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There is No (Sui Generis) Norm of Assertion

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 May 2020

Alexander Greenberg
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Abstract

There are norms on action and norms on assertion. That is, there are things we should and shouldn't do, and things we should and shouldn't say. How do these two kinds of norm relate? Are norms on assertion reducible to norms on action? Many philosophers think they are not. These philosophers claim there is a sui generis norm specific to assertion, a norm which is also often claimed to be constitutive of assertion. Both claims, I argue, should be rejected. The phenomenon claimed to support them – the intuitive wrongness of certain assertions – does not in fact support them. Because assertion is an action, the wrongness of assertions can be explained purely by norms on action. And the specifically epistemic wrongness an assertion norm is typically supposed to explain can be explained by an uncontroversial norm on action: one shouldn't act on epistemically faulty beliefs. No additional sui generis norm on assertion is needed.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 95 , Issue 3 , July 2020 , pp. 337 - 362
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2020

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