In October 1947, Charles Livengood settled in as the new American Consul General in Batavia, with a reputation of being an accomplished diplomat of the highest caliber.Within the State Department,Livengood was known as a Foreign Service officer who did his presentation and reporting work impeccably. Upon his arrival in Java, it was expected he would convey a far more objective and evenhanded analysis of the situation in the Indonesian archipelago than his predecessor, Walter Foote. The latter, meanwhile, stayed on temporarily to serve as Chairman of the Consular Council in Batavia, charged with overseeing the implementation of UN imposed cease-fire regulations, while his colleague Livengood assumed control of the US Legation.Yet even during his final months in Java, Foote continued to make careless charges, such as his allegation on January 8, 1948, that the British should be blamed singlehandedly for the protracted Dutch-Indonesian conflict because they were “all-out-pro-Indo.”

Southeast Asia desk officers in the State Department feared, however, that Livengood would never truly interest himself in the political problems of the area, because he possessed neither “the preparation nor the inclination to do so.” His skills as a highly trained expert in economic affairs were wasted in colonial Indonesia. He assumed his position at a time when the archipelago's economic reconstruction could barely be tackled,mostly because political negotiations,disrupted by armed clashes,superseded everything else. In addition, not possessing a strong physical constitution, the tropical climate would prove disastrous to his frail health.As predicted, Livengood in due course became increasingly unhappy with his assignment.After visiting the US Legation in Batavia in early 1949, the Philippines and Southeast Asia Division's (PSA) senior official,William Lacy, concluded that Livengood's gloomy attitude and lack of stamina had a “thoroughly depressing effect on the entire staff of the Consulate General.”

The American government had welcomed the Indonesian and Dutch signatures on the feeble Linggajati Agreement, concluded in March 1947, even if the accord did not resolve even the most basic interpretive details. Approximately one week after the endorsement of the accord reached at Linggajati, the United States recognized the de facto jurisdiction of the Indonesian Republic over Java, Madura, and Sumatra, which contained about eighty-five percent of the total population of the archipelago.