Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-ndw9j Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-10-31T23:27:16.425Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
This chapter is part of a book that is no longer available to purchase from Cambridge Core

4 - Libertarianism: two varieties

Graham McFee
Affiliation:
University of Brighton
Get access

Summary

Introduction

As noted towards the end of Chapter 2 and again in Chapter 3, the conclusion of any argument can be contested either by disputing the truth of some or all of the argument's premises or by denying that the conclusion follows from those premises. In that vein, this chapter will consider opposition to determinism based on denying the truth of the first premise of our determinist argument (Chapter 2, p. 21): that every event has a cause. (Later chapters will consider other premises.) Traditionally, those who deny the truth of the premise that every event has a cause are called “libertarians”: although this name may not be completely happy, I will use it here to pick up that philosophical tradition.

Does libertarianism provide a satisfactory answer to the challenge of the determinist argument? If not, does it nevertheless shed light on what free will defenders must acknowledge? And a satisfactory answer is of course one that has an “exact fit” with our examples of unfreedom or constraint (such as key cases 2 & 6) and with our examples of free action, such as walking across the room [key case 1], drinking a glass of water, and so on: actions that will be free if any are.

Two ways of denying that every event has a cause identify two versions of libertarianism. First, one might urge that some events were uncaused so it was not true that every event has a cause, an option to be considered in the next section.

Type
Chapter
Information
Free Will , pp. 53 - 68
Publisher: Acumen Publishing
Print publication year: 2000

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Save book to Kindle

To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

Available formats
×

Save book to Dropbox

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

Available formats
×

Save book to Google Drive

To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

Available formats
×