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“Dogmatism” and Dogmatism
- John Biro
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- Journal:
- Episteme , First View
- Published online by Cambridge University Press:
- 01 June 2022, pp. 1-5
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- Article
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The so-called paradox of dogmatism has it that it seems that one is both entitled and not entitled to ignore evidence against what one knows. By knowing something, one knows it to be true, and one also knows that there can be no non-misleading evidence against what is true. But to ignore evidence against what one believes – and, surely, one believes what one knows – is to be dogmatic, something one should not be. I argue that there is no genuine paradox here. One's attitude to evidence is governed not by what one knows but by what one thinks one knows. Thinking that one knows something does not entail that it is true. Knowing this, one knows that there may be non-misleading evidence against what one thinks one knows and should be open to examining what purports to be evidence against it.
Contributors
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- By Rony A. Adam, Gloria Bachmann, Nichole M. Barker, Randall B. Barnes, John Bennett, Inbar Ben-Shachar, Jonathan S. Berek, Sarah L. Berga, Monica W. Best, Eric J. Bieber, Frank M. Biro, Shan Biscette, Anita K. Blanchard, Candace Brown, Ronald T. Burkman, Joseph Buscema, John E. Buster, Michael Byas-Smith, Sandra Ann Carson, Judy C. Chang, Annie N. Y. Cheung, Mindy S. Christianson, Karishma Circelli, Daniel L. Clarke-Pearson, Larry J. Copeland, Bryan D. Cowan, Navneet Dhillon, Michael P. Diamond, Conception Diaz-Arrastia, Nicole M. Donnellan, Michael L. Eisenberg, Eric Eisenhauer, Sebastian Faro, J. Stuart Ferriss, Lisa C. Flowers, Susan J. Freeman, Leda Gattoc, Claudine Marie Gayle, Timothy M. Geiger, Jennifer S. Gell, Alan N. Gordon, Victoria L. Green, Jon K. Hathaway, Enrique Hernandez, S. Paige Hertweck, Randall S. Hines, Ira R. Horowitz, Fred M. Howard, William W. Hurd, Fidan Israfilbayli, Denise J. Jamieson, Carolyn R. Jaslow, Erika B. Johnston-MacAnanny, Rohna M. Kearney, Namita Khanna, Caroline C. King, Jeremy A. King, Ira J. Kodner, Tamara Kolev, Athena P. Kourtis, S. Robert Kovac, Ertug Kovanci, William H. Kutteh, Eduardo Lara-Torre, Pallavi Latthe, Herschel W. Lawson, Ronald L. Levine, Frank W. Ling, Larry I. Lipshultz, Steven D. McCarus, Robert McLellan, Shruti Malik, Suketu M. Mansuria, Mohamed K. Mehasseb, Pamela J. Murray, Saloney Nazeer, Farr R. Nezhat, Hextan Y. S. Ngan, Gina M. Northington, Peggy A. Norton, Ruth M. O'Regan, Kristiina Parviainen, Resad P. Pasic, Tanja Pejovic, K. Ulrich Petry, Nancy A. Phillips, Ashish Pradhan, Elizabeth E. Puscheck, Suneetha Rachaneni, Devon M. Ramaeker, David B. Redwine, Robert L. Reid, Carla P. Roberts, Walter Romano, Peter G. Rose, Robert L. Rosenfield, Shon P. Rowan, Mack T. Ruffin, Janice M. Rymer, Evis Sala, Ritu Salani, Joseph S. Sanfilippo, Mahmood I. Shafi, Roger P. Smith, Meredith L. Snook, Thomas E. Snyder, Mary D. Stephenson, Thomas G. Stovall, Richard L. Sweet, Philip M. Toozs-Hobson, Togas Tulandi, Elizabeth R. Unger, Denise S. Uyar, Marion S. Verp, Rahi Victory, Tamara J. Vokes, Michelle J. Washington, Katharine O'Connell White, Paul E. Wise, Frank M. Wittmaack, Miya P. Yamamoto, Christine Yu, Howard A. Zacur
- Edited by Eric J. Bieber, Joseph S. Sanfilippo, University of Pittsburgh, Ira R. Horowitz, Emory University, Atlanta, Mahmood I. Shafi
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- Book:
- Clinical Gynecology
- Published online:
- 05 April 2015
- Print publication:
- 23 April 2015, pp viii-xiv
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2 - Hume’s New Science of the Mind
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- By John Biro
- Edited by David Fate Norton, McGill University, Montréal, Jacqueline Taylor
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- Book:
- The Cambridge Companion to Hume
- Published online:
- 28 May 2009
- Print publication:
- 08 December 2008, pp 40-69
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Summary
“Human Nature is the only science of man.”
T 1.4.7.14For Hume, understanding the workings of the mind is the key to understanding everything else. There is a sense, therefore, in which to write about Hume's philosophy of mind is to write about all of his philosophy. With that said, I shall nonetheless focus here on those specific doctrines that belong to what we today call the philosophy of mind, given our somewhat narrower conception of that subject. It should also be remembered that Hume describes his inquiry into the nature and workings of the mind as a science. This is an important clue to understanding both the goals and the results of that inquiry, as well as the methods Hume uses in pursuing it. As we will see, there is a thread running from Hume's project of founding a science of the mind to that of the so-called cognitive sciences of the late twentieth century. For both, the study of the mind is in important respects just like the study of any other natural phenomenon. While it would be an overstatement to say that Hume's entire interest lies in the construction of a science in this sense - he has other, more traditionally “philosophical,” concerns - recognizing the centrality of this scientific aim is essential for understanding him.
2 - Hume's new science of the mind
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- By John Biro
- Edited by David Fate Norton, McGill University, Montréal
-
- Book:
- The Cambridge Companion to Hume
- Published online:
- 28 May 2006
- Print publication:
- 29 October 1993, pp 33-63
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- Chapter
- Export citation
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Summary
For Hume, understanding the workings of the mind is the key to understanding everything else. There is a sense, therefore, in which to write about Hume's philosophy of mind is to write about all of his philosophy. With that said, I shall nonetheless focus here on those specific doctrines that belong to what we today call the philosophy of mind, given our somewhat narrower conception of it. It should also be remembered that Hume describes his inquiry into the nature and workings of the mind as a science. This is an important clue to understanding both the goals and the results of that inquiry, as well as the methods Hume uses in pursuing it. As we will see, there is a thread running from Hume's project of founding a science of the mind to that of the so-called cognitive sciences of the late twentieth century. For both, the study of the mind is, in important respects, just like the study of any other natural phenomenon. While it would be an overstatement to say that Hume's entire interest lies in the construction of a science in this sense - he has other, more traditionally “philosophical” concerns, as well - a recognition of the centrality of this scientific conception of his subject is essential for understanding him.