Anderton, C. H., & Carter, J. R. (2006). Applying intermediate microeconomics to terrorism. Journal of Economic Education, 37(4), 442–458.Google Scholar

Apostolakis, G. (1990, December). The concept of probability in safety assessments of technological systems. Science, 250(4986), 1359–1364.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed

Aumann, R. J., & Maschler, M. B. (1995). Repeated games with incomplete information. MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar

Bauch, C. T., Galvani, A. P., & Earn, D. J. (2003, August). Group interest versus self-interest in smallpox vaccination policy. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA, 100(18), 10564–10567.Google Scholar

Bedford, T., & Cooke, R. M. (2001). Probabilistic risk analysis foundations and methods. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Binmore, K. (1990). Essays on the foundations of game theory. Basil Blackwell.Google Scholar

Bommer, J., Scherbaum, F., Bungum, H., Cotton, F., Sabetta, F., & Abrahamson, N. (2005, April). On the use of logic trees for ground-motion prediction equations in seismic-hazard analysis. Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America, 95(2), 377–389.Google Scholar

Borm, P., Hamers, H., & Hendrick, R. (2001, December). Operations research games: A survey. TOP, 9(2), 139–199.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Committee on Methodological Improvements to the Department of Homeland Security’s Biological Agent Risk Analysis, National Research Council (NRC). (2008). Department of Homeland Security Bioterrorism risk assessment: A call for change. Available at: http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?recordid=12206.Google Scholar

Cordesman, A. (2005). The challenge of bioterrorism. MA: CSIS Press.Google Scholar

Cornell, C. A., & Merz, H. (1975, October). Seismic risk analysis of Boston. Journal of the Structural Engineering Division, 101(10), 2027–2043.Google Scholar

Cournot, A. (1838). Recherches sur les principes math ematiques de la thorie des richesses (Researches into the mathematical principles of the theory of wealth). Hachette.Google Scholar

Dash, R. K., & Jennings, N. R. (2003, December). Parkes DC. Computational-mechanism design: A call to arms. IEEE Intelligent Systems, 18(6), 40–47.Google Scholar

Dillon-Merrill, R., Parnell, G., & Buckshaw, D. (2008). Logic trees: Fault, success, attack, event, probability, and decision trees. In Wiley Handbook of Science and Technology for Homeland Security.Google Scholar

Douglas, M., & Mars, G. (2003). Terrorism: A positive feedback game. Human Relations, 56(7), 763–786.Google Scholar

Ericson, C. (1999, August). Fault tree analysis: A history. Proceedings of the 17th International System Safety Conference.Google Scholar

Ezell, B. (1998, May). Risks of cyber attack to supervisory control and data acquisition for water supply. Thesis, University of Virginia.Google Scholar

Ezell, B., Haimes, Y., & Lambert, J. (2001). Risks of cyber attack to water utility supervisory control and data acquisition systems. Military Operations Research, 6(2), 30–46.Google Scholar

Garcia, M. (2006). Vulnerability assessment of physical protection systems. Sandia National Laboratories. US: Elsevier.Google Scholar

Garrick, B., Hall, J., Kilger, M., McDonald, J., O’Toole, T., Probst, P., Parker, E., Rosenthal, R., Trivelpiece, A., Arsdale, L., & Zebroski, E. (2004). Confronting the risks of terrorism: Making the right decisions. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 86(2), 129–176.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Goodwin, D. (2005). The military and negotiation: The role of the soldier-diplomat. Taylor & Francis.Google Scholar

Haimes, Y. (2009). Risk modeling, assessment, and management. New York: John Wiley and Sons.Google Scholar

Harsanyi, J. (1967). Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players I. Management Science, 14(20), 159–182.Google Scholar

Harsanyi, J. (1968a). Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players II. Management Science, 14(20), 320–334.Google Scholar

Harsanyi, J. (1968b). Games with incomplete information played by Bayesian players III. Management Science, 14(20), 486–502.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Harsanyi, J., & Selten, R. (1998). A general theory of equilibrium selection in games. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar

Hausken, K., Bier, V. M., & Zhuang, J. (2009). Defending against terrorism, natural disaster, and all hazards, game theoretic risk analysis of security threats. Springer.Google Scholar

Heal, G., & Kunreuther, H. (2005). You only die once: Interdependent security in an uncertain world. In Richardson, H. W., Gordon, P., & Moore, J. E., II (Eds.), The economic impacts of terrorist attacks. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.Google Scholar

Hees, M., & Roy, O. (2007). Intentions, decisions and rationality. Available at: www.illc.uva.nl/Publications/ResearchReports/PP-2007–21.text.pdf.Google Scholar

Herings, P. J., Mauleon, J. A., & Vannetelbosch, V. J. (2004). Fuzzy play, matching devices and coordination failures. International Journal of Game Theory, 32(4), 519–513.Google Scholar

Hora, S. (2007). Eliciting probabilities from experts. In Edwards, W., Miles, R. Jr., & von Winterfeldt, D. (Eds.) Advances in decision analysis. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Hudson, L., Ware, B., Laskey, K., & Mahoney, S. (2005). An application of Bayesian networks to antiterrorism risk management for military planners, C4ISR Papers Mason Archival Repository. Available at: hdl.handle.net/1920/268.Google Scholar

Jain, M., Pita, J., Tambe, M., Ordonez, F., Paruchuri, P., & Kraus, S. (2008). Bayesian Stackelberg games and their application for security at Los Angeles International Airport. Available at: http://www.sigecom.org/exchanges/volume7/2/jain.pdf.Google Scholar

Kaplan, S., & Garrick, B. J. (1981). On the quantitative definition of risk. Risk Analysis, 1(1), 11–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Kent, S. (2007). The Board of National Estimates: Collected Essays, Center for the Study of Intelligence. Available at: www.cia.gov.Google Scholar

Kirkwood, C. (2002). A decision tree primer. Available at: www.public.asu.edu/k˜irkwood/.Google Scholar

Koller, G. (2000). Risk modeling for determining value and decision making. FL: Chapman and Hall.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Kott, A., & McEneaney, W. M. (Eds). (2006). Adversarial reasoning: Computational approaches to reading the opponent’s mind. FL: Chapman and Hall.Google Scholar

Kumamoto, H., & Henley, E. (1996). Probabilistic risk assessment and management for engineers and scientists. US: IEEE Press.Google Scholar

Lapan, H., & Sandler, T. (1988). To bargain or not to bargain? That is the question. American Economic Review, 78(2), 16–21.Google Scholar

Mauw, S., & Oostdijk, M. (2006). Foundations of attack trees. Available at: http://www.cs.ru.nl/~martijno/publications/papers/attacktrees.pdf.Google Scholar

McGill, W., Ayyub, B., & Kaminskiy, M. (2007). Risk analysis for critical asset protection. Risk Analysis, 27(5), 1265–1281.Google Scholar

Myerson, R. (1991). Game theory: Analysis of conflict. Washington, DC: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar

Nash, J. (1951). Non-cooperative games. Annals of Mathematics, 54(2), 286–295.Google Scholar

Parnell, G., Liebe, R., Dillon-Merrill, R., Buede, D., Scouras, J., Colletti, B., Cummings, M., McGarvey., D., Newport, R., Vinch, P., Ayyub, B., Kaminskiy, M., & Scouras, J. (2005). Homeland security risk assessment: Volume 1 – An illustrative framework and Volume 2 – Appendices of methods. Washington, DC: Homeland Security Institute.Google Scholar

Pate-Cornell, M. E. (2007). The engineering risk analysis method and some applications. In Edwards, W., Miles, R. Jr., & von Winterfeldt, D. (Eds). Advances in decision analysis. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Pate-Cornell, M. E, & Guikema, S. D. (2002, December). Probabilistic modeling of terrorist threats: A systems analysis approach to setting priorities among countermeasures. Military Operations Research, 7(4), 5–23.Google Scholar

Plaut, S. (2004). Misplaced applications of economic theory to the Middle East. Public Choice, 118(1), 11–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Rosoff, H., & von Winterfeldt, D. (2007). A risk and economic analysis of dirty bomb attacks on the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. Risk Analysis, 27(3), 533–546.Google Scholar

Smith, M. (2004). The theory of games and the evolution of animal conflicts. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 47(1), 209–221.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Spirtes, P., Glymour, C., Scheines, R., Kauffman, S., Aimale, V., & Wimberly, F. (2000). Constructing Bayesian network models of gene expression networks from microarray data. Proceedings of the Atlantic Symposium on Computational Biology.Google Scholar

Vesely, W. (2005). Quantitative risk analysis: Challenges and opportunities at NASA, Manager Risk Assessment for NASA Headquarters. Available at: ti.arc.nasa.gov/ projects/ishem/Papers/Vesely PRA.doc.Google Scholar

Viscusi, W. K. (2003). The risk of terrorism. US: Kluwer Academic Publisher.Google Scholar

von Neumann, J., & Morgenstern, O. (1944). Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar

von Winterfeldt, D., & O’Sullivan, T. (2006). Should we protect commercial airplanes against surface to air missile attacks from terrorists? Decision Analysis, 3(2), 63–75.Google Scholar

Willis, H., Morral, A., Kelly, T., & Medby, J. (2003). Estimating terrorism risk. RAND Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy.Google Scholar

Wilson, R. (2003). Combating terrorism: An event tree approach. Proceedings of the International Seminar on Nuclear War and Planetary Emergencies 27th Session, 122–143.Google Scholar

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Response to National Academies of Science. (2008). Available at: http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/gc1222807486868.shtm.Google Scholar