T.M. Scanlon (b. 1940) presents a general theory of morality he calls contractualism (Scanlon 1998), and contrasts it with “philosophical utilitarianism” (Scanlon 2003, 129). Rawls writes in TJ that his aim is to “present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the familiar idea of the social contract” (TJ 11), and also contrasts his view with utilitarianism. So it is not surprising that there are important similarities between the two views. Both hold that valid principles of morality are grounded on the (objective) interests of individuals. Both adopt an individualistic, nonaggregative, nonmaximizing, and hence nonutilitarian approach to dealing with conflicts between these interests. Both hold that valid principles are those that are, in some sense, acceptable to all. And both reject the Hobbesian view that what is right is a matter of what rationally self-interested individuals would or could agree to if thinking soundly about the best strategy for satisfying their preferences. When we turn to specifics, however, it is easier to list differences between the two views than similarities.