This article explores whether allowing such expansive arbitration is a wise idea for the United States (and other western democracies). Like all arbitration, religious arbitration starts with a contract to arbitrate, but frequently does not invoke the law of the United States as the law to be used to resolve disputes, but instead allows parties to resolve disputes according to their own religious principles, both procedurally and substantively. The article is organized into two substantive parts. One part explores the strengths and weaknesses of the seven arguments against faith-based arbitration, which are (1) one law for one people; (2) religious arbitration produces substantive injustice; (3) religious arbitration produces procedural injustice; (4) religious arbitration is often subtly coercive to its members; (5) liberal society has a difficult time policing religious arbitration; (6) enforcement of religious arbitration sometimes violates people's rights to religious freedom; and (7) allowing religious arbitration promotes isolation and non-integration of religious communities. The next part explains and criticizes the five arguments in favor of religious arbitration, which are (1) religious arbitration is a religious freedom imperative; (2) religious arbitration can resolve some commercial disputes more accurately than secular courts can; (3) religious arbitration is the only way to resolve certain religious problems; (4) secular regulation of religious arbitration helps moderate and integrate religion; and (5) religious arbitration promotes value sharing between religious and secular cultures and as such enriches public discourse. The article concludes with an endorsement of the value of religious arbitration subject to reasonable procedural and substantive limitations.

In every legal system a gap exists between the law as it is actually enforced by the courts and the ethical categorical imperative. Although it was rejected by Justice Holmes in his “bad man rule,” a strong claim can be made that the measure of an enlightened and advanced legal system and society is its success in bridging this gap. Within a religious legal system which rejects the clear separation of law and ethics, the severity of this problem is ameliorated. As illustrated by Jewish law, even such a system's purely civil law must be influenced by ethical duties to a far greater degree than in secular legal systems.

This article compares the legal rules and jurisprudence of the American common law and Jewish law in the area of finding and returning lost or abandoned property, illustrating the interplay between the purely legal and ethical components of the respective legal systems. Surprisingly enough, the differences between the two systems are not usually significant; they follow the same basic legal principles, and typically lead to the same results. There are, however, two major exceptions: Jewish law imposes a duty to rescue the lost property of one's neighbor, while the common law does not require that one initiate the process by retrieving the article. Thus according to Jewish law, when one happens to stumble across lost property, one must intervene to retrieve it; according to the common law one need not. Second, Jewish law imposes ethical duties as part of its legal mandate, a practice the common law does not follow.

This essay seeks to place happiness and sadness as values in their proper place in the Jewish legal tradition—as secondary concerns that are properly invoked and considered in cases where Jewish law is indefinite and unclear. This article provides a number of illustrative examples where such is done, and it then seeks to place happiness and its related values in their proper place in Jewish law as compared to other second-tier principles.

Jewish Law (Mishpat Ivri): Cases and Materials is a comprehensive and lucid analysis of Jewish law as it is used in the Israeli Supreme Court as part of Israeli secular law, exhaustively detailed and clearly written. It is designed to be used as an American law school textbook and is published by a law school publishing house—Matthew Bender—as part of its casebook series. The book begins with two questions: “How is it possible that a legal system bereft of territory and police power has not only persevered but flourished? Whence do the Jewish legal authorities derive their tradition-embedded answers to what appear to be novel, contemporary questions?” The book seeks to answer these queries with an exposition on the nature and purpose of Jewish law, followed by a chapter-by-chapter integration of the uses of Jewish law into Israeli secular law.