Aristotle develops a conception of a human being's proper relationship to tuchē that returns to and further articulates many of the insights of tragedy. His philosophical account of the good human life is, as I shall argue, an appropriate continuation and an explicit description of those insights. We shall examine his criticisms of Plato's revisionary picture of the good human life and of the Platonic conception of philosophy as radical life-saver.

The structure of this section will differ from the structure of the Plato section, much as Aristotle's philosophical writing differs from Plato's. That is, it will move from problem to related problem, rather than from complex multi-voiced dramatic work to work. And it will attempt to show the interconnections of various apparently separate inquiries in their bearing on our problems. This seems fitting when we are dealing with a philosopher who constantly employs cross-references, and who is known to have rearranged his lectures in several different orderings, depending upon the purpose and the occasion.

Two chapters may at first glance seem extraneous to the purposes of an ethical inquiry. Chapter 8 contains a general discussion of Aristotle's philosophical method, using material from science and metaphysics as well as ethics. Chapter 9 gives an account of human action and the explanation of action, drawing on ethical texts, but also on general discussions of the explanation of animal movement. Why should an account of Aristotle's conception of the good human life begin with such issues?