15200 results in ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute
13 - A state of surveillance? Freedom of expression under the Jokowi presidency
- Edited by Thomas Power, Eve Warburton
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- Democracy in Indonesia
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- 24 November 2020
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- 19 August 2020, pp 254-274
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Summary
In May 2019, following the official announcement that Joko Widodo (‘Jokowi’) had been re-elected for a second term, supporters of his rival, former general Prabowo Subianto, took to the streets. While these protests were unlikely to alter broad public acceptance of the election results, they prompted a strong response from the Jokowi government. This included the large-scale mobilisation of security forces, mass arrests of demonstrators, and the blocking of video and image sharing on social media and messaging platforms such as WhatsApp.
Government representatives justified the actions by referring to national ‘interests’ and ‘security’. Communications and Information Technology Minister Rudiantara stated that the restrictions on social media were imposed to contain the spread of fake news, hoaxes and provocative content that could prompt clashes between Prabowo supporters and security personnel. Other cabinet members, including Wiranto, the coordinating minister for politics, law and security, similarly argued the restrictions were born of necessity: ‘[for] three days, we won't be able to look at pictures. I think we’ll be fine. This is for the national interests’ (Kure 2019). After the protests had ended, Rudiantara suggested the police should be given the power to monitor WhatsApp. He dismissed concerns of civil society groups who argued that such monitoring would violate privacy rights. Rudiantara received support from presidential chief of staff Moeldoko, who said that national security should be prioritised over individuals’ privacy (Lee 2019).
This case reflects a broader trend towards increasing limitations on the freedom of expression under the first term of Jokowi's presidency (2014– 2019). The Jokowi administration's limited interest in civil and political rights has been well noted (McGregor and Setiawan 2019). In the early years of Jokowi's presidency, analysts attributed this apathy to Jokowi's prioritisation of economic programs and the need to consolidate his initially weak political position by accommodating conservative political forces (Muhtadi 2015; Warburton 2016). But these trends only intensified as Jokowi secured his hold on power: by late 2016 he had consolidated his political position, yet the government's protection of civil and political rights continued to deteriorate.
These developments are further evidence of what Diprose et al. (2019) describe as an ‘illiberal turn’ in Indonesian politics.
5 - Divided Muslims: militant pluralism, polarisation and democratic backsliding
- Edited by Thomas Power, Eve Warburton
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- Democracy in Indonesia
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- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
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- 24 November 2020
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- 19 August 2020, pp 81-100
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Indonesia's most recent elections have been dubbed the most polarising in over 50 years. In 2017, the Christian Chinese governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (better known as Ahok), was ousted following a series of Islamist-led protests that resulted in his conviction on blasphemy charges. The 2019 presidential election between Joko Widodo (Jokowi) and Prabowo Subianto was no less divisive: many in the Prabowo camp claimed that Jokowi was anti-Islamic or even a communist, and many on Jokowi's side asserted that Prabowo's ‘radical’ Islamist supporters were seeking to turn Indonesia into an Islamic theocracy. Muslim voters were divided along ethnic and ideological lines: Javanese traditionalist Muslims overwhelmingly voted for Jokowi, while more puritan, modernist Muslims in the outer islands largely backed Prabowo (Shofia and Pepinski 2019). An unprecedented 97 per cent of non-Muslims voted for the ‘pluralist’ Jokowi, even though his running mate, Ma’ruf Amin, was widely known for his deeply conservative politics (Indikator Politik Indonesia 2019).
This kind of identity-based polarisation has serious consequences for democratic quality. Comparative studies emphasise that political polarisation makes normal democratic competition seem an existential battle between two sides with mutually exclusive identities. This in turn prompts voters to view elections as a zero-sum game, and both sides become willing to accept less democratic strategies and rules if it means ensuring their candidate wins office (García-Guadilla and Mallen 2018; McCoy et al. 2018). As other contributions to this volume explain, political polarisation in the Jokowi era has already begun to erode liberal democratic norms and institutions in this way (see Hicken, this volume). The Jokowi administration's constraints on opposition actors and Prabowo's initial refusal to accept the 2019 election results are two powerful examples of the anti-democratic implications of a more polarised electoral atmosphere (see Warburton, this volume).
In this chapter, I examine the role of Islamic organisations and leaders in producing a more polarised political climate and, in turn, a less democratic Indonesia. Much recent literature focuses on one part of the equation: the increasing political significance of hardline Islamist organisations (e.g. Arifianto 2019; IPAC 2018; Mietzner and Muhtadi 2018). I look instead at the ‘militant pluralist’ counter-mobilisation spearheaded by Indonesia's largest traditionalist organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU).
17 - Electoral violence in Indonesia 20 years after reformasi
- Edited by Thomas Power, Eve Warburton
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- Democracy in Indonesia
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- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
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- 24 November 2020
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- 19 August 2020, pp 346-370
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Summary
Over the past two decades, Indonesia has been acknowledged as the world's third-largest democracy and largest Muslim-majority democracy. By 2019, the country had smoothly run four direct presidential elections, five parliamentary elections and hundreds of direct local elections (pilkada). Voter participation rates in national elections have hovered around 70 per cent over the years, with greater variation in local executive elections. Following Suharto's resignation in 1998, Indonesia shifted to a multiparty system in which hundreds of thousands of candidates compete across a multitude of legislative and executive races. On 17 April 2019, Indonesia held its most complicated election in history. Billed as one of the world's largest simultaneous elections, the 2019 election saw over 80 per cent of 190 million registered voters cast their vote simultaneously for their local council representatives, parliament members and president in more than 800,000 polling stations across the archipelago. Despite the complicated logistical undertaking, the election proceeded without major incidents of violence.
These successes notwithstanding, many Indonesia specialists have expressed concerns over the quality of democracy in recent years (e.g. Aspinall 2018; Hadiz 2017; Lindsey 2018). An increase in government crackdowns on critics and the politicisation of identities around elections (Warburton and Aspinall 2017), among other indicators, have been identified as worrying symptoms of democratic deterioration. While the 2019 national election went smoothly, the announcement of its results a few weeks later spurred protests by Prabowo Subianto's supporters and a two-day riot that claimed ten lives and injured at least 200 people (BBC 2019; Halim 2019). The authorities deployed more than 40,000 troops, arrested hundreds of rioters and shut down access to social media for several days to prevent the spread of what it termed ‘hoaxes’ and ‘fake news’ (Straits Times 2019). While order was restored within a few days, authorities claimed that the outburst was purposefully planned to discredit election results, and promised to thoroughly investigate the provocateurs involved (Chan 2019).
This outburst of post-election violence raises a few important questions: To what extent is electoral violence a common occurrence in Indonesia? What can patterns of electoral violence tell us about the country's quality of democracy? Did the May 2019 riots mark a shift to more violence around elections in Indonesia?
4 - How polarised is Indonesia and why does it matter?
- Edited by Thomas Power, Eve Warburton
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- Democracy in Indonesia
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- 24 November 2020
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- 19 August 2020, pp 63-80
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Global events have reignited scholarly interest in the relationship between polarisation and democratic quality. Populist victories in Europe, Donald Trump's electoral success in America, and the sustained popularity of figures like Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey and Narendra Modi in India, have all depended upon the mobilisation of social and political division. In these parts of the world, the intensification of political conflict along ideological and identity-based lines has occurred in tandem with a decline in democratic quality.
More and more, analysts see polarisation as a critical factor in processes of democratic regression. Carothers and O’Donohue (2019: 2), for example, compare a range of countries from Latin America, Asia and Europe, and find that polarisation undermines democracy because it ‘routinely weakens respect for democratic norms, corrodes basic legislative process … exacerbates intolerance and discrimination, diminishes societal trust, and increases violence throughout the society’. Intense partisanship and polarisation create the conditions under which elite and mass support for liberal aspects of democracy—protection of freedoms and liberties for everyone—becomes increasingly ‘contingent’ or ‘conditional’.
Until recently, analysts viewed Indonesia as immune to such severe political polarisation and its pernicious effects. A divide between Islamic and pluralist parties has long structured Indonesia's party system: Islamic parties and their supporters promote a larger role for Islamic precepts in public life and politics, while pluralist parties have a more secular orientation. But patronage-driven politics has largely papered over ideological divisions in the democratic era. Indeed, when surveyed, a vast majority of politicians said they and the party to which they belong are willing to form coalitions with any of the other political parties (Aspinall et al. 2020). High levels of ethnic and religious fragmentation have also worked against the development of a divisive identity-based politics of the sort found in Malaysia—at least at the national level. In particular, complex doctrinal divisions and conflicts among proponents of political Islam made it difficult to categorise organisations or voters neatly into either a pluralist or Islamic camp.
The absence of polarisation for much of the democratic period can also be attributed in part to President Yudhoyono's (2004–2014) style of leadership.
1 - The decline of Indonesian Democracy
- Edited by Thomas Power, Eve Warburton
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- Democracy in Indonesia
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- 24 November 2020
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- 19 August 2020, pp 1-20
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Indonesia should feature prominently in any global account of democratisation. In a few heady years after the 1998 collapse of Suharto's autocratic New Order, Indonesia was transformed from one of the world's last and largest bulwarks of Cold War authoritarianism into one of Asia's most vibrant democracies. The details of this transition are well known, but bear repeating: the withdrawal of the armed forces from politics; the liberalisation of the party system; free and competitive elections; the proliferation of independent media; legal and judicial reform; expanded space for civil society; and a vast decentralisation program that devolved political power to elected local leaders. These achievements were yet more remarkable given they took place in an ethnically and religiously diverse country struggling to recover from the ravages of the Asian financial crisis. During this time, Indonesia appeared a democratic outlier (Carothers 2009; Diamond 2008; Lussier 2016): a rare case of successful transition and consolidation, not only within Southeast Asia, but globally amid the ebbing of democracy's third wave (Huntington 1991) and the onset of the democratic recession (Diamond 2015; cf. Levitsky and Way 2015).
Yet two decades after the landmark elections of 1999, a different— and far more pessimistic—scholarly consensus is taking shape. Where political analysts once lauded Indonesia as a beacon of democracy in a troubled region, most now agree that its democracy is in decline (Aspinall and Mietzner 2019; Diprose et al. 2019; Hadiz 2017). Recent studies have drawn attention to deterioration across an array of indicators: populist mobilisations, growing intolerance and deepening sectarianism (Mietzner et al. 2018; Warburton and Aspinall 2019); increasingly dysfunctional electoral and representative institutions (Aspinall and Sukmajati 2016; Muhtadi 2019); the deterioration of civil liberties (Marta et al. 2019); and the executive's expansion of an authoritarian toolkit for suppressing opposition and curtailing criticism (Mietzner 2019; Power 2018).
In the early months of 2020, as we finalised this volume for publication, the COVID-19 pandemic was sweeping into Indonesia's population centres. The central government was struggling to contain the virus, the death toll was rising, and the administration's instructions on lockdowns and social distancing were being poorly articulated and unevenly implemented. The government proved far more proactive and capable, however, in clamping down on criticism of its response to the pandemic.
Frontmatter
- Edited by Thomas Power, Eve Warburton
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- Book:
- Democracy in Indonesia
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- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
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- 24 November 2020
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Foreword
- Serina Rahman
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- Renewable Energy
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- 29 October 2021
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- 14 July 2020, pp v-vi
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The economic, political, strategic and cultural dynamism in Southeast Asia has gained added relevance in recent years with the spectacular rise of giant economies in East and South Asia. This has drawn greater attention to the region and to the enhanced role it now plays in international relations and global economics.
The sustained effort made by Southeast Asian nations since 1967 towards a peaceful and gradual integration of their economies has had indubitable success, and perhaps as a consequence of this, most of these countries are undergoing deep political and social changes domestically and are constructing innovative solutions to meet new international challenges. Big Power tensions continue to be played out in the neighbourhood despite the tradition of neutrality exercised by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
The Trends in Southeast Asia series acts as a platform for serious analyses by selected authors who are experts in their fields. It is aimed at encouraging policymakers and scholars to contemplate the diversity and dynamism of this exciting region.
THE EDITORS
Series Chairman:
Choi Shing Kwok
Series Editor:
Ooi Kee Beng
Editorial Committee:
Daljit Singh
Francis E. Hutchinson
Benjamin Loh
Renewable Energy: Malaysia’s Climate Change Solution or Placebo?
- Serina Rahman
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- Renewable Energy
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- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
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- 29 October 2021
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- 14 July 2020, pp vii-viii
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• Malaysia pledged to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 45 per cent by 2030 in relation to its 2005 GDP figure. The sectors listed as the main focus of this effort included: energy, industrial processes, waste, agriculture, land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF). Several initiatives under myriad governments have been launched to reduce Malaysia's climate change impacts; among those has been the emphasis on renewable energy (RE).
• Malaysia's current energy mix relies heavily on coal and natural gas. Long-entrenched subsidies on these energy sources, coupled with greatly depreciating prices make it difficult for new RE producers to enter the market and increase their market share. This is in spite of positive developments in RE infrastructure and reduced RE material costs.
• Solar, biogas, biomass and mini-hydro have been put forward as the RE sources with the most potential, but all have issues of consistency and reliability. Because small energy generators cannot guarantee infallible energy production, they may not be the most viable options for the long term. Their size also denies them the economies of scale that would reduce their costs. Instead, these higher costs may be transferred to the consumer.
• Other issues include the competition for land in the development of large-scale solar farms, including the possible loss of community farmlands and hence livelihoods, if not displacement. A push for biomass and biogas as a source of energy might also lead to increased oil palm production to meet the need for consistent supplies of oil palm waste. Biogas from municipal landfills is made even more challenging given that Malaysian municipal waste is not sorted at source.
• One possible solution is the use of hybrid RE in rural areas, comprising a mix of micro-hydro, solar and diesel-based energy generation as a back-up. However an immediate win is to ensure energy efficiency and public education to encourage emissions reduction and climate change impacts on the individual consumer.
Renewable Energy: Malaysia’s Climate Change Solution or Placebo?
- Serina Rahman
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- Book:
- Renewable Energy
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- 29 October 2021
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- 14 July 2020, pp 1-28
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Under the Paris Agreement, Malaysia committed to reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 45 per cent by 2030 in relation to its 2005 GDP figure. The target includes a caveat for an unconditional reduction by 35 per cent, and an additional 10 per cent reduction upon receipt of climate financing, technology transfer and capacity building from more developed nations (MITI, 2017).
Malaysia's commitment to climate change began with then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad's insistence at the 1992 Rio Earth Summit that poorer nations had already been exploited by developed countries (who were guilty of higher carbon emissions), and should be allowed to continue to develop, albeit sustainably (Varkkey 2019). This was when Malaysia first pledged to keep at least 50 per cent of the country under forest cover. Since then, several initiatives under myriad governments have been launched to reduce Malaysia's climate change impacts.
On the ground in Malaysia, many feel and see the effects of climate change; increasingly frequent and extreme weather ranging from violent storms to extended droughts, changes in the winds and monsoon seasons affecting farmers and fishermen, as well as rising sea levels encroaching on coastal communities. Studies have shown that climate change will have an extensive impact beyond those that are immediately physically visible; reduced crop yields and food insecurity, biodiversity loss and disease, increased flood intensities, coral bleaching, decrease in freshwater availability from seawater encroachment and novel human illnesses (Abdul Rahman 2018; MESTECC 2018).
However, not everyone necessarily connects the changes in these natural phenomena with climate change. Only 32 to 40 per cent of the general public are aware of climate change and its impacts (Varkkey 2019). This thus hampers the government's efforts to encourage Malaysian citizens and residents to take ownership of climate change issues. While there are several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and research centres that focus on climate change awareness and action, broad-scale efforts for institutional change to accommodate and mitigate climate change impacts have necessarily been top-down (but not necessarily effective) in nature.
This paper examines some of Malaysia's efforts at climate change mitigation, thereafter focusing on the country's emphasis on renewable energy (RE) as a key tool to reduce GHG emissions and meet its reduction targets.
Renewable Energy
- Malaysia's Climate Change Solution or Placebo?
- Serina Rahman
-
- Published by:
- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
- Published online:
- 29 October 2021
- Print publication:
- 14 July 2020
-
Malaysia pledged to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 45 per cent by 2030 in relation to its 2005 GDP figure. The sectors listed as the main focus of this effort included: energy, industrial processes, waste, agriculture, land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF). Several initiatives under myriad governments have been launched to reduce Malaysia's climate change impacts; among those has been the emphasis on renewable energy (RE). Malaysia's current energy mix relies heavily on coal and natural gas. Long-entrenched subsidies on these energy sources, coupled with greatly depreciating prices make it difficult for new RE producers to enter the market and increase their market share. This is in spite of positive developments in RE infrastructure and reduced RE material costs. Solar, biogas, biomass and mini-hydro have been put forward as the RE sources with the most potential, but all have issues of consistency and reliability. Because small energy generators cannot guarantee infallible energy production, they may not be the most viable options for the long term. Their size also denies them the economies of scale that would reduce their costs. Instead, these higher costs may be transferred to the consumer. Other issues include the competition for land in the development of large-scale solar farms, including the possible loss of community farmlands and hence livelihoods, if not displacement. A push for biomass and biogas as a source of energy might also lead to increased oil palm production to meet the need for consistent supplies of oil palm waste. Biogas from municipal landfills is made even more challenging given that Malaysian municipal waste is not sorted at source. One possible solution is the use of hybrid RE in rural areas, comprising a mix of micro-hydro, solar and diesel-based energy generation as a back-up. However an immediate win is to ensure energy efficiency and public education to encourage emissions reduction and climate change impacts on the individual consumer.
Frontmatter
- Serina Rahman
-
- Book:
- Renewable Energy
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- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
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- 29 October 2021
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- 14 July 2020, pp i-iv
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Islam and Religious Expression in Malaysia
- Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani
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- 10 November 2020
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- 29 June 2020
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This book attempts to analyse the concept of religious expression vis-à-vis freedom of speech in Malaysia from the philosophical, political and theoretical perspectives. It begins by discussing the major sources of religious expression that are firmly rooted in the societal and religious beliefs, constitution and legislation of the country. It also examines multiple facets of the Islamization policy in the country and to what extent such policy affects the exercise of domestic religious expression. The problems and challenges of domestic religious expression, theoretically and practically, will also be examined including the issues of radicalization and terrorism. After a change of power from the Barisan Nasional (BN) to Pakatan Harapan (PH) in 2018, this book attempts to explain PH's approach in dealing with the issue of Islam and religious expression in Malaysia. Lastly, this book intends to identify and observe how Malaysian society and the state react to the issue of religious expression.
Frontmatter
- Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani
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- Book:
- Islam and Religious Expression in Malaysia
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- 10 November 2020
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Cantents
- Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani
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- Islam and Religious Expression in Malaysia
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6 - New Malaysia under Pakatan Harapan
- Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani
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- Islam and Religious Expression in Malaysia
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- 10 November 2020
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- 29 June 2020, pp 135-162
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Introduction
According to Prime Minister Najib and his predecessors, Malaysia's culturally diverse population is the main reason additional restrictions have consistently been placed on the population's civil liberties. Thus, under the banner of “national security”, the government limits freedom of speech to safeguard race relations and to ensure national stability. Further, while democracy as a political ideal is still sought after, restrictions are imposed on political processes to protect other fundamental values. Unlike the West, it is not so much the restriction of freedom of speech that is being questioned in Malaysia but the government's domination of the channels of political expression which it uses to weaken the opposition and eliminate criticism. Thus, the main problem in Malaysia lies in the ruling government's willingness to exploit the country's fragile political situation for its own ends by routinely suppressing dissent and criticism from political opposition, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the public.
However, Prime Minister Najib has rebuffed such claims, saying, on the contrary, his government is open to criticism. While denouncing opposition leaders and foreigners, whom he blamed for spreading falsehoods and fake news, Najib said that the media has a duty to:
fight to the last this tide of fake and false news that threatens to turn truth into a purely subjective matter, with little relation to the actual facts … The government of Malaysia will be on your side … All we ask in return is the opportunity to remind you to rely in your reporting and sourcing— in whichever country that may be—not on rumours, not on unsourced anonymous quotes, and not on invented propaganda, no matter how persuasively it may be presented, but on verified facts. We have no fear of the facts: for they are undisputed. For the future of newspapers, both in print and online, to be as healthy as we all want and need it to be, I am sure (Channel News Asia 2017).
Najib even argued that “free speech is thriving in Malaysia”, compared to other nations in the region, before going on to blame the false and fake news tyrannizing social media now plaguing the country.
4 - Intra-Religious Expression
- Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani
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- Book:
- Islam and Religious Expression in Malaysia
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- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
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- 10 November 2020
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- 29 June 2020, pp 81-112
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Introduction
Malaysia is a state that embraces communitarianism. Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (2006, p. 47), former prime minister of Malaysia, is critical of the Western values of individualism and once urged the West to learn about the Muslim world because in his view, Muslims see themselves ideally as a collective ummah, notwithstanding the occasional disunity among Muslims countries. Malaysia is also a multireligious society prone to inter-and intra-group conflicts if the relations between and within races are not handled and managed well.
From the debate of religious expression, a communitarian approach to speech regulation where the curtailment of a speech and the consequent loss of autonomy are considered less problematic. In a communitarian society like Malaysia, the state is not neutral between conceptions of the good life, but seeks to promote a substantive version of the “common good” and actively strives to create the public and private virtues needed for society to attain that end (Sandel 1982; Taylor 1985; Walzer 1983). Communitarians perceive individuals as having social characters grounded in the communities in which they live (McIntyre 1981). The good of an individual is not conceivable unless understood within some broader views of the good of the community. For communitarians, rules of civility found in the common law or in statutes regulating public morals, express dominant community norms and thus identity. Restraints on offensive and racist expressions can thus be cast and defended as the product of majoritarian rule-making that reflects prevailing norms such as tolerance and the equal worth of individuals and are enforced for the good of the whole community. Here, the protection of religious feeling may be prioritized over the value of democratic legitimacy, or these legitimacy concerns may simply be seen as a non-issue and ignored altogether (Cram 2009, p. 329).
Those who called for treating religion distinctively remind us that in religion, speech plays a unique role by connecting a person to God positively (prayer) or negatively (blasphemy). It is not “just an opinion”. Moreover, religious expression, such as prayer, is often a communal act and thus the community has a direct stake in the content of the speech.
3 - Inter-Religious Expression
- Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani
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- Book:
- Islam and Religious Expression in Malaysia
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- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
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- 10 November 2020
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- 29 June 2020, pp 65-80
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Introduction
Freedom of expression is a fundamental liberty that all modern states should have in their constitutions and implement in the society. But freedom of expression is not absolute even to the defenders of the right. There is a heated debate in identifying the kinds of expressions that warrant constitutional protection. It is rather ironic that some staunch defenders of free expression deny certain other practices including religious expression. Gregory P. Magarian (2010) explains that there are arguments for normative constraints on religious argument and the translation imperative on the ground that religious arguments threaten liberal democracy. They posit two distinctive sorts of danger. First, they contend that religious beliefs cannot provide adequate justifications for coercive governmental actions in conditions of democratic pluralism. Members of a liberal democratic political community should not offer religious arguments in public debate because such arguments by definition urge improper grounds for government action. Any coercion based on religious arguments is unfair to non-believers, because such coercion denies non-believers equal respect and full and fair access to the process of political decision-making (Audi 1989, pp. 259–76; Greene 1993, pp. 1611–33). Second, religious arguments undermine public political debate, and thus threaten liberal democracy, by fostering social and political instability. Religious arguments, on the restrictive theorists’ account, carry a distinctive capacity to inspire intolerance of opposing political viewpoints (Audi 1997, p. 5; Rorty 1994, pp. 1–6; Marshall 1993, pp. 843–58; Sullivan 1992, pp. 195–99).
In contrast, some theorists argue that secularism poses a greater threat to liberal democracy than religion. Some compare what they portray as overblown claims of religion's divisiveness to the genuine divisiveness of political advocacy by or for historically disadvantaged racial and ethnic groups (McConnell 1999, pp. 639–48). First, they reject the restrictive concern that leads to religious arguments in public political debate denying non-believers equal respect and regard by underwriting religious justifications for coercive government actions. These theorists maintain that whatever features of insularity or exceptionalism might cause certain religious arguments to alienate non-believers and are equally likely to cause certain secular arguments to alienate believers or others. In any event, they contend that religious arguments in public political debate do not dictate policy outcomes but simply make “one contribution among others in a debate about how political power is to be used” (Alexander 1993, pp. 775–76; Waldron 1993, pp. 817–29).
2 - Islamization Policy and Islamic Bureaucracy
- Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani
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- Book:
- Islam and Religious Expression in Malaysia
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- ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute
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- 10 November 2020
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- 29 June 2020, pp 25-64
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Summary
Introduction
Considerable restrictions over certain types of religious expression practices in Malaysia imply the State's subtler and consistent intention not only to maintain racial and religious harmony within the country's multiethnic society, but also ultimately to protect the sanctity of Islam. Safeguarding the primacy of Islam as the official religion of the Federation serves as raison d’etre for the Malaysian government and state-religious authorities to carry out Islamization policies and programmes in which Islamic values, principles, laws and systems are integrated into every aspect of national life.
Within the broader context of domestic political landscape, the impetus for Islamization coincided with the deliberate tactical political measures employed by the UMNO-led ruling government to continue to remain in power amidst the background of burgeoning socio-political climate oriented towards Islamic primacy and conservatism which emerged since the 1970s. Hence, this chapter explores and examines the characteristics of state-driven Islamization policy in Malaysia and its historical narrative development. Greater attention will also be paid to the driving factors of and socio-politico ramifications arising from this policy. An understanding of the government's intents, rising Islamic revivalism and the existing national constitutional and legislative framework offer some insights into why the State acted in such ways.
Historical and Contemporary Background of Islamization Policy: An Overview
The origin of Islamization policy in Malaysia can be traced back to the early 1960s. Nevertheless, historical accounts of the early period following the post-independence Malaya reveal that the signs of Islamization process were already visible. The country's first Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman paved the way by establishing the Muslim Welfare Organisation of Malaysia (PERKIM: Persatuan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia). Since its establishment in 1960, PERKIM has been a “non-partisan” da’wah organization entrusted to care for recent converts to Islam and to educate the Muslims about Islam. Even so, it was during the period between the 1970s and the 1980s that the policy had gained impetus with the steadily revival of political Islamist movement in the country. During this period, social, legal and political Islamization process in Malaysia coincided and, to a significant extent, was influenced by a landmark of geopolitical events unfolded outside the country—the Iranian Revolution of 1979–82 and revivalism of conservative Islamism in sub-Indian continent.
Index
- Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani
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- Book:
- Islam and Religious Expression in Malaysia
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- 10 November 2020
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- 29 June 2020, pp 209-224
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Foreword
- Mohd Azizuddin Mohd Sani
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- Islam and Religious Expression in Malaysia
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- 10 November 2020
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- 29 June 2020, pp viii-x
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Summary
Islamic religious expression takes various forms globally from peaceful piety-oriented ones to the most brutal and violent ones.
The September 11 attack in New York has come to be viewed as the most violent public Islamic religious expression that led to the development of intense Islamophobia globally. It was subsequently made more intense by continuous Islamic jihadist attacks conducted in various parts of the world, from the United Kingdom to Chechnya, from Bali to Colombo. When videos of the beheadings of innocent individuals by the Islamic State and the Levant (ISIL) of the Middle East were shown on the Internet, the whole world was shocked and bewildered as to how much more violent Islam could become. Not surprisingly, thereafter, hatred towards Islam came to be generalized and embedded in the negative perceptions and narratives of billions throughout the world.
The majority of Muslims themselves could not provide any explanation or rationale to these abhorrence violent religious expressions. They could not give any credible reason and even if they could, most of them sounded weak and defensive, even evasive.
When President Barrack Obama delivered his speech in Cairo on 4 June 2009 on “the new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world, one based on mutual interest and mutual respect … by expanding partnerships in areas like education, economic development, science and technology, and health …”, the world paused for a moment, with some segments of the Muslim and non-Muslim populace offering euphoric responses.
When Obama addressed the issue of economic development and opportunity, he emphasized how human progress cannot be denied, in spite of the crisis faced by the world, including among Muslim communities across the globe. He then specifically referred to “the astonishing progress within Muslim-majority countries from Kuala Lumpur to Dubai” based on innovation and modernization whilst enjoying peace, prosperity, progress, and political stability.
It could be argued that the gist of Obama's speech is that Islamic religious expression throughout history has been intellectually positive. He stressed on the peaceful manner of the expression that benefitted human civilization. Peaceful Islamic religious expression has continuously dominated the history of Islam that, in turn, has enabled it to contribute to world civilizations in the longue durée term.