Achievement of the full set of EU objectives in the long run requires basic and critical research in the social sciences and the humanities. A European Research Council (ERC) may offer economies of scale, the alleviation of coordination problems, and the provision of public goods or ‘club goods’ to the social sciences and humanities. It should focus on data sharing and large comparative projects; raising public awareness of the value of the social sciences and humanities, and funding basic and critical research in these disciplines – not just research offering immediate-term extrinsic pay-offs. In order to function properly, such a body should develop standards of assessment and peer review processes that are appropriate for research in the social sciences and humanities. An ERC must receive ‘fresh money’; it must minimise transaction costs – both to attract good applicants and to fund as many of them as possible – and, by giving priority to academic excellence over Lisbon relevance and geography, it must maximise its credibility as a supporter of high-quality research. At a time when competition is supposed to foster excellence in research, academies and private funding bodies must continue to be competitors of the European Research Council.

While 10 years is too short a time to draw broad conclusions, the ERC does seem to have succeeded in promoting excellent and basic research in Europe, both through its own projects and by affecting standards and aspirations more broadly. It has affected widely shared conceptions of scholarly excellence and introduced new measures of academic esteem, with more attention to rigorous peer review—in the social sciences and the humanities as well as in the natural sciences. One concern is that the portability of grants may have fuelled the clustering of research talent and reputation towards some institutions and some states, away from others. The benefits of the ERC in promoting research quality across Europe in the longer term may be at risk unless some parties take steps to correct this imbalance.

Critics challenge international courts for their interference with domestic democratic processes and alleged violations of rule of law standards: they claim that these guardians of the rule of law are not well guarded themselves. These concerns should not be dismissed too quickly as mere disgruntled venting by populist politicians. This article focuses on regional human rights courts and argues that the same interests and values that justify rule of law standards of impartiality, independence and accountability domestically also justify similar standards for international courts. Focusing on the European Court of Human Rights and its doctrine of the margin of appreciation, the article demonstrates how this doctrine may contribute to fulfilling the rule of law but at the same time may also endanger it. This requires changes to the doctrine to ensure that the core rule of law standards of predictability and protection against arbitrary discretion are respected.