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The law of responsibility has been subject to massive change over the past centuries. While in key areas such change is well-established in the form of customary law or general principles, for particular transformations the process of change is more difficult to pin down. Major examples are the transition from a private to a public law model and from independent to shared responsibility, where the depth and scope of change and its support in practice remains uncertain. The author argues that the normal rules for determination of change in international law, reflected in the sources of international law, are not always helpful for determining change in the law of responsibility. To understand such change, it is helpful to distinguish change in secondary rules from change in primary rules (substantive rights and obligations) and tertiary rules (procedures and institutional rules for implementing responsibility). Change in the law of responsibility is to some extent driven by prior changes in primary rules, but it is also argued that secondary rules have a logic and justification that is to some extent independent from primary rules.
This chapter examines how international courts have applied principles of state responsibility in the context of situations of shared responsibility between multiple parties, concluding that when this occurs international adjudication becomes less suited as a process for implementing such responsibility. Substantive law of international responsibility is slowly adjusting to its increasingly relational nature, but the procedures of international adjudication in many respects are not well suited for incorporating this relational nature. There are considerable differences between states, in terms of their willingness to submit themselves to adjudication of shared responsibility claims, even within “the west,” as a result of which responsibility will often will be shared between some states, but not all. The role of international adjudication in relation to shared responsibility differs widely – both between international courts and between states – in terms of the willingness of states to subject themselves, or make use of, international adjudication. An interesting example is the adjudication of claims related to extraordinary rendition. Whereas European states, like Macedonia and Poland, were found responsible by the European Court of Human Rights in relation to their (shared) responsibility, the USA has always resisted attempts to be subjected to adjudication for their leading role in extraordinary rendition.
The tragic events in the 1990s in Rwanda, Srebrenica and Kosovo, and the crisis in Libya in 2011 have triggered a fundamental rethinking of the role and responsibility of the international community. It is now accepted that while individual states continue to bear the primary responsibility to protect their populations against genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes within their boundaries, the international community should step in when the state is unable or unwilling to provide such protection. The principle of the Responsibility to Protect, or RtoP, reflects this recognition, and provides the normative basis for involvement of the international community in cases of mass atrocities. This thoughtful work is a major contribution towards clarifying what RtoP can offer, moving from principle to practice. It spans the disciplines of international law, international relations, and moral philosophy.
States that are in transition after a violent conflict or an authoritarian past face daunting challenges in (re)establishing the rule of law. This volume examines in detail attempts that were made in certain significant post-conflict or post-authoritarian situations to strengthen the domestic rule of law with the aid of international law. Attention is paid in particular to the empowerment of domestic courts in such situations. International law may serve these courts as a tool for reconciling the demands for new rights and responsibilities with due process and other rule of law requirements. The volume contains case studies of the role of domestic courts in various post-conflict and transitional situations (Balkans, Iraq, Afghanistan, Nepal, East Timor, Russia, South Africa, and Rwanda). Each of these case studies seeks to answer questions relating to the exact constitutional moment empowering domestic courts to apply international law, the range of international legal norms that are applied, the involvement of international actors in bringing about change, the contextualization of international legal norms in states in transition, tension within such states as a result of the application of international law, and the legacy of domestic courts' empowerment in terms of durable rule of law entrenchment.
On December 20, 2019, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands published its judgment in The State of the Netherlands v. Urgenda. The judgment is largely a discussion of questions of Dutch law, but contains several conclusions that are relevant from an international law perspective. In particular, the Court held that on the basis of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the Netherlands has a positive obligation to take measures for the prevention of climate change and that it was required to reduce its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by at least 25 percent by the end of 2020, compared with 1990 levels.
An important presumption underlying the smart mixes approach is that ‘complementarity’ adds to the ‘smartness’ of an instrumental mix; however, the questions of what complementarity actually means, in what forms it may occur, and when it can be said to be smart must be answered. This chapter focuses on these questions, considering complementarity between public and private actors in the regulatory and enforcement space from both theoretical and practical perspectives by looking into the goals, nature and dynamics of public-private interaction in several areas. It also assesses when and how public-private complementarity may contribute to an effective smart mix and what contextual factors may affect this. However, public-private regulatory and enforcement regimes will only be truly smart and effective when they are perceived as legitimate – and consequently followed up on – by those affected by them. This chapter argues the importance of taking greater account of the role of the law in this regard, not only to fully explain public-private complementarity, but to fully assess whether this represents a smart mix or not and how the law may impact on the shaping of a smart mix both now and in future, inducing certain limits so as to secure its legitimacy.
This is the third book in the series Shared Responsibility in International Law, which examines the problem of distribution of responsibilities among multiple states and other actors. In its work on the responsibility of states and international organisations, the International Law Commission recognised that attribution of acts to one actor does not exclude possible attribution of the same act to another state or organisation. Recognising that the applicable rules and procedures for shared responsibility may differ between particular issue areas, this volume reviews the practice of states, international organisations, courts and other bodies that have dealt with the issue of international responsibility of multiple wrongdoing actors in a wide range of issue areas, including energy, extradition, investment law, NATO-led operations and fisheries. These analyses jointly assess the fit of the prevailing principles of international responsibility and provide a basis for reform and further development of international law.
International law is not merely a set of rules or processes, but is a professional activity practised by a diversity of figures, including scholars, judges, counsel, teachers, legal advisers and activists. Individuals may, in different contexts, play more than one of these roles, and the interactions between them are illuminating of the nature of international law itself. This collection of innovative, multidisciplinary and self-reflective essays reveals a bilateral process whereby, on the one hand, the professionalisation of international law informs discourses about the law, and, on the other hand, discourses about the law inform the professionalisation of the discipline. Intended to promote a dialogue between practice and scholarship, this book is a must-read for all those engaged in the profession of international law.