In the previous chapter I developed the first of two particular, practical means of advancing the human rights idea conceived as social construction: translating between local understandings and nonlocal human rights ideas. In this chapter I turn to the second practical means: reframing culturally particular ideas, such as human rights, in ways that render them more plausible or attractive to the local community.

No one, neither speculative philosopher nor empirical anthropologist, has ever shown human rights to be anything other than a culturally particular social construction. Human rights do not appear to be natural, divine, or metaphysical, despite persistent allegations to the contrary. And if they are a social construction, then there is nothing otherworldly about them, “nothing entitled to worship or ultimate respect. All that can be said about human rights is that they are necessary to protect individuals from violence and abuse, and if it is asked why, the only possible answer is historical” (Ignatieff 2001:83).