Skip to main content Accessibility help

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.

Close cookie message
×
  1. Home
  2. Search

Refine search

Refine search

Access:
Content type:
Publication date:
Apply   From and To filters
Subject: Show more
Journals Show more
Publishers: Show more
Societies Show more
Series: Show more
Collections: Show more

Actions for selected content:

Select all | Deselect all
  • View selected items
  • Export citations
  • Download PDF (zip)
  • Save to Kindle
  • Save to Dropbox
  • Save to Google Drive

Save Search

You can save your searches here and later view and run them again in "My saved searches".

Please provide a title, maximum of 40 characters.
Cancel
×

49 results

Page 1 of 3

U.S. Innovation Inequality and Trumpism

U.S. Innovation Inequality and Trumpism
  • The Political Economy of Technology Deserts in a Knowledge Economy
  • Victor Menaldo, Nicolas Wittstock
  • Published online:
    07 February 2025
    Print publication:
    13 February 2025
  • President Trump embraced economic populism centered on trade protectionism, restrictions on international capital and technology flows, and subsidies for American raw material providers and domestic manufacturers. More innovative US counties roundly rejected this economic paradigm: Voters in innovation clusters of all sizes and across the country repudiated Trumpism in both 2016 and 2020. Trump's tariffs and attacks on global supply chains, restrictions on visas for skilled foreign workers, and his overall hostility toward high-tech sectors threatened the innovative firms that motor these places' economies. Trump was different in degree but not kind from previous American populists such as Jennings Bryan and Perot: they too exploited innovation inequality, but were less successful because, before the digital revolution, the industrial organization of American technological progress was not rooted in vertically disintegrated global supply chains. Thus, populism may not only be about resentment toward elites and experts but threaten innovation.

  • 3 - The Stickiness of “Bad” Institutions

  • Edited by Daniel M. Brinks, University of Texas, Austin, Steven Levitsky, Harvard University, Massachusetts, María Victoria Murillo, Columbia University, New York
  • Book:
    The Politics of Institutional Weakness in Latin America
    Published online:
    06 May 2020
    Print publication:
    11 June 2020, pp 61-97

  • Summary

    Most countries in the world operate under authoritarian constitutions. Historically, Latin American countries have been overrepresented in this group. Many of these authoritarian constitutions have proven remarkably sticky. The most long-lived ones not only govern the authoritarian regimes that pen them but subsequently constrain democratic successors long after the end of dictatorship.

    On average, these constitutions are relatively strong as defined in this volume: they achieve their statutory goals and produce outcomes their authors and bequeathers intended them to produce. Historically, their authors and bequeathers have used them to satisfy a narrow set of objectives: secure the safety and welfare of outgoing dictators as well as safeguard the political and economic interests of their core supporters. These constitutions are also consequential, distorting democracy in favor of these former dictators and supporters.

Page 1 of 3