Welfare states work better for some age groups than for others. Social programs in the United States and Italy, for example, do little to raise children out of poverty, but elderly citizens are made better off by the substantial benefits available to them. In other countries, such as Norway and Portugal, senior citizens' incomes on average are lower than in the United States or Italy, but low-income workers, families with children, and the long-term unemployed receive significant support from the welfare state. Across the industrialized countries, social programs such as public pensions, family allowances, and benefits for the unemployed vary significantly, with consequences for the well-being of different age groups in the population.

This book asks how social policies in rich democracies buffer and channel risks for the aged, the young, and working-age adults. What do different welfare states do for their elderly and non-elderly citizens? Why does the age orientation of social policies vary from country to country and over time? And what are the political consequences of different strategies for redistributing resources across different age groups in society? How and why welfare states distribute resources to different age groups is linked to broader questions of theory in comparative politics: What are the important dimensions of similarity and difference among different modes of economic regulation? Which actors impact political-economic outcomes? What is the relative importance of social and economic structures, political practices, and institutional legacies in determining the policies pursued in different countries?