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PRESIDENTS AND THE CONDITIONAL CORE-SWING TARGETING OF THE NATIONAL SUBSIDY IN SOUTH KOREA, 1989–2018

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 October 2021

Wooseok Kim Open the ORCID record for Wooseok Kim [Opens in a new window]
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Abstract

In this article, I present a theory of conditional core-swing targeting that focuses on the competition for majority control in legislative elections to explain how presidents use their strong budgetary powers to manipulate the distribution of the national subsidy in South Korea. Presidents whose parties already possess a legislative majority are expected to favor core municipalities to strengthen the foundations of their majority constituency, whereas those who seek majority control are predicted to prioritize swing municipalities in an effort to cross the majority threshold. Presidents are also anticipated to respond to the electoral cycle by shifting subsidies to riskier municipalities when elections approach. Using a novel data set on national subsidy allocations that spans three decades, I find evidence in favor of the hypotheses. This article demonstrates that the beneficiaries of distributive favoritism are not fixed, and that politicians can engage in complex and varied targeting strategies to achieve their objectives.

Keywords

distributive politicspork barrelSouth Koreapresidentslegislative elections
Type
Article
Information
Journal of East Asian Studies , Volume 21 , Issue 3 , November 2021 , pp. 477 - 497
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the East Asia Institute

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