Lava Jato (Car Wash) was one of the largest corruption trials in the world. The Lava Jato taskforce launched a battle against powerful political actors using legal tools creatively and sought to garner public support by resorting to the media. The chapter examines three examples that illustrate these two strategies and unpacks their legal dimensions. It focuses on three decisions by Sergio Moro, Lava Jato’s most prominent judge: ordering the police to bring former president and 2018 presidential candidate Lula Da Silva in for questioning without a previous request, disclosing a recorded conversation obtained during an investigation against Lula, and making public a plea bargain agreement that incriminated Lula. The chapter outlines the political impact of Moro’s actions and examines them in light of current Brazilian legislation on transparency and accountability for judges’ behaviour. It finds that while transparency is a principle that informs criminal trials in Brazil, Moro pushed the existing rules to their limits to gain public support. At the same time, he attempted to influence public opinion by taking advantage of the discretion the Brazilian inquisitorial criminal system provides judges. The chapter also analyses the limitations of Brazilian legislation to prevent this kind of behaviour and points to the challenges of reforming it. It concludes that while courts’ mobilization of the media and creative use of legal tools may increase anti-corruption accountability, the costs of this strategy outweigh its benefits.

The relationship between corruption and privatization is a complex one. In some cases, they are conceived as polar opposites, with privatization touted as a strategy to combat corruption. In others, they are synonyms: privatization is perceived as a product of or a mechanism to enable corruption. In this chapter, I argue that there are particular circumstances in which each of these hypotheses may prevail, suggesting that the answer to the question “who gains from privatization?” is largely dependent on context. An accurate picture needs to consider the multiple phases of the privatization process, the unique institutional framework in which decisions are made, and the particularities of the sector(s) involved. To develop this argument, I organize the vast literature on the political economy of privatization according to three key moments: the decision to privatize (before privatization), the privatization process (during privatization), and the dynamics governing the privatized structures (after privatization).

Prologue

Beijing Consensus was a term initially coined by Joshua Cooper Ramo in 2004, as a superior, and distinctly Asian, developmental model. Ramo's claim of a “Beijing Consensus” triggered much academic interest and resistance in the West, as some questioned whether the developmental policies Ramo's model prescribed accurately described China's path to economic development. In 2007, Randall Peerenboom, in a book titled China Modernizes: Threat to the West or Model for the Rest?, advanced what he termed an “East Asian Model,” which prioritizes economic reforms over liberal political reforms and is characterized by a distinctively gradualist approach to development. A couple years later, Dani Rodrik advanced a similar model – “New Development Economics.” Similar to the East Asian Model, it emphasizes pragmatism and experimentation and considers China's post-Mao development as its principal exemplar.

In this chapter, Pessimo (Dowdle) and Optimo (Prado) debate the merits and pitfalls of each of these instantiations of the idea of a consensus. We conclude – somewhat surprisingly – that it is in the discussion they generate, rather than in their substantive prescriptions, that the real value of these models lies.

On Joshua Ramo's Original Idea of a “Beijing Consensus”

Joshua Ramo introduced the term Beijing Consensus as a particular developmental strategy that was superior to the then still popular, but increasingly discredited, “Washington Consensus.” According to Ramo, the Beijing Consensus consists of “three theorems about how to organize the place of a developing country in the world.” We examine each theorem in turn.

On Ramo's First Theorem

“The first theorem repositions the value of innovation. Rather than the ‘old-physics’ argument that developing countries must start development with trailing-edge technology (copper wires), it insists that on [sic] the necessity of bleeding-edge innovation (fiber optic) to create change that moves faster than the problems change creates. In physics terms, it is about using innovation to reduce the friction losses of reform.”

Pessimo on Development as “Bleeding-Edge” Innovation

To me, this is just a buzzword salad. What does it mean to “create change that moves faster than the problems change creates”? What problems do copper wires cause that immediate transition to fiber optics outruns?