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11 results

The Philosophy of Animal Minds
  • Edited by Robert W. Lurz
  • Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 September 2009
  • This volume is a collection of fourteen essays by leading philosophers on issues concerning the nature, existence, and our knowledge of animal minds. The nature of animal minds has been a topic of interest to philosophers since the origins of philosophy, and recent years have seen significant philosophical engagement with the subject. However, there is no volume that represents the current state of play in this important and growing field. The purpose of this volume is to highlight the state of the debate. The issues which are covered include whether and to what degree animals think in a language or in iconic structures, possess concepts, are conscious, self-aware, metacognize, attribute states of mind to others, and have emotions, as well as issues pertaining to our knowledge of and the scientific standards for attributing mental states to animals.

  • The philosophy of animal minds: an introduction

  • Edited by Robert W. Lurz, Brooklyn College, City University of New York
  • Book:
    The Philosophy of Animal Minds
    Published online:
    05 June 2012
    Print publication:
    03 September 2009, pp 1-14

  • Summary

    INTRODUCTION

    The minds of animals has been an abiding topic in philosophy since its earliest beginnings. Some may find this surprising. After all, a fairly common picture of the philosopher is someone (in a darkened study) ruminating on the nature of the human mind, or on the mind of God, or on some other abstruse idea, but certainly not on the minds of cats, dogs, and honeybees. As common as this picture may be, however, it does not paint an entirely accurate portrait. Philosophers have thought long and hard about the minds of animals and have held and defended significant and influential views on the topic. Moreover, in the past ten years or so there has been an unprecedented amount of interest among philosophers in animal minds, with numerous publications and conferences dedicated to the subject. The level of interest and publication has reached a critical mass and has sustained itself long enough that it is now appropriate to say that the philosophy of animal minds is a field in its own right. The purpose of this volume is to highlight the state of the art in the field by bringing together a collection of new and cutting-edge essays by the best and brightest philosophers.

    Since the essays in this volume have been shaped by various lines in the rich history of philosophical thought on animal minds, I provide a brief (albeit, vastly incomplete) sketch of some of the most important and influential ideas and arguments in this history, as well as a road map to the volume itself.

  • Feigning introspective blindness for thought

  • Robert W. Lurz
  • Journal:
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences / Volume 32 / Issue 2 / April 2009
    Published online by Cambridge University Press:
    23 April 2009, pp. 153-154

  • I argue that the very reasons Carruthers gives for why the “mindreading is prior” account should allow introspective access to perceptual/quasi-perceptual states, can be given for thought, as well. I also argue that we have good subjectively accessible grounds for the intuition in introspective thoughts, notwithstanding Carruthers' argument to the contrary and his attempt to explain the intuition away.