Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Introduction
- Part I Origins and Development
- 1 Antecedents in early Greek philosophy
- 2 Pyrrho and early Pyrrhonism
- 3 Arcesilaus and Carneades
- 4 The sceptical Academy: decline and afterlife
- 5 Aenesidemus and the rebirth of Pyrrhonism
- 6 Sextus Empiricus
- Part II Topics and Problems
- Part III Beyond Antiquity
- Bibliography
- Index
- Index Locorum
3 - Arcesilaus and Carneades
from Part I - Origins and Development
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 March 2010
- Frontmatter
- Introduction
- Part I Origins and Development
- 1 Antecedents in early Greek philosophy
- 2 Pyrrho and early Pyrrhonism
- 3 Arcesilaus and Carneades
- 4 The sceptical Academy: decline and afterlife
- 5 Aenesidemus and the rebirth of Pyrrhonism
- 6 Sextus Empiricus
- Part II Topics and Problems
- Part III Beyond Antiquity
- Bibliography
- Index
- Index Locorum
Summary
Arcesilaus initiated a sceptical phase in the Academy after taking over in c. 268 BCE. He was motivated in part by an innovative reading of Plato’s dialogues. Where his predecessors found positive doctrines to be systematically developed, he found a dialectical method of arguing and the sceptical view that nothing can be known (akatalêpsia, De Or. 3.67, see DL 4.28, 4.32). He also advanced this conclusion in opposition to the ambitious system of the Stoics, claiming further that the appropriate response to the pervasive uncertainty generated by his method is the suspension of judgement (epochê).
Arcesilaus' dialectical method was practiced without significant modification in the Academy until Carneades, who became head sometime before 155 BCE. Carneades both continued and strengthened Arcesilaus' method (ND 1.11, Acad. 2.16, see also Acad. 1.46, and Eusebius, Praep. evang. 14.7.15). Sextus marks the change by referring to Plato’s Academy as Old, Arcesilaus' as Middle, and Carneades' as New (PH 1.220).
Since the main interpretative issues regarding both Arcesilaus and Carneades depend on the concepts of akatalêpsia and epochê, we must try to determine what they mean, how they are related, and what attitude the Academics take towards them – i.e. in what sense, if any, are these their sceptical doctrines?
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- The Cambridge Companion to Ancient Scepticism , pp. 58 - 80Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 2010
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