35 results in Jagiellonian University Press
Introduction
- Paweł Laider, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Maciej Turek, Jagiellonian University, Krakow
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- Basic Documents in Federal Compaign Finance Law
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- 01 January 2015, pp 7-10
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Summary
The significant growth of scholarship on the issue of money in American politics in recent years does not mean that the problems with these matters have emerged only recently. In fact, they have been there since the beginnings of the American political system, and the scope of their influence has depended on the given state of the regulations – legislative and Supreme Court opinions – as well as the creativity of candidates and campaign operatives.
In the 19th century the problem of money in elections was of little interest to legislators, though this did not mean there was a lack of regulations concerning the operation of the selection, appointment and election of public officers on the federal level. The laws implemented at that time, however, had limited range, and resulted either from political scandals or social concerns about corruption among government officers rather than from a general necessity to regulate campaign finance issues. In the 20th century, reformers began to see campaign laws as a way to solve the problem of the proper regulation of the growing impact of money on politics and politicians during election campaigns. Due to the changing perspectives of ideologically based political forces, electoral procedures became less important than questions concerning the proper functioning of American democracy, the rule of law, and the scope of such crucial individual rights as freedom of speech or broad access to information. Today, the discussion over the proper scope of campaign finance regulations is highly politicized and divides representatives of the two major political parties as to the scope of control over said regulations. Money and politics have always been connected, but the active participation of big business, corporations, and political action committees as contributors to congressional and presidential campaigns have made the system prone to and dependent on high levels of funding. The issue has never been so tense and challenging as it is now, as the amount of money pumped into political campaigns at the beginning of the 21st century increases the concern of various social and political circles over the proper functioning of American democracy.
The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974: 88 Stat. 1263 (1974)
- Paweł Laider, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Maciej Turek, Jagiellonian University, Krakow
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- 01 January 2015, pp 40-43
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Summary
The limited success of the authors of the FECA, stemming from the ineffectiveness of its various provisions, mainly those referring to the public disclosure of financial documents from election campaigns, stimulated legislators to search for a quick revision of the document and insert necessary amendments. Such an approach was especially characteristic after the lack of pre-election disclosure of expenditures by President Richard Nixon in the 1972 campaign, when the public found out that the Republican candidate collected more than $11 million from various sources. Apart from the disclosure failure, even more decisive for congressional action was the outbreak of the Watergate scandal, which revealed the illegal activities of the Committee to Re-Elect the President, putting the whole problem of money and politics at the center of social concern.
The authors of the amendment opted for strengthening the disclosure system, furthering limits to campaign contributions and spending, and creating a comprehensive system of public funding for presidential elections, based on the earlier provisions of the 1971 laws. The most significant aspect of the 1974 legislation, however, was the creation of an independent administrative agency, the Federal Election Commission (FEC), which would be responsible for administering and enforcing campaign finance laws, including oversight of the presidential election public fund. Prior to this the system had lacked such an institution; this was one of the major reasons for its ineffectiveness. Therefore, the creation of the Commission was aimed at enhancing the disclosure procedures, implementing further regulations on campaign finance, and investigating alleged violations of the laws concerning campaign finance by both contributors and candidates. Another important innovation was a limit on so-called independent expenditures. These were all the expenses made on behalf of the candidates by the political parties or the outside groups without the coordination with them, their campaign committees or political parties. Before the new law took effect, however, it was challenged in court, leading to the milestone Supreme Court decision on the scope of campaign finance regulations, Buckley v. Valeo.
Frontmatter
- Paweł Laider, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Maciej Turek, Jagiellonian University, Krakow
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McConnell v. F.E.C.: 540 U.S. 93 (2003)
- Paweł Laider, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Maciej Turek, Jagiellonian University, Krakow
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- 01 January 2015, pp 103-107
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Summary
The implementation of BCRA in 2002 was announced as a great success of American democracy, because the law was adopted with the votes of members of both political parties in Congress. The authors of the legislation argued that it addressed the most controversial effects of the Federal Election Campaign Act, which was the uncontrolled flow of soft money and growing impact of political action committees on the electoral process. As a matter of fact, during the congressional debates there were some critics on both sides of the political aisle, with Senator Mitch McConnell as the leading opponent of the new law. Therefore, there was no surprise when McConnell decided to challenge it and took the issue to the federal courts. Due to a special procedure designed in BCRA, the case was heard by a panel of three district judges, who found part of the legislation unconstitutional, and then the case was brought to the Supreme Court on appeal.
McConnell v. F.E.C. became the first (but not last) decision in which the highest court in the U.S. determined the constitutionality of various provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. McConnell challenged two restrictions implemented by the campaign finance law: the prohibition of using soft money for election campaigns, and broad limitations on political advertisements used for campaign purposes. In a narrowmargin decision, supported by liberal Justices and Sandra Day O'Connor, the Court upheld the challenged provisions of BCRA, arguing that the impact of campaign finance restrictions on the freedom of speech of contributors was not significant, and was justified by a compelling state interest. As a result, the regulations on soft money and electioneering communications remained in force, and the only part of BCRA which was struck down referred to limitations on political contributions by minorities. Four conservative justices strongly dissented from raising arguments of First Amendment protection of candidates and their contributors, thereby assuring that the clash of values between the left and right wings of the Court would dominate in its subsequent decisions in 2007, 2010 and 2013.
The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979: 90 Stat. 339 (1979)
- Paweł Laider, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Maciej Turek, Jagiellonian University, Krakow
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In the late 1970s, Congress initiated a third revision of the Federal Election Campaign Act, voting for amendments to the legislation in 1979, which were enacted in early 1980. Contrarily to the reasons for earlier amendments, which were imposed after political scandals (1974) and a Supreme Court decision (1976), this time the legislators decided to make changes in the regulations analyzing the conduct of the federal elections of 1976 and 1978. One of the main purposes of the revision of campaign finance law was a simplification of the procedures referring to the disclosure of campaign reports, which was achieved by diminishing the amount of reports, as well as reducing the number of subjects responsible for the disclosure of documentation. The other significant input of the 1979 amendments was the enhancement of the public financing program, through an increase in the amount of funds used in that program. Generally, the law was intended to make the procedures simpler, which was the main notion of election campaign participants, as well as the critics of FECA. Finally, the amendment sought to promote raising turnout and party-building activities. It raised the allowable expenditures of state and local parties, as long as they were coordinated with federal office candidates, particularly in presidential races. Yet while it aimed at voting registration drives and get-out-the-vote activities, it soon became a major source of soft money proliferation.
Despite the fact that Congress implemented small changes to the FECA in the 1980s, there was no further major legislation concerning campaign finance until the beginning of the 21st century, when the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act was adopted.
An Act to amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 to make certain changes in the reporting and disclosure requirements of such Act, and for other purposes…
SEC. 304. (a)(1) Each treasurer of a political committee shall file reports of receipts and disbursements in accordance with the provisions of this subsection. The treasurer shall sign each such report.
The Taft-Hartley Act: 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
- Paweł Laider, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Maciej Turek, Jagiellonian University, Krakow
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The Labor Management Relations Act (known as the Taft-Hartley Act after its sponsor, Senator Robert Taft), which amended the famous National Labor Relations Act, referred to campaign finance law in only small part. It was aimed mainly at regulating the operation of labor unions, which meant imposing several restrictions on their powers, such as defining the types of strikes, which were prohibited, determining relations between employer and labor unions, and allowing the employer to use free speech rights against so-called “unionization.” In addition, however, the law permanently banned labor unions’ contributions to federal campaigns, as well as covering any expenses on behalf of the party, campaign committee, or candidate, or directly influencing primary elections, caucuses, political conventions and general elections.
As a result, labor unions and civil rights organizations tried to challenge the Taft- Hartley Act in the courts, referring to the scope of the constitutional freedom of speech, but the judiciary did not answer these challenges in the affirmative. The only case which found part of the Act unconstitutional was United States v. Brown (1965), but the Court's holding did not refer to the issues of campaign finance.
An Act to amend the National Labor Relations Act, to provide additional facilities for the mediation of labor disputes affecting commerce, to equalize legal responsibilities of labor organizations and employers, and for other purposes…
SEC. 304. Section 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1925, as amended, is amended to read as follows: “SEC. 313. It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by authority of any law of Congress to make contribution or expenditure in connection with any election or any political office, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any political office, or for any corporation whatever, or any labor organization to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any election at which Presidential and Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative in, or a Delegate or Resident Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for, or in connection with any primary election or political convention or caucus held to select candidates for any of the foregoing offices, or for any candidate, political committee, or other person to accept or receive any contribution prohibited by this section.
The Hatch Act 53 Stat. 1147 (1939) The 1940 Amendment to the Hatch Act: 54 Stat. 767 (1940)
- Paweł Laider, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Maciej Turek, Jagiellonian University, Krakow
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Summary
The lack of new general campaign finance regulations between 1925 and 1971 did not mean that the issue was not present in political debates in Congress, as well as during presidential and congressional campaigns, which saw increased interest from various organizations contributing to particular candidates. In the 1930s, such interest occurred on the side of labor unions, which saw in the electoral process a proper way of influencing changes in government policies. This was especially visible during the implementation of New Deal programs, which were supported by members of various labor unions and organizations. As a part of the New Deal coalition, these suddenly became important contributors to federal campaigns for Congress and the White House. Furthermore, there were allegations that the Democratic Party used employees of the Works Progress Administration to pursue their political and electoral goals. All this led to the implementation in 1939 of the Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, known as the Hatch Act, after its sponsor Senator Carl Hatch.
The authors of the law wanted to limit the political impact of those federal civil employees not restricted by the Pendleton Act and its extension. These individuals were now prohibited from contributing to all federal campaigns. The Act, however, did not control the flow of big money in federal campaigns. Therefore, a year after creating The Hatch Act, Congress decided to amend it by broadening the types of entities banned from contributing to presidential and congressional elections. It also introduced the first annual limits on individual donations in these elections. In practice, both laws limited the influence of political parties on the process of financing campaigns, which resulted in the growing impact of outside organizations on that process.
An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities…
SEC. 5. It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit or receive or be in any manner concerned in soliciting or receiving any assessment, subscription, or contribution for any political purpose whatever from any person known by him to be entitled to or receiving compensation, employment, or other benefit provided for or made possible by any Act of Congress appropriating funds for work relief or relief purposes.
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. F.E.C.: 518 U.S. 604 (1996)
- Paweł Laider, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Maciej Turek, Jagiellonian University, Krakow
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Summary
The last vital Supreme Court decision on the constitutionality of certain regulations of the Federal Election Campaign Act made in the 20th century came in 1996 in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. F.E.C. The issue referred to the actions undertaken by the Republican Committee in Colorado during the 1986 elections to the state Senate, when it prepared a series of radio advertisements criticizing prospective candidates of the rival Democratic Party. According to FECA provisions, such contributions were prohibited, because the expenditures of political parties during federal election campaigns to Congress were limited. As a result, the Federal Election Commission filed a suit against the operations of the Republican Committee, which, in a countersuit, claimed that federal campaign finance legislation was inconsistent with the constitutional right to free speech. Although the District Court decided to dismiss the case on the grounds of its mootness, the Court of Appeals adjudicated in the dispute, finding no violation of the constitution in FECA's restrictions. Finally, the case was brought to the Supreme Court, which posed a general question on the constitutionality of the FECA provisions regarding campaign contributions by political parties in elections to Congress.
Seven Justices signed the plurality opinion written by Justice Stephen Breyer, in which they declared the constitutionality of the expenditures of political parties which were not made in the name of any candidates and not coordinated with them – thus making them independent expenditures. The Court established that any prohibition of such an expenditure contradicts the principles of free speech and free expression. As a result, the Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee won the case, but the Court's holding did not directly overrule any larger piece of campaign finance legislation, as only Justice Clarence Thomas, who wrote a dissent, opted for an argument on the unconstitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act's restrictions on political party contributions. Although the Republican Committee also challenged the limits on coordinated expenditures in support of candidates to the House of Representatives and Senate, the Court decided not to consider that issue in the case.
The Tillman Act: 34 Stat. 864 (1907)
- Paweł Laider, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Maciej Turek, Jagiellonian University, Krakow
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Despite the intent of legislators, the Pendleton Act did not fully diminish the influence of politics on the operation of the government, especially in the selection and removal of federal employees. Furthermore, in the last decade of the 19th century the issue of money and politics became a major concern to party leaders and American society, when candidates for political posts raised unprecedented amounts of funding during election campaigns, particularly from private business and corporations. This was observed especially in the 1896 presidential campaign, when the Republican Party candidate, William McKinley, often collected more than $100,000 in a single donation, thanks to the implementation of an organized, corporate system of fundraising by party leader Mark Hanna. In sum, throughout only few election cycles, some candidates were able to spend more than $3 million in a single race, creating a social perception of corrupt government. As large companies were now filling the coffers of parties and candidates with large contributions- and the 1904 presidential campaign of Theodore Roosevelt did not avoid allegations of wrongdoing – in his State of the Union Addresses of 1905 and 1906 the president urged legislators to establish a law which would control the flow of money during electoral campaigns and prohibit national banks and corporations from contributing to the electoral efforts of candidates for federal offices.
Democratic Party Senator Benjamin Tillman initiated a bill aimed at reducing the impact of corporations and big money on congressional and presidential elections. Despite Republican obstruction, The Tillman Act was signed into law in 1907, becoming in time one of the longest standing campaign finance regulations. It was the first to ban corporations from making campaign donations, and demanded the filing of financial reports after the election cycle.
An Act to prohibit corporations from making money contributions in connection with political elections
Be it enacted, that it shall be unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation organized by authority of any laws of Congress, to make a money contribution in connection with any election to any political office.
F.E.C. v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life: 479 U.S. 238 (1986)
- Paweł Laider, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Maciej Turek, Jagiellonian University, Krakow
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Summary
Just one year after the victory of a Republican-leaning political action committee in the Supreme Court, another campaign finance case, which raised the problem of contributions made by an ideological organization as decided. A non-profit corporation, Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCL) produced and distributed a newsletter entitled Everything You Need to Know to Vote Pro-Life. As this was issued before the primary elections to Congress in 1978, it agitated for those candidates who supported a conservative pro-life ideology. According to the Federal Election Commission, such a contribution to an election campaign by a corporation violated the Federal Election Campaign Act, which prohibited the use of general corporate funds for federal election expenditures. The case against MCL was brought to the court, and on appeal was decided by the Supreme Court in 1986.
In a unanimous opinion (with two Justices concurring), the Court found that the newsletter prepared by the non-profit corporation before the primary elections was protected by the First Amendment, and, therefore, that the provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act banning various forms of corporate contributions to the electoral process was unconstitutional. Although the Court found that MCL's actions directly endorsed certain pro-life candidates, it argued that the idea of expenditure itself constitutes elements of express advocacy, thus being consistent with the elements of the Buckley ruling. The decision did not mean that any kind of contribution made by corporations or political action committees was acceptable, but that expenditures made by a non-profit organization, even if they constituted express advocacy communication, were within the scope of freedom of speech.
MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN announced the judgment of the Court…
The questions for decision here arise under § 316 of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA or Act), as renumbered and amended, 2 U.S.C. § 441b. The first question is whether appellee Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), a nonprofit, non-stock corporation, by financing certain activity with its treasury funds, has violated the restriction on independent spending contained in § 441b.
Davis v. F.E.C.: 554 U.S. 724 (2008)
- Paweł Laider, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Maciej Turek, Jagiellonian University, Krakow
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Summary
Just one year after the Wisconsin Right to Life decision, the Supreme Court came across another dispute concerning the constitutionality of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act. The issue referred to section 319(b) of the legislation, called the ‘Millionaire‘s Amendment’, which imposed special exceptions to contribution limits made by certain candidates in federal elections. The law demanded special information before the electoral process from candidates who planned to spend more than $350,000 from their own funds, which, in turn, provided the possibility to their opponents of increasing campaign spending, by allowing them to raise the donation limits they could accept from individual contributors and their national political party. A millionaire, Jack Davis, a Republican turned Democrat, challenged the BCRA provision, arguing that it violated his rights provided by the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution.
The Supreme Court decided Davis v. F.E.C. on appeal in 2008. Five conservative Justices reached similar conclusions as to the scope of the freedom of speech of candidates in federal elections, stating that Davis’ financial status put him in an unequal position relative to his opponents in the congressional race. In the majority opinion, Justice Samuel Alito declared that the First Amendment was created in order to promote the free exchange of opinions, with no regard to the material status of the speaker. For liberals on the Court, it was obvious that the ‘Millionaire's Amendment’ was implemented in order to protect the system from the uncontrolled flow of big money into the electoral process, and to pursue the idea of the equalization of chances to be heard by non-wealthy candidates. This was now held unconstitutional by the conservative majority on the Court.
MR. JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court…
We turn to the merits of Davis’ claim that the First Amendment is violated by the contribution limits that apply when §319(a) [Millionaire's Amendment] comes into play. Under this scheme, as previously noted, when a candidate spends more than $350,000 in personal funds and creates what the statute apparently regards as a financial imbalance, that candidate's opponent may qualify to receive both larger individual contributions than would otherwise be allowed and unlimited coordinated party expenditures.
Contents
- Paweł Laider, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Maciej Turek, Jagiellonian University, Krakow
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The Federal Corrupt Practices Act: 43 Stat. 1070 (1925)
- Paweł Laider, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Maciej Turek, Jagiellonian University, Krakow
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Apart from the growing influence of money in the electoral process, and increased criticism of the legislation, there was another, more political reason for a legislative initiative on the issue of campaign finance in the 1920s: the Teapot Dome scandal. The controversial lease of Navy petroleum reserves by government officials to businessmen became a subject of investigation, which revealed serious corrupt practices among high ranking political officers. Although the scandal did not directly refer to the issue of campaign finance, the investigation proved that large contributions were made by big business to politicians during non-election years. Therefore, after the Newberry precedent and Teapot Dome Scandal, Congress decided to act by passing another Federal Corrupt Practices Act.
The legislation was aimed at enhancing the enforcement of the campaign finance laws by granting more powers to Congress and imposing stricter regulation. It placed more restrictions on the size and character of campaign contributions, as well as on the disclosure of financial reports, which now had to be filed quarterly. Every donation of $100 or more, made in both election and non-election years, was now reportable. While the limits on how much candidates were able to spend in U.S. Senate elections were now raised, these regulations were confined to general elections, in accordance with the Newberry decision. As time showed, the 1925 law became the major legislation in the area of campaign finance for the next four decades, until early the 1970s and the enactment of the Federal Election Campaign Act.
Sec. 301. This title may be cited as the “Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1925”…
Sec. 303. (a) Every political committee shall have a chairman and a treasurer. No contribution shall be accepted, and no expenditure made, by or on behalf of a political committee for the purpose of influencing an election until such chairman and treasurer have been chosen.
(b) It shall be the duty of the treasurer of a political committee to keep a detailed and exact account of – (1) All contributions made to or for such committee; (2) The name and address of every person making any such contribution, and the date thereof;
F.E.C. v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee: 533 U.S. 431 (2001)
- Paweł Laider, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Maciej Turek, Jagiellonian University, Krakow
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In 1996 the Supreme Court adjudicated in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. F.E.C., in which the Justices held that the provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act were not applicable to political party expenditures which were not directly related to any candidate. The Republican Committee challenged in that case the coordinated expenditures restrictions, but the Court did not answer that question. The same issue was repeated by the Committee a few years later, leading to another lawsuit which again ended up in the Supreme Court. As a result, the same Justices answered the same legal question on the scope of the expenditure limits of political parties as imposed by the Federal Election Campaign Act.
The Court declared that restrictions on coordinated expenditures were constitutional as they served an important state interest, and did not violate political parties’ right to freely participate in election campaigns for federal offices. This time, however, the distribution of votes was 5–4, producing not only a narrow-margin decision, but also revealing a strong division among liberal and conservative Justices. Sandra Day O'Connor was the only conservative who supported the majority opinion, whereas such Justices as Anthony Kennedy, William Rehnquist, Antonin Scalia, and Clarence Thomas wrote dissenting opinions, in which they undermined the compelling state interest arguments, arguing for broader protection of the freedom of speech of political parties.
MR. JUSTICE SOUTER delivered the opinion of the Court
In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n (Colorado I), we held that spending limits set by the Federal Election Campaign Act were unconstitutional as applied to the Colorado Republican Party's independent expenditures in connection with a senatorial campaign. We remanded for consideration of the party's claim that all limits on expenditures by a political party in connection with congressional campaigns are facially unconstitutional and thus unenforceable even as to spending coordinated with a candidate. Today we reject that facial challenge to the limits on parties’ coordinated expenditures…
Spending for political ends and contributing to political candidates both fall within the First Amendment's protection of speech and political association. Buckley.
Buckley v. Valeo: 424 U.S. 1 (1976)
- Paweł Laider, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Maciej Turek, Jagiellonian University, Krakow
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Almost no other case has had such a significant impact on the constitutional meaning of campaign finance laws as Buckley v. Valeo. Analysts of the issue often divide the history of money in the federal electoral process into the pre-Buckley and post-Buckley eras, demonstrating that the 1976 Supreme Court decision introduced a new understanding of the regulation of campaign finance. Opponents of the FECA and its amendment argued that some limits on campaign donations and expenses severely violated the Constitution, as they endangered the First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and association. The First Amendment's clause referring to the right to express oneself, the right to decide about the amount of money spent in a campaign by the candidate, and the right to information concerning the candidates, led to the very original conclusion reached by the majority of Justices that “money talks,” and that, therefore, the process of spending money in electoral campaigns is a type of expression called political speech.
The lawsuit was filed by conservative Senator James Buckley against a former member of Federal Election Commission, Francis Valeo, who represented the U.S. government. When the District Court and Court of Appeals decided against Buckley, he appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted review. The main issue in the case referred to the constitutionality of the provisions of the 1971 and 1974 legislation, which imposed expenditure limits on candidates in federal campaigns, but the Court, in a per curiam opinion, determined not only the status of campaign spending but also of individual and group contributions to candidates. On the one hand, the Justices upheld contribution limits, explaining their important anti-corruption role, but on the other they found expenditure limits to be in contradiction to freedom of speech and expression. In other words, the American government, having an interest in fighting corruption, had a compelling state interest to impose limitations on contributions, but not on campaign spending. Moreover, several passages of the Buckley decision seem to contradict each other. For instance, if presidential candidates applied to use the public fund, the expenditure limit would be constitutional. But if they chose to reject it, they were free to spend as much as they wished.
Basic Documents in Federal Compaign Finance Law
- Paweł Laider, Maciej Turek
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The purpose of the volume Basic Documents in Federal Campaign Finance Law is to present that evolution of the meaning of money and politics in American governance, with a special focus on the regulations and norms which have shaped the current understanding of campaign finance in the United States. It is important to acknowledge the main reasons for federal legislation on campaign finance, its outcomes, and the ways in which issues have been challenged in the courts, focusing especially on the changing interpretations of the Supreme Court towards the issue. The book contains a short introduction to every important piece of legislation or Court decision, in which the authors have presented the background of the legislation and its main purposes and substance, as well as the facts leading to legal disputes over the legislation's constitutionality. Each introductory piece is followed by the most crucial excerpts from legislative acts or Supreme Court opinions on campaign finance, so that readers are able to analyze for themselves the substance and form of the regulations on the issue. According to the authors, all twenty nine documents presented in the volume (14 acts of Congress, and 15 Court decisions), should be considered the main legal source of the debate on the proper scope of money in federal election campaigns. Although most of the excerpts presented relate to federal laws, there are a few references to state laws when the issue at stake has a direct effect on the national discussion on campaign finance.
Further Readings
- Paweł Laider, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Maciej Turek, Jagiellonian University, Krakow
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Citizens United v. F.E.C.: 558 U.S. 310 (2010)
- Paweł Laider, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Maciej Turek, Jagiellonian University, Krakow
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Summary
Although the F.E.C. v. Wisconsin Right to Life decision did not invalidate major pieces of federal campaign finance legislation, it revealed the opinions of particular Justices of the Supreme Court on the scope of the regulation of money in the electoral process. With five conservatives and four liberals, it seemed just a matter of time before the next challenge to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act regulations would enter the Court's docket. The discussion on the proper scope of expenditure limits or disclosure procedures was also present during legislative debates, but after BCRA the majority of Congressmen were reluctant to propose new legislation. Therefore, any changes to the meaning of campaign finance could be made by the judiciary as part of the process of the constitutional interpretation of money in the electoral process. Such a possibility occurred in connection with events that took place during the primary phase of the 2008 presidential elections, when a conservative corporation – Citizens United – was prevented from publicizing a movie concerning the suitability of Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton as a future president. The organization challenged the provisions of BCRA regarding electioneering communications, which were the source of limitations on the broadcast of a politically-oriented movie, arguing that their freedom of speech guarantees were violated by the legislation. The District Court denied the arguments of Citizens United, so the corporation appealed to the Supreme Court, which reached its decision in 2010.
Apart from the main issue raised by Citizens United about the constitutionality of regulations on electioneering communications, the Court recognized other important aspects of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, which should be interpreted in accordance with the constitution, such as the scope of disclosure procedures, the role of campaign contributions as political speech, and, above all, the correctness of the McConnell holding. Five conservative Justices made the majority, underlining the democratic values of freedom of speech, especially referring to corporate communications and contributions in election campaigns, which constituted political speech. The majority acknowledged no difference between funding by individuals and corporations, which had to be protected in order to pursue the ideals of rule of law and democracy.
F.E.C. v. National Conservative Political Action Committee: 470 U.S. 480 (1985)
- Paweł Laider, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Maciej Turek, Jagiellonian University, Krakow
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- Book:
- Basic Documents in Federal Compaign Finance Law
- Published by:
- Jagiellonian University Press
- Published online:
- 12 January 2018
- Print publication:
- 01 January 2015, pp 72-75
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Summary
The issues raised in the California Medical Association decision, on the proper conduct of political action committees in election campaigns, were the subjects of many other cases decided by federal courts in the 1980s. One of the most important disputes was F.E.C. v. National Conservative Political Action Committee, argued and decided in the Supreme Court's 1984–1985 term. The National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC), founded in 1975, became a major contributor to Republican Party candidates in their campaigns for Congress and the White House in the early 1980s. Recognized as a very influential political organization of the right side of the ideological sphere in the United States at that time, the committee supported conservative candidates by collecting funds for their campaigns, as well as preparing media advertisements attacking their political opponents.
The Federal Election Commission filed a suit against the conservative political action committee when it was revealed that the organization had spent more than $1,000 on the campaign supporting a candidate for the presidency, which was a violation of one of the provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act. After a long battle in the lower courts, the highest judicial tribunal in the U.S. took the case in order to define the constitutionality of expenditure limits. In a 7–2 decision, announced by William Rehnquist, the Court used the freedom of speech argument to declare that parts of the Federal Election Commission Act violated the First Amendment, as such issues were beyond the power of the government. The decision underlined the important role of political action committees in the electoral process, defending their status as independent organizations which could openly participate in election campaigns.
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court…
NCPAC is a nonprofit, non-membership corporation formed under the District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation Act in August, 1975, and registered with the FEC as a political committee. Its primary purpose is to attempt to influence directly or indirectly the election or defeat of candidates for federal, state, and local offices by making contributions and by making its own expenditures.
Newberry v. United States: 256 U.S. 232 (1921)
- Paweł Laider, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Maciej Turek, Jagiellonian University, Krakow
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- Book:
- Basic Documents in Federal Compaign Finance Law
- Published by:
- Jagiellonian University Press
- Published online:
- 12 January 2018
- Print publication:
- 01 January 2015, pp 18-19
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Summary
Until the early 20th century, the Supreme Court rarely adjudicated in cases concerning the scope of campaign finance laws, as there was no legislation on the issue that would be thought of as controversial. The situation changed when Congress began to regulate money in the federal election process, as the new provisions limited some aspects of the financial participation of various campaign actors. It was a matter of time before these laws would be challenged in the courts, and the first important Supreme Court decision on the constitutionality of federal campaign finance legislation was made in 1921, in Newberry v. United States.
In Michigan in 1918 Republican Truman H. Newberry won the U.S. Senate would primary against Henry Ford. According to official data disclosed by his campaign committee, Newberry spent much more money than was permitted by the Federal Corrupt Practices Act. The law provided for spending limits in federal election campaigns according to the regulations set by particular states, whereas funds used during Newberry's campaign exceeded the Michigan-established limits by about 100 times. After the District Court convicted Newberry, he decided to appeal to the Supreme Court, which found the provisions concerning spending limits unconstitutional. In the Court's view, issues regarding primaries and other nomination processes were not elections for office, and were thus beyond the scope of congressional regulation. Such an approach was changed in the early 1940s, when the Court overruled the Newberry holding in United States v. Classic (1941).
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court…
If it be practically true that, under present conditions, a designated party candidate is necessary for an election – a preliminary thereto – nevertheless his selection is in no real sense part of the manner of holding the election. This does not depend upon the scheme by which candidates are put forward. Whether the candidate be offered through primary, or convention, or petition, or request of a few, or as the result of his own unsupported ambition does not directly affect the manner of holding the election. Birth must precede, but it is no part of, either funeral or apotheosis.