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Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism
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  • Cited by 119
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    This book has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by CrossRef.

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    Koo, Sejin 2018. PARTY ACTIVISTS IN SOUTH KOREA AND MONGOLIA: PROGRAMMATIC LINKAGES AND POLICY MOTIVATIONS. Journal of East Asian Studies, p. 1.

    Maiorano, Diego Das, Upasak and Masiero, Silvia 2018. Decentralisation, clientelism and social protection programmes: a study of India’s MGNREGA. Oxford Development Studies, p. 1.

    Wang, Yi-ting and Kolev, Kiril 2018. Ethnic Group Inequality, Partisan Networks, and Political Clientelism. Political Research Quarterly, p. 106591291878928.

    Ruiz-Rufino, Rubén 2018. When do electoral institutions trigger electoral misconduct?. Democratization, Vol. 25, Issue. 2, p. 331.

    Wang, Yi-Ting 2018. Clientelistic parties and satisfaction with democracy. Party Politics, p. 135406881878496.

    Bohlken, Anjali Thomas 2018. Targeting Ordinary Voters or Political Elites? Why Pork Is Distributed Along Partisan Lines in India. American Journal of Political Science,

    Heath, Oliver and Tillin, Louise 2018. Institutional Performance and Vote Buying in India. Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 53, Issue. 1, p. 90.

    Post, Alison E. 2018. Cities and Politics in the Developing World. Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 21, Issue. 1, p. 115.

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    Arias, Enrique Desmond 2018. Criminal organizations and the policymaking process. Global Crime, p. 1.

    Soedirgo, Jessica 2018. Informal networks and religious intolerance: how clientelism incentivizes the discrimination of the Ahmadiyah in Indonesia. Citizenship Studies, Vol. 22, Issue. 2, p. 191.

    Kikuchi, Hirokazu 2018. Presidents versus Federalism in the National Legislative Process. p. 89.

    Berenschot, Ward 2018. The Political Economy of Clientelism: A Comparative Study of Indonesia’s Patronage Democracy. Comparative Political Studies, p. 001041401875875.

    Andersson, Per F. 2018. Democracy, Urbanization, and Tax Revenue. Studies in Comparative International Development, Vol. 53, Issue. 1, p. 111.

    Ejdemyr, Simon Kramon, Eric and Robinson, Amanda Lea 2018. Segregation, Ethnic Favoritism, and the Strategic Targeting of Local Public Goods. Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 51, Issue. 9, p. 1111.

    Oliveros, Virginia and Schuster, Christian 2018. Merit, Tenure, and Bureaucratic Behavior: Evidence From a Conjoint Experiment in the Dominican Republic. Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 51, Issue. 6, p. 759.

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    Auerbach, Adam Michael 2018. Informal Archives: Historical Narratives and the Preservation of Paper in India’s Urban Slums. Studies in Comparative International Development,

    AUERBACH, ADAM MICHAEL and THACHIL, TARIQ 2018. How Clients Select Brokers: Competition and Choice in India's Slums. American Political Science Review, p. 1.

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Book description

Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism addresses major questions in distributive politics. Why is it acceptable for parties to try to win elections by promising to make certain groups of people better off, but unacceptable - and illegal - to pay people for their votes? Why do parties often lavish benefits on loyal voters, whose support they can count on anyway, rather than on responsive swing voters? Why is vote buying and machine politics common in today's developing democracies but a thing of the past in most of today's advanced democracies? This book develops a theory of broker-mediated distribution to answer these questions, testing the theory with research from four developing democracies, and reviews a rich secondary literature on countries in all world regions. The authors deploy normative theory to evaluate whether clientelism, pork-barrel politics, and other non-programmatic distributive strategies can be justified on the grounds that they promote efficiency, redistribution, or voter participation.

Reviews

‘This book advances a single broad theoretical point: vote brokers are central to any system of vote buying in mass elections. While many previous scholars have considered the role of vote brokers from one angle or another, what sets this book apart is that it provides a unified theoretical model of vote brokers. It is grounded effectively in the modern economic theory of agency, and the authors run it through a series of tests using both original primary and secondary sources. Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism will be a landmark for the next generation of studies.'

Gary W. Cox - Stanford University

'Brokers deserves every bit of attention it will garner … Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism is a model of theoretical precision, conceptual clarity, and impeccable logical reasoning, and its measured inferences, which are supported by exhaustive, careful empirical work, are placed within a proud tradition pioneered by V. O. Key, David Mayhew, Edward Banfield and other intellectual giants who young scholars often do not take the time to read.'

Frances Hagopian Source: Perspectives on Politics

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