THE GOOD OF ENDS AND OUTCOMES

The idea that the good is the object of our aims is deeply entrenched in both ethics and moral psychology. One of the main purposes of this book is to shake that view from its pinnacle of received wisdom by revealing a plausible alternative. The received view has the air of the obvious because there are aspects of it that are obvious, although the obvious parts do not have the metaphysical or psychological implications that are usually taken for granted. Here is a short story of the received view and where I think it goes wrong.

When we act, we always aim at bringing about some state of affairs S. We see S as desirable, which is to say, good. As Aquinas put it, we always act under the aspect of good. Sometimes we are mistaken, but sometimes we are not mistaken. The will or choice or desire to bring about S is good just in case S is a good state of affairs to bring about in the situation in question. When desires or choices to bring about good states of affairs become stable dispositions, they are virtues. Good is reflected backward from states of affairs to states of the agent.

I think there are many things wrong with this picture, but I wlll concentrate on two.