‘Nevertheless, it is evident that eudaimonia stands in need of good things from outside, as we have said: for it is impossible or difficult to do fine things without resources’ (EN 1099a31–3). We have now filled in the background for a study of this claim. We have seen how every Aristotelian philosophical inquiry is conducted within the world of human experience and belief, limited by the limits of that world. We have seen Aristotle defend a conception of action appropriate to a needy animal being vulnerable to influences from its world; he has argued that to view human action as combining activity with passivity in this way is fully compatible with our most serious sorts of ethical assessment. We have, finally, seen him articulate and defend a conception of ‘non-scientific’ practical deliberation in which proper ‘passivity’ and responsiveness plays a very important role, and in which the touchstone of correctness is a good person's refined perception of the contingencies of a particular situation. With all of this in place, we must now ask what Aristotle ultimately concludes about our central questions. How far is human good living, eudaimonia, vulnerable? What external events can disrupt or distract it, and how (and how far) should it attempt to make itself safe? Aristotle clearly regards this as a pressing and a delicate question. For the appearances ascribe to luck considerable ethical importance. ‘Most people suppose that the eudaimōn life is the fortunate life, or not without good fortune; and no doubt correctly. For without the external goods, which are in the control of luck, it is not possible to be eudaimōn’ (MM 1206b30–5).