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52 results

Page 1 of 3

  • Falsity and untruth

  • Peter van Inwagen
  • Journal:
    Religious Studies / Volume 60 / Issue 4 / December 2024
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    29 April 2024, pp. 706-716
    Print publication:
    December 2024
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  • Jc Beall's Divine Contradiction is a fascinating defence of the idea that contradictions are true of the tri-personal God. This project requires a logic that avoids the consequence that every proposition follows from a contradiction. Beall presents such a logic. This ‘gap/glut’ logic is the topic of this article. A gap/glut logic presupposes that falsity is not simply the absence of truth – for a proposition that is true may also be false. This article is essentially an examination of the idea that falsity is not simply untruth. The author rejects this position but does not claim to have an argument against it. In lieu of an argument, he presents three ‘considerations’. First, it is possible to give an intuitive semantics for the language of sentential logic that yields ‘classical’ sentential logic (including ‘p, ¬ p ⊢ q’) and which makes no mention of truth-values. Second, it is possible to imagine a race who manage their affairs very well without having the concept ‘falsity’. Third, it is possible to construct a semantics that yields a logic identical with the dialetheist logic and which makes no mention of truth-values – and which, far from being plausible, seems pointless.

  • If New York Is Not in the United States, It's in California

  • PETER VAN INWAGEN
  • Journal:
    Journal of the American Philosophical Association / Volume 8 / Issue 1 / Spring 2022
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    24 January 2022, pp. 41-51
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  • An argument is presented for the truth of the conditional, ‘If New York is not in the United States, it's in California’. Several possible objections to this argument are then examined and evaluated. Further argument establishes that if the argument for the truth of ‘If New York is not in the United States, it's in California’ is sound, it follows that an indicative conditional is true if and only if it has either a false antecedent or a true consequent.

  • 12 - Begging the Question

  • Edited by Graham Oppy, Monash University, Victoria
  • Book:
    Ontological Arguments
    Published online:
    01 November 2018
    Print publication:
    08 November 2018, pp 238-249

  • Summary

    The focus of this chapter is on the question whether modal ontological arguments are question-begging. I assume – on the basis of material that I have published elsewhere – that all other arguments that have been grouped together under the title ‘ontological arguments’ are irremediably flawed for reasons other than their begging the question. (Perhaps some of them are also question-begging; but the issue is clearly not pressing.) I conclude that whatever value the modal ontological argument may have, whatever philosophical rewards may attend a careful study of the argument, this value and these rewards are not epistemological: they will not provide the student of the argument with any sort of reason for believing that a perfect being exists, and nor will they provide the student of the argument with any sort of reason for believing that it is rationally permissible to believe that a perfect being exists.

Thinking about Free Will
  • Peter van Inwagen
  • Published online:
    31 March 2017
    Print publication:
    06 March 2017
  • Peter van Inwagen, author of the classic book An Essay on Free Will (1983), has established himself over the last forty years as a leading figure in the philosophical debate about the problem of free will. This volume presents eleven influential essays from throughout his career, as well as two new and previously unpublished essays, 'The Problem of Fr** W*ll' and 'Ability'. The essays include discussions of determinism, moral responsibility, 'Frankfurt counterexamples', the meaning of 'the ability to do otherwise', and the very definition of free will, as well as critiques of writings on the topic by Daniel Dennett and David Lewis. An introduction by the author discusses the history of his thinking about free will. The volume will be a valuable resource for those looking to engage with van Inwagen's significant contributions to this perennially important topic.

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