Does Religion Cause War? Or Does Religion Promote Peace and Restrain War?

Within the pages of this book the reader will discover a rich array of texts that, in their different ways, throw light on a range of religious attitudes toward violence and war. The challenge inherent in such a collection of texts lies in their divergence – both the divergence between texts from different religions on the one hand, and the different, partly conflicting views found within the same religion or branches of a religion on the other. To draw a single overarching conclusion about the relationship between religion, war, and ethics is well-nigh impossible. Does religion cause war? Yes. Does religion promote peace and restrain war? Yes. Both – and more – are true. Much depends on the conflict in question, the historical situation, the people and beliefs involved, and – not least important for this book – the interpretation of texts. Yet in spite of this diversity there do exist common tensions and questions that can be found throughout the materials gathered herein. In highlighting these, our purpose in this Introduction is to facilitate the reading of the texts on war, violence, and religion found in this book.

What Is Our Subject Matter?

Before we go any further, let us start with a very basic question: What is religion? In other words, what is the basic point of departure for this book? This is not easy to answer, since there are so many nuances and differences within and between religions, such as the following:

• between monotheism and polytheism;

• between belief in a god who reveals him- or herself through history and belief in karma or other more impersonal forces that influence our lives;

• between the belief that earthly life is lived only once and the belief that any one human life is part of a long cycle of lives lived;

• between belief in an overarching, omnipotent power or principle and belief in several competing powers or principles who (or which) can challenge and potentially defeat each other;

• between belief in a strict dividing line between earthly and heavenly existence and beliefs that do not as clearly distinguish between the two; and

• between belief in a set of canonical texts that express divine truth and belief in less text-oriented and less canonical approaches to the tenets of a religion.

Preface

The events of 11 September 2001 cast a harsh new light on links between religion and violence. While much of the attention was initially directed toward Islam, it was not long before parallels were explored within Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, and other mainstream religious traditions. This coincided with a sharp rise of philosophical interest over the past decades in the ethics of war, particularly within the confines of what is standardly termed the Western “just war tradition.” Consequently, among scholars certainly, but also among the general public, there is now a wider recognition that religion has the dual potential to encourage and to restrain violence. While some religious adherents urge a complete renunciation of violence (pacifism), more often there can be found a mixed approach in which the resort to force is excluded under certain conditions but allowed and perhaps even enjoined in others. Some have looked for ethical alternatives to limit war; others have sought to justify acts of violence to make these acceptable in ethical terms; while still others have sought to use religious symbols and ideals to foment conflict in pursuit of political agendas.

Despite the accrued interest in religion, violence, war, and ethics, the source texts in which these issues are expounded have often remained inaccessible to all but a handful of specialists. This is especially true of traditions such as Islam, Hinduism, and Judaism, where the key authoritative treatments are often embedded in texts (e.g., Qur’anic jurisprudence, religious epics, or Halakhic commentary) that are not overtly about matters pertaining to the ethics of war, thus requiring a difficult process of interpretation and selection, and for which English translations frequently do not exist. Since debate in the public arena (on, for instance, what Islam does or does not teach regarding participation in violence) often hinges on a proper knowledge of the relevant textual traditions, the quality of such debate would be significantly enhanced if the most important texts could be made available, under a single cover, in English, to a broader reading public. It is with this goal in mind that the present book was conceived. A generous grant from the Research Council of Norway, for a four-year project on “Comparative Ethics of War,” enabled the idea to become a reality.

Introduction

The catchphrase for investments that both safeguard the financial assets of the funds under management and show proper concern for the communities and the environment affected by those investments is ‘responsible investing’ (RI) or ‘socially responsible investing’ (SRI). While such phrases until recently were reserved for funds that have a strict screening policy, they are increasingly becoming part of the self-understanding of large, broadly invested, mainstream funds.

When we use such phrases, however, we should also be careful to clarify their meaning, in this case not least the meaning of responsibility. What is implied by the claim that someone is responsible? What kinds of responsibility are there? And which of these are relevant to a modern institutional investor?

A very basic way to explain what responsibility is focuses on the ability to give a response: If someone were to complain about the conference venue where this paper was first presented, and they came with their complaint to us, there is no reasonable way in which we, as authors or presenters, could be expected to respond to the complaint. We are in no position to respond, in terms of our competence, our knowledge, or our position. If they, on the other hand, lodged a complaint about the quality of the lectures at the conference, we might well be expected to give a response. And if the complaint especially surrounded the last lecture before lunch (ours!), then we would indeed be the ones from whom to expect a justifying or excusing response.