Game theory seemed aptly suited to warfare because it assumes that without threat of coercive sanctions, no agreement, consensual arrangement, or voluntary obligation is sacrosanct. The Prisoner's Dilemma, accordingly, seemed to capture the essence of the nuclear security dilemma. International relations theorist Alexander Wendt describes this most tense security dilemma in terms of the “logic of Hobbesian anarchy,” which is well known: “the ‘war of all against all’ in which actors operate on the principle of sauve qui peut and kill or be killed.” Wendt explains that Hobbes's anarchy “is the true ‘self-help’ system …, where actors cannot count on each other for help or even to observe basic self-restraint.” In this case, survival depends on military power, and when actor A increases security, those gains reduce B's security because B is unsure of whether A's intentions are defensive. Harkening back to the nuclear security dilemma, and the condition of uncertainty, which is only enhanced when actors deploy weapons with offensive value, Wendt concludes that “security is a deeply competitive, zero-sum affair, and security dilemmas are particularly acute … because of the intentions attributed to others.”