6 - Cambodia and Vietnam: Good Fences Make Good Neighbours
- from CAMBODIA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
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- By Carlyle A. Thayer, University of New South Wales
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- Book:
- Cambodia
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 26 March 2012, pp 62-78
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INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an overview of Cambodia's relations with Vietnam in the period following the 1991 political settlement of the Cambodian conflict. Particular attention is paid to the period since 2005, the year both sides adopted the guideline of “good neighbourliness, traditional friendship, comprehensive and long-term cooperation” for their bilateral relations.
The Kingdom of Cambodia and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) formally established diplomatic relations on 24 June 1967. Since that time bilateral relations have reflected the vicissitudes of Cambodia's domestic politics. In 1970, for example, when Prince Norodom Sihanouk was deposed in a coup, the DRV granted recognition to his government-in-exile, the Royal Government of National Union of Kampuchea. In 1976, after the Khmer Rouge seized power and established Democratic Kampuchea, Vietnam (renamed the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, SRV) reopened its embassy in Phnom Penh.
As a result of mounting bilateral tensions and conflict along the border, Democratic Kampuchea severed diplomatic relations with the SRV on 31 December 1977. A year later Vietnam invaded Cambodia. The SRV granted recognition to its protégé, the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK, 1979–89), which renamed itself the State of Cambodia in 1989. As a result of an international agreement reached in Paris in October 1991, the SRV recognised the Supreme National Council and, following United Nations sponsored elections in May 1993, subsequently recognised its successor, the Kingdom of Cambodia.
This chapter reviews Cambodia-Vietnam relations in four parts. Part one provides an overview of political relations. Part two discusses border issues, the most contentious aspect of bilateral relations. Parts three and four consider economic and defence relations, respectively.
POLITICAL RELATIONS
Vietnamese military forces invaded Cambodia in late 1978 and occupied the country until their unilateral withdrawal in September 1989. During this period, Vietnam's relations with the PRK were conducted under the framework of a 25-year treaty of friendship and cooperation. The restoration of the Kingdom of Cambodia in 1993 altered the framework of Cambodia-Vietnam bilateral relations. Under the new Constitution, Cambodia became a liberal democracy and a “permanently neutral and non-aligned country.”
United Nations-sponsored elections in May 1993 resulted in a coalition government comprising two main political parties, FUNCINPEC and the Cambodian People's Party (CPP).
4 - The Five Power Defence Arrangements Exercises, 2004–10
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- By Carlyle A. Thayer, University of New South Wales
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- Book:
- The Five Power Defence Arrangements at Forty
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 01 November 2011, pp 51-67
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Summary
The Five Power Defence Agreements (FPDA) came into force in 1971 as a consultative forum and not a treaty alliance. The FPDA was initially conceived as a transitional agreement to provide for the defence of peninsula Malaysia and Singapore until these new states could fend for themselves. The FPDA has evolved and adapted over the past forty years. As the author has argued elsewhere, the FPDA has become “the quiet achiever” and an important component among the plethora of multilateral security organizations making up Southeast Asia's security architecture.
The FPDA has developed a robust consultative structure, complemented by a standing multilateral military component, and a comprehensive exercise programme. The FPDA has gradually expanded its focus from the conventional defence of Malaysian and Singaporean air space, through an annual series of Air Defence Exercises (ADEXs), to large-scale combined and joint military exercises designed to meet emerging conventional and non-conventional security threats extending into the South China Sea. This chapter analyses the contribution of the FPDA's programme of exercises to regional security in the period from 2004 to the present when the latest evolution took place.
Background (1971–2003)
During the first decade of its existence (1971–81), the FPDA conducted only a handful of exercises. It was left up to each member to decide the degree of resources that it would contribute. The FPDA exercise programme evolved slowly. The operational command of FPDA exercises alternated between Malaysia and Singapore.
During the 1980s, the FPDA exercise programme evolved into staging regular land and sea exercises. In 1981, Australia hosted the first land exercise, Exercise PLATYPUS. Since 1981 the FPDA has conducted regular naval exercises. Initially designated Exercise STARFISH, they were renamed Exercise BERSAMA LIMA.
Towards the end of the 1980s, the FPDA exercise programme had become routine and predictable. The FPDA went into the doldrums as the forces committed by external powers began to decline. In 1988, the five defence ministers attended Exercise LIMA BERSATU and took stock of the situation and decided to revitalize the FPDA consultative process.
The United States, China and Southeast Asia
- from The region
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- By Carlyle A. Thayer, University of New South Wales
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2011
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 03 June 2011, pp 16-25
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Summary
In 2010 regional security in Southeast Asia was affected by three major developments: increased tensions in Sino-American relations, U.S. re-engagement with the region, and Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. Each of these developments when taken in combination posed a challenge to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) self-proclaimed role as the “primary driving force” in regional affairs. ASEAN weathered these challenges and by year's end demonstrated that ASEAN continued to remain central to the region's security architecture.
Tensions in Sino-American Relations
In November 2009, China and the United States issued a joint statement at the conclusion of President Obama's visit to Beijing. Both leaders “agreed that respecting each other's core interests is extremely important to ensure steady progress in U.S.-China relations”. Early the following year, when the United States announced arms sales to Taiwan and President Obama received the Dalai Lama, Tibet's spiritual leader, in The White House, China reacted angrily to what it perceived as an infringement of its core interests. Beijing immediately suspended all military-to-military exchanges.
In early March the Obama administration dispatched two senior officials to Beijing where they were received by State Councilor Dai Bingguo. The visitors had hoped to focus discussions on the nuclear programmes under way in Iran and North Korea, trade and market access, and climate change and to elicit Chinese cooperation on these issues. But Councilor Dai demanded that the United States genuinely respect China's core interests by halting all future meetings with the Dalai Lama and arms sales to Taiwan.
The American officials were told by their counterparts that “China would not tolerate any interference in the South China Sea, now part of China's ‘core interest’ of sovereignty”. U.S. analysts quickly noted that this was the first time China had identified the South China Sea as a core interest, along with Tibet, Taiwan, and Xinjiang.
Whether or not China had elevated the South China Sea to a core interest in official national policy has become a point of controversy. However, according to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Dai Bingguo reasserted this claim at the 2nd U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), held in Beijing in May.
Asia. China and Vietnam: The politics of asymmetry. By Brantly Womack. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006. Pp. 281. Maps, Tables, Figures, Bibliography, Index.
- Carlyle A. Thayer
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- Journal:
- Journal of Southeast Asian Studies / Volume 42 / Issue 2 / June 2011
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 12 May 2011, pp. 352-354
- Print publication:
- June 2011
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Vietnam and Rising China: The Structural Dynamics of Mature Asymmetry
- from VIETNAM
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- By Carlyle A. Thayer, University of New South Wales
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- Southeast Asian Affairs 2010
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 18 May 2010, pp 392-409
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Ever since the Vietnamese nation-state emerged as an independent entity in the first millennium it has had to contend with “the tyranny of geography”. Vietnam shares a common border with China its giant neighbour to the north. Even today, with a population of eighty-eight million, Vietnam ranks as a middle sized Chinese province. As a major study by Brantly Womack notes, the bilateral relationship has been embedded in a structure of persistent asymmetry throughout recorded history.
This chapter focuses on how Vietnam's leaders manage relations with a rising China. Womack's theory of asymmetry provides a useful framework for analyzing this relationship. Womack argues “disparities in capacities create systemic differences in interests and perspectives between stronger and weaker sides”. The larger power always looms more importantly to the weaker than the reverse. This structural factor results in over attention to the bilateral relationship on the part of the weaker state because more is at risk. The result, Womack concludes, is that weaker states are “prone to paranoia”. Conversely, the stronger power is less attentive to the details of the bilateral relationship with a weaker state. These contrasting views often lead to misperception.
Womack argues that Sino-Vietnamese hostility over Cambodia in the 1980s (which he terms “hostile asymmetry”) led to a stalemate when both sides realized that they could not prevail. This led to a period of negotiated normalization (1990–99) in which both parties came to recognize and accept the interests of the other. Normalcy, according to Womack, does not alter the asymmetric nature of relations; but it ushers in a new phase that he terms normal or mature asymmetry. According to Womack, “[n]ormalcy might be called ‘mature asymmetry’ because it is grounded in a learning experience and it has the capacity to be long term and stable.” In other words, both parties adopt mutual expectations of the other's behaviour. The stronger expects deference, while the weaker expects that its autonomy will be acknowledged.
11 - Problematising ‘linkages’ between Southeast Asian and international terrorism
- Edited by William T. Tow, Australian National University, Canberra
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- Book:
- Security Politics in the Asia-Pacific
- Published online:
- 05 June 2012
- Print publication:
- 15 October 2009, pp 211-227
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Summary
On 20 September 2001, in response to the terrorist attacks on the United States nine days earlier, President George W. Bush addressed a joint session of the US Congress to explain who had perpetrated the attacks and how his administration would respond. President Bush made clear that ‘(o)ur war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated’ (Bush 2001). Bush described al-Qaeda as ‘a collection of loosely affiliated terrorist organizations’, led by Osama bin Laden, with a network extending to sixty countries. In sum, Bush committed the US to an open-ended global war on terrorism:
Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even in success. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.
(Bush 2001)
Cambodia: The Cambodian People's Party Consolidates Power
- from CAMBODIA
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- By Carlyle A. Thayer, University of New South Wales
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2009
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 28 May 2009, pp 85-102
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This chapter reviews major domestic and foreign policy developments in Cambodia in 2008. Three major issues are highlighted: the fourth national elections, the border dispute with Thailand, and the proceedings of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal. The chapter concludes with a brief overview of economic trends and a review of Cambodia's external relations.
National Elections
Cambodia held national elections on 27 July; they were the fourth general elections to be held since the end of the Cambodian conflict in 1991. In 2007, the National Electoral Committee (NEC) revised its national voter list and removed 586,160 names due to death, duplication and other reasons. The list of deregistered voters was displayed publicly for thirty-five days and citizens were given the right to contest their deletion. According to a U.S. Embassy assessment, “virtually all who took steps to protest the deletion of their names were re-instated”. Nonetheless, an audit by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) found that as many as 57,401 voters (or 0.7 per cent of the total) were deleted. This figure was challenged by the NEC and reduced to 49,340 voters (or 0.6 per cent of the total) who “may [have been]… improperly and unintentionally” disenfranchised. The U.S Embassy noted that the deletion of as many as 57,000 legitimate voters “was a high price to pay for the successful removal of over 450,000 ghost voters”. The final official list totalled 8,125,529 registered voters.
In 2008 Cambodia had fifty-three officially registered political parties. Only twelve parties applied to contest the elections during the official registration period from 28 April to 12 May. Eleven political parties were approved (see Table 1). The NEC also approved a total of 2,479 candidates (titular and alternate) and rejected the applications of 213. Only five political parties won seats: Cambodian People's Party (CPP), Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), Human Rights Party (HRP), FUNCINPEC (National United Front for Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Co-operative Cambodia) and the Norodom Ranariddth Party (NRP).
5 - Political Relations
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- By Carlyle A. Thayer, The University of New South Wales
- Edited by Takashi Shiraishi
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- Book:
- Across the Causeway
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 15 December 2008, pp 80-91
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Summary
Current relations between Singapore and Malaysia were significantly shaped by the legacy of merger and separation. A review of this period indicates not only the importance of political leadership, but also, more fundamentally, the importance of communalism. These twin factors infused tensions into political and economic issues.
The creation of the Federation of Malaysia was precipitated by Singapore's shift from colonial status to internal self-government (June 1959) and eventual independence. The People's Action Party (PAP) won the general elections in May 1959 and its leader, Lee Kuan Yew, became prime minister. In May 1961, Tunku Abdul Rahman mooted the idea of an eventual merger between Malaya, Singapore, and the British Borneo territories. Lee Kuan Yew favoured independence through merger with Malaya and rejected the idea of an independent Singapore because it would become “South-East Asia's Israel with every hand turned against it.”
The PAP successfully won a referendum on the future of Singapore conducted in September 1962. Seventy-one per cent of the voters supported merger. But domestic opposition by communists, with support in the Chinese community, kept Lee under constant pressure to demonstrate in merger negotiations that he was standing up for the island republic's interests. Lee sought and gained special terms including greater autonomy and diminished financial obligations for Singapore. Singapore became independent on 1 September 1963, and then joined the Federation of Malaysia a fortnight later.
The political leaders in Singapore and Malaysia shared the objective of defeating the challenge posed by ethnic Chinese communism. And they both favoured creating a Federation of Malaysia. But they also had differing political motivations. Malaya's leaders sought to incorporate Singapore into a larger federation in which Malay dominance would be maintained. Lee Kuan Yew and the People's Action Party (PAP) sought independence through merger with Malaya, but on terms of equality for all communal (read ethnic Chinese) groups. Lee strongly argued in favour of meritocracy and this was perceived by the Malay leadership as a veiled attack on the political entitlements of indigenous Malays.
Once Singapore joined the Federation, a major fault line quickly developed between the incumbent federal Alliance government led by Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, and the PAP under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew. At issue were personal ambitions, economic questions, communalism, political ideology, and the question of federal power and state autonomy.
10 - Security Relations
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- By Carlyle A. Thayer, The University of New South Wales
- Edited by Takashi Shiraishi
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- Book:
- Across the Causeway
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 15 December 2008, pp 163-174
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Summary
Since the nineteenth century, peninsula Malaya and Singapore have formed essentially one economic and military unit under British colonial rule. As Malaysia and Singapore moved towards independence, political leaders on both sides of the causeway accepted as an article of faith that their mutual defence was indivisible. The continuing presence of British military forces, based mainly in Singapore, reinforced this view. The political leadership of Singapore's People's Action Party (PAP), who agitated for an end to colonial rule, concluded that an independent Singapore would not be militarily viable on its own and that Singapore's defence and security needs could best be met through merger.
Up until separation from Malaysia in August 1965, Singapore's military forces have always been an adjunct of outside powers, first of Britain and then Malaysia. Indeed, at independence in September 1963, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) were incorporated in and came under the operational control of the Malaysian Armed Forces. These arrangements resulted in the recruitment of a military force that was overwhelmingly peninsular Malay in ethnic composition. The presence of Malaysian troops on Singapore's territory and the ethnic composition of Singapore's armed forces at the time of separation proved catalysts in the development of an ethnically Chinese SAF and a defence doctrine that stressed deterrence against threats by Malaysia.
The origins of Singaporean military forces can be traced back to 1854 with the formation of the Singapore Volunteer Rifle Corps. In 1934, the Straits Settlements Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve was created, comprising mainly small coastal patrol boats. In the mid-1950s the land forces were filled out by the addition of national servicemen and part-time conscripts. Singapore's first professional military force was created in 1957 when the Singapore Infantry Regiment (SIR) was formed. Singapore maintained a small air element until 1960 when it was disbanded.
Peninsula Malaya gained its independence on 31 August 1957. Under the terms of the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA), which came into force in October, Great Britain and Malaya agreed to “take all necessary action” in the event of an armed attack on Malaya or British territories in the Far East. Britain was permitted to retain its military bases and forces in Malaya. Britain also agreed to assist in the development of the Malayan armed forces and to fund the SIR's second battalion.
11 - Radical Islam and Political Terrorism in Southeast Asia
- from Part III - Local Security, Global Insecurity
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- By Carlyle A. Thayer, University College
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- Book:
- Globalization and its Counter-Forces in Southeast Asia
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 29 February 2008, pp 256-276
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Summary
INTRODUCTION: THE CONVENTIONAL VIEW OF ISLAM
The term “globalization” has many meanings. To some it is the spread of trade and production on a global scale. Proponents of this view differ over whether globalization is a recent phenomenon or a process that has been underway for centuries. To others, the chief characteristic of globalization is the spread of communications technology that compresses time and space, particularly in the speed of processing information and commercial transactions. A third view maintains that globalization is the spread of Western, particularly American, culture and values. This latter view is myopic because it overlooks the spread of Islam and Islamic values as part of the globalization process. This chapter is concerned with the relationship between radical Islam and political terrorism in Southeast Asia. There can be no doubt that the spread of communications technology assisted in the mobilization of Muslim volunteers to join the global jihadist cause and a growing sense of identity among radical Muslims in Southeast Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East. Globalization, in this sense, has facilitated the emergence of political terrorism in Southeast Asia. But globalization alone does not fully explain this development. Political terrorism in Southeast Asia has historical roots in indigenous society and its emergence can be traced, in part, to state repression of Islam. It is the combination of global and domestic forces that explains the appearance of radical Islam and political terrorism in the 1990s.
Prior to the Bali bombings of 12 October 2002, the conventional view of Islam in Southeast Asia, and Islam in Indonesia in particular, was that it differed from Islam in the Arab Middle East and Pakistan. Islam in Southeast Asia was viewed not only as moderate but inward looking and tolerant. The conventional view also held that radical Islam represented a tiny minority and was not influential politically either domestically or in regional affairs. The vast majority of Southeast Asia'S Muslims are Sunni.
Vietnam: The Tenth Party Congress and After
- from VIETNAM
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- By Carlyle A. Thayer, University of New South Wales
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- Book:
- Southeast Asian Affairs 2007
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 21 October 2015
- Print publication:
- 28 May 2007, pp 381-397
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Summary
In 2006 Vietnam marked the twentieth anniversary of its reform programme known as doi moi. Party leaders, state officials, academics, and foreign specialists all took part in a series of conferences that evaluated developments over the past two decades and made recommendations for the future. Simultaneously, members of the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) undertook a parallel policy review in preparation for the Tenth Party Congress in April.
One of the hallmarks of doi moi has been Vietnam's transformation from a centrally planned to a market-led economy and Vietnam's integration into the global economy. In 2006 no two events better symbolized Vietnam's success in attaining these objectives than its membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the successful hosting of the 14th Summit Meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum from 18 to 19 November. The Presidents of Chile, China, Russia, and the United States made separate official state visits at this time. Vietnam also achieved the third highest economic growth rate in East Asia. The year 2006, therefore, was one of “success, success, great success”, to quote a party slogan.
As a result, Vietnam was showered with accolades by foreign observers. For example, the President of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation characterized Vietnam as “one of the world's great untapped emerging markets”. The Chief Economist of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) described Vietnam as an “emerging China”. After the Tenth Party Congress, the foreign media portrayed leadership changes as a victory of southern entrepreneurial spirit over northern conservatism.
This article presents a review of major political, economic, and foreign policy developments in 2006. The analysis documents Vietnam's accomplishments but also tempers the assessment with reference to cross currents that present a more complex portrait of contemporary Vietnam.
Domestic Politics
In January 2006 the VCP Central Committee's Thirteenth Plenum considered a report from the Politburo summarizing the results of a six-month period of in-house consultation on key draft policy documents to be submitted to the Tenth Congress.