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5 - Are autonomous weapons systems a threat to human dignity?
- from PART III - Autonomous weapons systems and human dignity
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- By Dieter Birnbacher, University of Düsseldorf
- Edited by Nehal Bhuta, European University Institute, Florence, Susanne Beck, Universität Hannover, Germany, Robin Geiβ, University of Glasgow, Hin-Yan Liu, European University Institute, Florence, Claus Kreβ, Universität zu Köln
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- Book:
- Autonomous Weapons Systems
- Published online:
- 05 August 2016
- Print publication:
- 19 August 2016, pp 105-121
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Summary
Introduction: human dignity – an integrative and open concept
‘Human dignity’ has become one of the most important integrative formulas in international politics. Since 1948, when it was introduced into Article 1 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it has successfully functioned as an umbrella concept that bridges seemingly insurmountable ideological gulfs and provides a basis for consensus and compromise. Similarly to other political guiding concepts such as justice, liberty, peace or, more recently, sustainability, human dignity is an essentially open concept that leaves room for varying interpretations and contextualizations and thereby allows even the otherwise fiercest adversaries to speak with one voice.
Another reason why human dignity has been increasingly introduced into constitutions and international treaties since 1948 is the wish for an absolute – a foundational principle that overarches, as it were, all constitutional and other political principles, a common reference point that is beyond controversy and conflict and plays the role, in Kantian terms, of an a priori to which all other political ideas are subject. Human dignity is predestined for this role because of two characteristic factors: the openness of its content and its independence of any particular metaphysical background theory. The extent to which the concept is semantically open is documented by its function as a heuristic tool in the process of gradually extending the canon of basic human rights. Although it is generally agreed that there is a stable connection between the idea of human dignity and the idea of basic human rights, the number and identity of the rights associated with the idea of human dignity is not static but, rather, dynamic. What human dignity implies – its content and consequences – has no fixed magnitude but is open to interpretations that extend its range and content into new directions, though in continuity with its established content. Extensions usually respond to new threats posed, for example, by new and unexpected political constellations, natural phenomena or technological developments. That human dignity shares this dynamic character with human basic rights supports the widely held assumption that the notions of human dignity and basic human rights are closely linked to each other.
Appendix 1 - Study guide for teachers
- Donna Dickenson, University of London, Richard Huxtable, University of Bristol, Michael Parker, University of Oxford
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- Book:
- The Cambridge Medical Ethics Workbook
- Published online:
- 10 November 2010
- Print publication:
- 14 October 2010, pp 215-220
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Summary
Each of the chapters in this workbook is intended to be a flexible educational resource, and we would encourage both learners and teachers to use the materials in a way which best suits their requirements. In some cases this might mean working through an entire chapter, but more often it might mean using a case study and the related activities as an educational resource to be used in conjunction with other materials. The chapters and the activities within them are intended to be used in a variety of ways at different points in the medical or nursing curriculum or for post-qualifying training; they are equally suitable for use as distance learning materials for self-study.
We aim to present a kind of medical ethics and a way of teaching it which we believe doctors and nurses will find highly relevant to their everyday practice. Although we sometimes refer to the ‘big’ cases and issues, as evidence of legal positions, for example, we concentrate on ‘everyday ethics’ by beginning each chapter with a very ordinary and typical sort of case. So we answer the question ‘why study medical ethics?’ by beginning from examples which will resonate with practitioners, we hope. The headline topics are important, demonstrating that the issues of medical ethics are of widespread interest to the population as a whole – of which healthcare practitioners are of course a part.
9 - Limits to Substitutability in Nature Conservation
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- By Dieter Birnbacher, Professor of Philosophy Heinrich Heine University, Düsseldorf, Germany
- Edited by Markku Oksanen, University of Kuopio, Finland, Juhani Pietarinen, University of Turku, Finland
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- Book:
- Philosophy and Biodiversity
- Published online:
- 26 June 2009
- Print publication:
- 06 September 2004, pp 180-196
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Summary
BIODIVERSITY AND THE “SUBSTITUTION PROBLEM”
Philosophy traditionally deals with concepts and values, either in the spirit of analysis and reconstruction or in the spirit of construction and innovation. In both respects, biodiversity is a “hard case” and a challenge to philosophy's intellectual resources. Like simplicity (a concept which plays a crucial role in the philosophy of science and scientific methodology), diversity is a concept of considerable complexity which easily defies definition. With biodiversity, difficulties multiply because it is not clear what the items are of which biodiversity is predicated. What does it mean to say that a natural system is “diverse,” absolutely or to a certain degree? Does diversity refer to the number and diversity of biological species, to the number and diversity of alleles, or to the diversity of all properties of natural systems including structural, aesthetic, and symbolic properties? The distinction, customary in ecology, between species diversity, ecosystem diversity, and genetic diversity is certainly helpful in this respect, since it shows the essential incompleteness of statements about biodiversity. Nevertheless, an inclusive concept of biodiversity, covering all relevant dimensions, would certainly be desirable.
Similar difficulties beset the attempt to spell out why biodiversity, however defined, is a value and why we should be concerned to preserve or even enhance biodiversity. Is the value of biodiversity extrinsic or intrinsic? “Extrinsic” means that it is valued for its causal role in preserving or enhancing other values, “intrinsic” that it is an end in itself worth pursuing for its own sake.