Taking Chances
Taking Chances
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The essays in this book develop and explore the Bayesian idea that rational actions maximize expected values, where an action's expected value is a weighted average of its agent's values for its possible total outcomes. The author establishes principles for distinguishing options in decision problems and pays much attention to games--both isolated and iterated. The book also views critically Gauthier's revisionist ideas about maximizing rationality.
- Major philosopher working in decision theory - this collection represents his most important publishing in the field
- Genuine interdisciplinary interest in economics, statistics, political science and psychology
Reviews & endorsements
"...there is a profound unity throughout the volume and the analysis is always first-rate....I sincerely hope that this book will be widely read..." Maurice Salles, Mathematical Reviews
"Spotting a rational choice is sometimes mercifully easy. Read this book. I guarantee a hefty payoff. Taking a chance on Taking Chances is taking no chance at all." Mark Vorobej, Canadian Philosophical Review
"Sobel is one of philosophy's leading experts on decision theory. How nice to have a collection of his contributions! These essays, mostly written during the last ten years, provide an excellent survey of current research in the field....Sobel's book is a cornucopia of insights about rational choice." Ethics
Product details
- Published: April 1994
- Format: Hardback
- ISBN: 9780521416351
- Length: 390 pages
- Dimensions: 237 × 160 × 27 mm
- Weight: 0.731kg
- Availability: Available
Table of Contents
- Preface
- Part I. World Bayesianism:
- 1. Utility and the Bayesian paradigm
- Part II. Problems for Evidential Decision Theory:
- 2. Newcomblike problems
- 3. Not every prisoners' dilemma is a Newcomb problem
- 4. Some versions of Newcomb's problem are prisoners' dilemmas
- 5. Infallible predictors
- 6. Kent Bach on good arguments
- 7. Maximising and prospering
- Part III. Causal Decision Theory:
- 8. Notes on decision theory: old wine in new bottles
- 9. Partition theorems for causal decision theories
- 10. Expected utilities and rational actions and choices
- 11. Maximisation, stability of decision and actions in accordance with reason
- 12. Useful intentions
- Part IV. Interacting Causal Maximisers:
- 13. The need for coercion
- 14. Hyperrational games
- 15. Utility maximizers in iterated prisoners' dilemmas
- 16. Backward induction arguments: a paradox regained
- References
- Index of names.
- Show more
