^{page 45 note 2} Two criteria were employed in the selection of individuals for the survey: (1) the degree to which a figure is centrally significant for and representative of the theology of the period and (2) the extent to which a person's exegetical work makes a distinctive contribution to the changing understanding of the sensus literalis of Scripture.

^{page 45 note 3} Brown, Raymond E., ‘The Literal Sense of Scripture’, in Brown, Raymond, Fitzmeyer, Joseph, and Murphy, Jerome (eds.), The Jerome Biblical Commentary, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 1968, 606–610Google Scholar.

^{page 45 note 4} Brown cites the Catholic scholars A. Fernandez and P. Benoit as examples (ibid., 606–607).

^{page 46 note 5} Ibid., 607.

^{page 46 note 6} ‘That only is to be regarded as plain, straightforward, or simple exegesis which corresponds to the totality of meanings intended by the writer …’ (Loewe, Raphael, ‘The “Plain” Meaning of the Scriptures in Early Jewish Exegesis’, in Weiss, J. G. (ed.), Papers of the Institute of Jewish Studies London, Jerusalem, 1964, 141–142Google Scholar.

^{page 46 note 7} Ibid., 176. (Weiss' work is Dor Dor we-doreshaw.) Loewe, however, also criticizes Weiss for uncritically equating the ‘essential’ and ‘literal’ meanings and identifying them with peshat (Ibid., 176–177).

^{page 46 note 8} Loewe points out that the fundamental meaning of peshat in Hebrew is ‘to strip (a garment), properly to flatten it by so doing’, with the meaning ‘make a raid’ as a metaphorical extension. Also, via the cognate languages peshat comes to mean ‘extend’ or ‘stretch out’ in later rabbinic Hebrew (Ibid., 155).

^{page 46 note 9} Childs, Brevard S., ‘The “Sensus Literalis” of Scripture: An Ancient and Modern Problem’, in Donner, Herbert, Hanhart, Robert, and Smend, Rudolf (eds.), Beiträge zur Alttestamentliche Theologie, Festschrift für Wallher Zimmerli zum 70. Geburtstag, Göttingen, 1977, 81Google Scholar. A clear sense of this ‘usual textbook definition’ may be gained by consulting Wilhelm Bacher's standard work, Die Exegetische Terminologie der Jüdischen Traditionsliteratur, 1905; rpt. Hildesheim, 1965. Examining the use of peshat in the Tannaitic period, Bacher states, ‘Mit ist dann das einfache, einmalige Recitiren verstanden’ (i, 86). For a similar definition from the Amoraic period, see Part ii, 170–173.

^{page 47 note 10} Loewe, , ‘The Plain Meaning’, 155–160Google Scholar.

^{page 47 note 11} Ibid., 180–181. Loewe concludes his detailed study with a flat assertion that ‘notions of “plain literalism” as a formal branch of rabbinic exegesis ought, up to the end of the periods of the Talmud and the midrashim, to be abandoned’ (Ibid., 180). He also suggests ‘the categories of static and dynamic exegesis’ to replace the inadequate traditional opposition between peshat and derash (Ibid., 183–185).

^{page 47 note 12} Childs, ‘Sensus Literalis’, 81.

^{page 47 note 13} Ibid., 93.

^{page 47 note 14} The origin of the distinction between ‘the letter and the spirit’ in Christian theology may be found in Paul's contrast of these terms in Romans ii.29 and vii.6 and especially in II Corinthians iii.6. Preus, James (From Shadow to Promise, Cambridge, Mass., 1969, 11CrossRefGoogle Scholar) disputes the significance of this theme for Augustine's exegesis, claiming that in The Spirit and the Letter Augustine provides ‘the hint (sic) that “spirit and letter” have nothing to do with the difference between “spiritual” and “literal” senses of Scripture’. Nevertheless, simply because Augustine saw a larger theological issue in the contrast between ‘spirit and letter’ emerging out of his controversy with the Pelagians is not sufficient reason to assume that this theme does not play a major role in his exegetical method.

^{page 47 note 15} I am indebted to Childs' article, ‘The “Sensus Literalis” of Scripture: An Ancient and Modern Problem,’ for pointing out this contrast.

^{page 47 note 16} Origen's interpretation of the Old Testament is one of his major exegetical achievements. For a detailed exposition of his position, see Hanson, R. P. C., Allegory and Event, Richmond, 1959, 288–310Google Scholar. Also cf. Daniélou, Jean, Origen, Mitchell, Walter (trans.), New York, 1958, 39–173Google Scholar.

^{page 48 note 17} Chadwick, Henry (trans.), Origen: Contra Celsum, Cambridge, 1965, vii, 20, 411Google Scholar. P.G., xi, 1449. Also found in Die Griechischen Christlichen Schrifsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte: Origenes Werke, Leipzig ii, 171. In addition, cf. Contra Celsum, vi, 70 (Chadwick, Origen, 384; P.G., xi, 1404–1405) for a similar passage expounding Paul. For a homiletical illustration of Origen's use of this theme, see his Leviticus Homily VII, 5 (Gary Wayne Barkley (trans.), Origen's Homilies on Leviticus: An Annotated Translation (Ph.D. dissertation, The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1984), 174. P.G., xii, 488).

^{page 48 note 18} For a detailed discussion of issues related to the historicity of Scripture in Origen, see Hanson, , Allegory, ch. x, 258–288Google Scholar.

^{page 48 note 19} Cf. Brown's, Raymond assessment of Origen's exegetical views (Brown, ‘The Literal Sense’, 607ff.Google Scholar).

^{page 48 note 20} Butterworth, G. W. (trans.), Origen on First Principles, London 1936, iv, 2, 4, 275–276Google Scholar. P.G., xi, 364 (iv, 11). Grant, citing a fragment of Origen's interpretation of Galatians for support, wisely comments that for Origen, ‘Condemning literalism does not involve condemning literalists’ (Grant, Robert M., The Letter and the Spirit, London 1957, 90)Google Scholar.

^{page 48 note 21} Butterworth, , First Principles, iv, 2, 6, 279Google Scholar. P.G., xi, 368 (iv, 12). Cf. Deuteronomy xxv.4 for the law which Paul is discussing.

^{page 49 note 22} Butterworth, , First Principles, iv, 2, 5, 277–278Google Scholar. P.G., xi, 365 (iv, 12).

^{page 49 note 23} See Hanson, , Allegory, 239–241Google Scholar, for an extensive listing of these passages in Origen.

^{page 49 note 24} Butterworth, , First Principles, iv, 3, 1, 288Google Scholar. P.G., xi, 376–77 (iv, 16).

^{page 49 note 25} Butterworth, , First Principles, iv, 3, 5, 297Google Scholar. P.G., xi, 385 (iv, 20).

^{page 49 note 26} Butterworth, , First Principles, iv, 2, 9, 285Google Scholar. P.G., xi, 373 (iv, 15).

^{page 49 note 27} Butterworth, , First Principles, iv, 2, 8, 284Google Scholar. P.G., xi, 373 (iv, 14).

^{page 49 note 28} Butterworth, , First Principles, iv, 2, 9, 286Google Scholar. P.G., xi, 376 (iv, 15). Grant (The Letter, 95–96) cites Strabo's view of Homeric poetry and Aristotle's Poetics for earlier classical parallels to this ‘weaving in’ notion of composition.

^{page 50 note 29} For additional discussion and critique of Origen's view of the literal sense of Scripture, see my paper, ‘Origen and the Sensus Literalis’, published with the proceedings of the 1986 Origen Colloquium at the University of Notre Dame.

^{page 50 note 30} Origen, Genesis Homily I, in Heine, Ronald E. (trans.), Origen: Homilies on Genesis and Exodus, (The Fathers of the Church, A New Translation, 71) Washington 1982, 48–50Google Scholar. P.G., xii, 147–148. Unfortunately, the Genesis homilies of Origen are only extant in the Latin ‘translation’ of Rufinus, which frequently tries to make Origen appear more orthodox by the standards of later Catholic doctrine.

^{page 51 note 31} Butterworth, , First Principles, iv, 2, 2, 271–272Google Scholar. P.G., xi, 360 (iv, 9).

^{page 51 note 32} For a dramatic example of Origen's fantastic allegory, see his interpretation of the ‘fatty parts’ of animal sacrifices as the soul of Christ (!) in his Leviticus Homilies (Homily III, 5. Barkley, , Leviticus, 66Google Scholar; Homily V, xi. Barkley, , Leviticus, 128Google Scholar. Cf. also at p. 112 (V, 4) and p. 120 (V, 8) for other interpretations of the ‘fatty parts’.) For an extended homiletical illustration of this incredible allegorical exegesis, see Homily I, 4 (Barkley, Leviticus, 32–37), where the skin of the calf is ‘the veil of the letter’. For further discussion of the problem of Origen's allegory, see my paper ‘Allegorical Flights of Fancy: The Problem of Origen's Exegesis’, The Greek Orthodox Theological Review, 32 (1987), 69–88.

^{page 51 note 33} Hanson (Allegory, 258) strikingly characterizes Origen's interpretive principles as ‘exegetical suicide’.

^{page 51 note 34} In the words of one biographer, ‘Augustine never lost an opportunity of reminding his people that Holy Scripture must first and foremost be taken in the literal and historical sense … he endeavoured to correct his own allegorical exegesis by giving a literal interpretation of the extremely difficult opening passages of Genesis which he had once interpreted mystically’. (von der Meer, F., Augustine the Bishop, Brian Battershaw and G. R. Lamb (trans.), London 1961, 448.)Google Scholar

^{page 52 note 35} Augustine, De Doctrina Christiana, ii, 6, 8, in Aurelius Augustine, Opera Omnia, Monks of St Benedict (eds.), Paris 1836, iii, 1, 45 (hereafter cited as Augustine, Opera). Robertson, D. W. Jr. (trans.), On Christian Doctrine, Indianapolis 1958, p. 38Google Scholar (hereafter cited as Robertson, Doctrine).

^{page 52 note 36} Cf. Childs, ‘Sensus Literalis’, 82.

^{page 52 note 37} Augustine uses analogia here to refer to the relationship of the Old Testament to the New Testament. ‘Secundum analogiam cum demonstratur non sibi adversari duo Testamenta, Vetus et Novum.’ (Augustine, Liber de Utilitate Credendi, iii, 5, in Augustine, Opera, viii, 102.)

^{page 52 note 38} Ibid. I am indebted to Wolfson, Harry Austryn (The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, I, Faith, Trinity, Incarnation, Cambridge, Mass. 1964, 68Google Scholar) for directing me to this work by Augustine. Also, Wolfson (Ibid.) twice cites Augustine's De Genesi ad litteram, Imperfectus liber, ii, 2 for this same fourfold distinction, though this reference is incorrect. The correct citation is ii, 5 (Augustine, Opera, 8, 159).

^{page 52 note 39} Augustine, , De Doctrina Christiana, iii, 22, 32Google Scholar. Robertson, , Doctrine, 98Google Scholar. Augustine, , Opera, iii, 1, 95Google Scholar.

^{page 53 note 40} Ibid., iii, 5, 9. Robertson, , Doctrine, 84Google Scholar. Augustine, , Opera, iii, 1, 84Google Scholar. Augustine specifically excludes the Jews in the Old Testament from his condemnation of taking spiritual signs literally (Ibid., iii, 6, 10).

^{page 53 note 41} Ibid., iii, 10, 14. Robertson, , Doctrine, 88Google Scholar. Augustine, , Opera, iii, 1, 87Google Scholar.

^{page 53 note 42} Augustine's use of this norm for requiring spiritual interpretation may especially be found in his exposition of the Psalms, which in their literal sense are frequently difficult to interpret as leading to the knowledge and love of God and neighbor. For instance, Augustine interprets Psalm 10 (LXX; Psalm 11 Hebr.) allegorically as a ‘a hymn against the heretics’ (i.e., the Donatists). In his exegesis even ‘the moon’ is interpreted as spiritually symbolic of both the Church and the synagogue, with the latter warranting a christological interpretation of the Psalm (Augustine, , On The Psalms, 1, Hebgin, Scholastica and Corrigan, Felicitas (trans.), Westminster, Md. 1960, 135–148Google Scholar).

^{page 54 note 43} Augustine, , The Literal Meaning of Genesis, Taylor, J. (trans.), New York 1982, 46–48Google Scholar (Book ii, Ch. 1, 1–4 passim).

^{page 55 note 44} The significant convergence of Jewish and Christian exegesis in the medieval period, as expressed in such figures as Rashi, Andrew of St Victor, and Lyra, who lie beyond the scope of the present study, is an additional factor of major significance for the changing shape of the sensus literalis.

^{page 55 note 45} For a recent, detailed discussion of Thomas' view of the literal sense, see Kennedy, Robert George, Thomas Aquinas and the Literal Sense of Sacred Scripture (Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Notre Dame, 1985)Google Scholar.

^{page 55 note 46} Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologica, la. i. 10Google Scholar, in St Thomas Aquinas: Theological Texts, Gilby, Thomas (ed. and trans.), Durham, N.C. 1982, 17. First published Oxford, 1955.Google Scholar

^{page 56 note 47} Thomas, Summa Theologica, la. i. 10 ad 2, in Gilby, , Theological Texts 20–21Google Scholar. R. P. P. Synave argues from detailed examination of the texts that the literal sense in Thomas is a single sense (Synave, R. P. P., ‘La doctrine de Saint Thomas D'Aquin sur le sens littéral des Écritures’, Revue Biblique, 35 (1926), 48–61)Google Scholar. In contrast, T. F. Torrance maintains less convincingly that the literal sense in Thomas ‘may itself be twofold’ (Torrance, T. F., ‘Scientific Hermeneutics According to Saint Thomas Aquinas’, Journal of Theological Studies, New Series 13 (1962), at p. 282)Google Scholar.

^{page 56 note 48} Cf. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1. i. a. 10: ‘Now because the literal sense is that which the writer intends, and the author of Scripture is God who comprehends everything all at once in his understanding, it comes not amiss, as St Augustine observes (Confessions, xii, 31), if many meanings are present even in the literal sense of one passage of Scripture.’ (Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologica, I, The Existence of God. Part One: Questions 1–13, Gilby, Thomas (ed.), New York 1969, 60.)Google Scholar

^{page 56 note 49} Thomas, , De Trinitate, ii. 3Google Scholar, in Gilby, , Theological Texts, 8Google Scholar.

^{page 56 note 50} According to Ménard, ‘Son originalité la plus grande est sans dome d'avoir faite du sens littéral l'unique voie d'accès à un sens spirituel authentique’. (Ménard, Étienne, La Tradition: Révélation, Écriture, Église selon Saint Thomas d'Aquin, Paris 1964, 135Google Scholar.) While Ménard probably overstates the originality of Thomas' contribution, given his dependence upon and extension of Augustine in this area (cf. Kennedy, Literal Sense, 6), the emphasis on the hermeneutical control exercised by the sensus literalis for Thomas is vital for understanding his exegetical method.

^{page 56 note 51} Thomas, Summa Theologica, la. i. 10, ad 3, in Gilby, , Theological Texts, 21Google Scholar. As Synave, citing Thomas' De scripturis et scriptoribus sacris (ch. 3), has indicated, this metaphorical extension required a major redefinition of the adjective ‘historicus’ for Thomas (Synave, ‘La doctrine’, 43).

^{page 57 note 52} Thomas, , vii Quaestiones Quodlibetales, vi. 15Google Scholar, c, ad 1, in Gilby, , Theological Texts, 19Google Scholar. As Synave explains, in Messianic prophecies, Thomas holds that, ‘le sens littéral c'est la figure elle-méme, désignée premièrement comme réalité, …’ (Synave, ‘La doctrine’, 45).

^{page 57 note 53} Thomas, , vii Quaestiones Quodlibetales, vi, 15Google Scholar, c, in Gilby, , Theological Texts, 19Google Scholar.

^{page 57 note 54} I am indebted to Brevard Childs' article, ‘The “Sensus Literalis” of Scripture: An Ancient and Modern Problem,’ (at p. 85) for pointing to this comparison of Augustine and Thomas.

^{page 58 note 55} Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologica, Fathers of the English Dominican Province (trans.), New York 1947, 1. i. 68, aaGoogle Scholar. 1, 3, pp. 338, 339, 341.

^{page 59 note 56} The larger context of this rule is as follows: ‘Oportet enim scriptura iudice hie sententiam ferre, quod fieri non potest, nisi scripturae dederimus principem locum in omnibus quae tribuunter patribus, hoc est, ut sit ipsa per sese certissima, facillima, apertissima, sui ipsius interpres, omnium omnia probans, iudicans, et illuminans. …’ (Martin Luther, Assertio omnium articolorum M. Lutheriper bullam Leonis X novissimam damnatorum, in D. Martin Luthers Werke, Weimar 1897, vii. 11.20–24, at p. 97. Hereafter the Weimar Ausgabe will be cited simply as W.A.).

^{page 59 note 57} Luther abandoned the fourfold medieval sense of Scripture in 1517 (Preus, Shadow, 227). Instead he sought to combine all the meanings of the text into one true literal sense. As Ebeling states, ‘Es gibt keinen mehrfachen Schriftsinn. Die buchstäbliche ist der geistliche, der geistliche ist der buchstäbliche Sinn’, (Ebeling, Gerhard, Evangelische Evangelienauslegung, Munich 1942Google Scholar; Darmstadt 1962, 311.)

^{page 59 note 58} Martin Luther, Against Latomus, George Lindbeck (trans.), in Luther's Works, xxxii, Career of the Reformer II, Philadelphia 1958, 236–237Google Scholar.

^{page 60 note 59} Ibid., 168. W.A., viii. 64. Here Luther refers to Matt, xix.29 to illustrate the ‘absurdity of meaning’ rule (a ‘hundredfold’ of wives!) and to the swords of Psalm xlv.3 and Luke xxii.38 to illustrate the contextual necessity rule. For an illustration of Luther's argument with Latomus that a passage (Rom. vii. 15–25) should be taken literally, see Lindbeck, , Luther's Works, xxxii, 244–245Google Scholar.

^{page 61 note 60} Luther, Martin, Lectures on Genesis. Luther's Works, i, Schick, George V. (trans.), St Louis, 1958, 22, 23–24, 26, and 33.Google Scholar

^{page 61 note 61} Frei, Hans, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, New Haven 1974, 23Google Scholar.

^{page 62 note 62} Cf. Childs, ‘Sensus Literalis’, 87. Frei, Eclipse, 23. Parker finds the locus classicus for Calvin's view to be in his commentary on Galatians iv. 22–24 (the allegory of Sarah and Hagar), where, after attacking Origen and other allegorists, Calvin declares, ‘Therefore let us know eum esse verum Scripturae sensum, qui germanus et ac simplex (i.e., ‘onefold’), and let us embrace it and hold it resolutely. As for those pretended expositions which lead us a literali sensu, let us not merely neglect them as doubtful, but boldly reject them as dead corruptions.’ (Parker, T. H. L., Calvin's New Testament Commentaries, Grand Rapids, Mich. 1971, 64.)Google Scholar

^{page 62 note 63} Calvin, John, Institutes of the Christian Religion, McNeill, John T. (ed.), Battles, Ford Lewis (trans.), London, 1961, 1385 (iv, 17, 21).Google Scholar

^{page 62 note 64} ‘And that no one may despise my view as something newly devised, Augustine felt and spoke the same way’ (Ibid., 1386).

^{page 62 note 65} Note the ten scriptural citations Calvin uses as illustrations of and warrants for metonymy (Ibid., iv, 17, 21).

^{page 62 note 66} Ibid., 1385 (iv, 17, 21), emphasis added. Cf. Frei, Eclipse, 25.

^{page 63 note 67} Calvin, John, Commentaries on the First Book of Moses Called Genesis, King, John (trans.), Grand Rapids, Mich. 1948, 79–81Google Scholar.

^{page 64 note 68} As Steinmetz declares, ‘The meaning of historical texts cannot be separated from the complex problem of their reception and the notion that a text means only what its author intends it to mean is historically naïve. Even to talk of the original setting in which words were spoken and heard is to talk of meanings rather than meaning.’ (Steinmetz, David C., ‘The Superiority of Pre-Critical Exegesis’, Theology Today, 37 (1980–1981), at p. 37CrossRefGoogle Scholar.) Also cf. the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer in philosophical hermeneutics, especially his Truth and Method, Barden, Garrett and Cumming, John (translation eds.), New York, 1975Google Scholar.