I begin with a foundational premise: that the basic beliefs about truth and morality that undergird a culture — any culture — are social and discursive constructions. I cannot establish this claim with absolute certainty, although I can provide the reasoning behind such an assertion. I can furnish models that show the explanatory power of such an assertion, and I can provide examples of people who use the premise to useful ends. But finally, the regime of truth I propose — one based on the belief that all truth is provisional and endemic to the culture that produces it — is one accepted on faith. In accepting it, I also accept as credible the rules of meaningmaking, the procedures, the heuristics, and the institutions through which the authority of truths are established in the culture(s) of which I consider myself a part. I can enter into dialogue with the community of those who, at least for the purposes of conversation, share these basic premises with me. With those who do not, I am at an impasse.