Book contents
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction: the problem of a priori justification
- 2 In search of moderate empiricism
- 3 Quine and radical empiricism
- 4 A moderate rationalism
- 5 Epistemological objections to rationalism
- 6 Metaphysical objections to rationalism
- 7 The justification of induction
- Appendix: Non-Euclidean geometry and relativity
- References
- Index
5 - Epistemological objections to rationalism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 January 2010
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- Acknowledgments
- 1 Introduction: the problem of a priori justification
- 2 In search of moderate empiricism
- 3 Quine and radical empiricism
- 4 A moderate rationalism
- 5 Epistemological objections to rationalism
- 6 Metaphysical objections to rationalism
- 7 The justification of induction
- Appendix: Non-Euclidean geometry and relativity
- References
- Index
Summary
INTRODUCTION
This chapter will consider a number of epistemological objections to the moderate rationalism outlined in the previous chapter. What qualifies these objections as distinctively epistemological in character is their underlying concern with whether and why rational insight, as characterized in the preceding chapter, can provide epistemic justification for a belief, in the sense specified in 1.1 above: that is, can yield a compelling reason for thinking that the belief in question is true. There can be little doubt that an apparent rational insight provides some sort of reason for believing the proposition in question. A belief arrived at in this way is certainly not merely arbitrary or capricious and may indeed be psychologically compelling to the point of being inescapable. But none of this shows that the believer in question possesses a genuinely epistemic reason for his belief, and it is this that the objections to be considered attempt to call into question.
I have already remarked that despite the widespread conviction that rationalism is untenable, fully developed and articulated objections to rationalism are difficult to find. This is especially true of the epistemological objections that are the subject of this chapter. Thus, while it is unlikely that anyone who has thought very much about the issue of a priori justification will find the general drift of these objections to be utterly unfamiliar, the specific presentations offered here are largely my own attempts to tease out and develop lines of thought that are usually only briefly hinted at in the literature or, more often, in oral discussion (thus the relative dearth of specific citations).
- Type
- Chapter
- Information
- In Defense of Pure ReasonA Rationalist Account of A Priori Justification, pp. 130 - 152Publisher: Cambridge University PressPrint publication year: 1997